Kazakhstan's Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States: Current Status, Structure and Prospects

Marat KENZHETAEV

Researcher

Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies

Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology

In 2000 Kazakhstan was involved in military-technical cooperation (MTC) with 20 coun­tries around the world.¹

In 1998 Kazakh arms exports totaled $12 mil­lion.² According to Bekbulat Baigarin, chairman of the defense industry committee of the Kazakh Ministry of Energy, Industry and Trade, in 1999 "Kazakh defense industry enterprises exported military output worth $13 million… All $13 million were received from Rosvoorouzhenie which had supplied Kazakh enterprises with sub­contracts for its export contracts."³ He said that in 2000 Kazakhstan planned about $20 million in arms exports. However, in reality Kazakh arms exports that year stood at about $15 million.⁴ The share of the main Kazakh government mediator company - Kazspetsexport - was $6.2 million (900 million tenge⁵ ) or a little over 40% of total exports.

In 2001 Kazspetsexport planned to sell materiel worth 3 billion tenge (about $20.6 million).⁶. In the first eight months its export deliveries amounted to $15 million.⁷ There has been no published information about deliveries by other Kazakh arms exporters. The tentative target for Kazspetsexport for 2002 is around $13.7 million (2 billion tenges).⁸

Kazakh arms deliveries in the next few years are likely to amount to $10-30 million a year, though Kazspetsexport CEO Maksat Nauruz­bayev describes $50-100 million as quite realis­tic.⁹ The expansion of cooperation with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine is one of the con­ditions for such growth.

Kazakhstan's MTC can be divided into three groups of partner countries: the Russian Federation, the CIS and others.

Cooperation with Russia

Kazakhstan's military-technical cooperation with Russia relies on the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, the other signatories to which are Arme­nia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On June 20, 2000, the prime ministers of the signa­tory-countries concluded an agreement on the key principles of MTC that established the pro­cedure of delivering military-purpose goods at advantageous terms to the armed formations as­signed by the Collective Security Treaty coun­tries to multilateral forces in collective secu­rity areas. Under the agreement Kazakhstan can acquire Russian armaments at domestic prices set for the Russian army that are only a fraction of export prices. The legislative bodies of signatory-countries, including Kazakhstan and Russia, ratified the agreement in 2000-2001.

MTC with Russia covers the following spheres:

• deliveries of arms and military hardware,

• cooperation in the development and produc­tion of arms and the development of dual pur­pose technologies,

• military purpose services and the joint use of the Baikonur space center.

Arms deliveries

In the 1990s aircraft deliveries constituted the biggest Russian arms transfers to Kazakhstan. They were conducted under the 1995 intergov­ernmental agreements on military and military-technical cooperation by way of compensation for strategic armaments withdrawn from Ka­zakhstan.¹⁰ Russia pledged to deliver 73 combat aircraft to Kazakhstan by the end of 1997, namely:

• 14 Su-25 (Frogfoot) ground attack aircraft,

• 21 MiG-21 (Fishbed) fighters,

• 38 Su-27 (Flanker) air superiority fight­ers/Su-27 combat trainers.

• The first 43 planes were supposed to be deliv­ered in 1995 and the remaining 30 before the end of 1997. The 14 Su-25 ground attack air­craft were transferred in 1996, and 21 MiG-29 (Fulcrum) fighters in 1995-1996, with Russia reporting the export of only 12 MiG-29 aircraft to the UN Register, and Kazakhstan the import of 19 of them in 1995. In following reports nei­ther Russia, nor Kazakhstan (except for 1999) named deliveries of combat aircraft, though such transfers continue to this day.

• Deliveries of Su-27 began in 1996. Initially all 38 aircraft were supposed to be supplied by the end of 1997, however, the leadership of the Russian Air Force resisted that. As a result, ac­cording to different sources, by the end of 2000 10 to 47 Su-27 had been delivered.¹¹ The most likely schedule of supplies was as follows:

• 6 planes (including 2 Su-27UB trainers) in 1996,¹²

• 4 in 1997,¹³

• 10 at the end of 1997 beginning of 1998,¹⁴

• 4 (16) in 1999,¹⁵

• 2 in 2000.¹⁶

Thus the transfer of the 38 aircraft should have been completed in 2000, but apparently only 26 had been delivered by the end of 2000. In addi­tion, there were reports of plans of sending an addi­tional 8 Su-27 in 2001-2002¹⁷ that evidently did not belong to the group planned for delivery under the 1995 "compensation" agreement.¹⁸

Reuters reported that in addition to MiG-29, Su-25 and Su-27, Kazakhstan also received L-39 trainers.¹⁹ However, an analysis of the total number of combat aircraft reported by other sources indicates that these trainers were not in­cluded in the package of 73 combat aircraft.²⁰ The number of trainers was not disclosed, but according to different estimates, 8 to 12 L-39 trainers were transferred in 1996-2000.

In addition, in 2000-2001 Russia delivered one Il-76MD (Candid) military freight aircraft²¹ and one Tu-134Sh and one Tu-154B air-borne command post.²²

Kazakhstan is an active member of the CIS uni­fied air defense system, which currently includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. In the framework of the system the air defense forces of participating countries conduct regular joint exercises and practice firing and steadily exchange operational information. In the second half of the 1990s - early 2000 under bilateral agreements Russia delivered two or three S-300 (SA-10) medium range surface-to-air missile systems (the latest in April 2000).²³

In addition to aircraft and air defense systems Russia transferred a significant number of ar­mored vehicles: 55 BMP-2 armored fighting ve­hicles, 63 T-72 main battle tanks and 10 BTR-80 wheel armored personnel carriers decommis­sioned from the Russian Armed Forces.²⁴ Ka­zakhstan is also known to have imported a cer­tain amount of small arms and ammunition from Russia. For instance, in 2000 the Novosibirsk Instrument Making Plant signed a $0.5 million contract for the delivery of sights to Kazakhstan.²⁵

Besides, in the late 1990s Kazan Helicopters de­livered Mi-8MTV (Hip) helicopters upgraded to the VIP MTV-1C modification for the president of Kazakhstan and equipped with a global navi­gation system. The Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant in cooperation with the Ural Optical & Mechanical Plant is planning to upgrade the helicopters of the Kazakh border service in 2001-2002.²⁶

According to the Russian Agency for Conven­tional Armaments, in the first half of 2000 Ka­zakhstan held second place after Belarus among CIS countries in imports from the association's companies.

One should also mention Russian deliveries to the Kazakh coast guard which is part of the border guard service. In January 1996 the De­fense Ministries of the two countries reached an understanding on two minesweepers and two pa­trol craft.²⁷ No information about deliveries or dates followed, though later reports said that in 2000 the minesweepers and patrol craft be­longed to the Kazakhstan flotilla.²⁸ Russian me­dia reports say Russia transferred to Kazakhstan five ships to enhance the local coast guard.²⁹ It also promised Kazakhstan to help acquire more ships, examine the coastal infrastructure and upgrade it.

There is actually no information available about supplies of Kazakh military-purpose end prod­ucts to Russia. Only in 1995 2 MiG-29 fighters and 4 Su-24M bombers³⁰ are known to have been delivered to Russia evidently with the purpose of re-export to third countries.

On the whole an analysis of Russian deliveries to Kazakhstan indicates that up-to-date expen­sive aircraft and air defense hardware constitute the major share of Kazakh arms imports. This il­lustrates the idea the Kazakh Defense Ministry had of potential military threats to national security in the 1990s. The ministry evidently be­lieved that the main threat to Kazakhstan's ter­ritorial integrity and independence came from a potential large-scale armed conflict with one or two countries armed with modern fighters and bombers. The fact that unlike some other former Soviet republics or East European countries Ka­zakhstan did not sell combat capable armored vehicles on a large scale in the 1990s but on the contrary imported them from Russia indicates that in the opinion of the Kazakh military, the potential adversary had a bigger fleet of tanks and armored vehicles.

Following the appearance of new threats in 2000-2001 (terrorism, instability in Afghanistan, a certain deterioration of relations with Uzbeki­stan) the Kazakh defense and security agencies have realized that a large-scale armed conflict with a super power is much less likely than terrorism or instability in Kazakhstan and/or in neighboring nations. In these condi­tions a certain change has clearly occurred in the immediate and medium-term priorities³¹ in arms purchases in favor of weaponry for low/medium intensity warfare: communication and command systems, light weapons and small arms, equipment for task forces and border guards. Purchases and upgrading of helicopters and frontline bombers can be added here. The restructuring of the Kazakh Armed Forces and reports of talks and contracts with Russian companies in 2000-2001 go to prove the point.

The joint development and production of arms, development of dual-purpose technologies

Even though in the 1990s the demand of both Russian and Kazakh arms manufacturers for components from CIS countries slumped, the degree of their cooperation remained high. While in the mid-1990s some 13-14 Kazakh de­fense plants cooperated with their Russian coun­terparts, in 2001-2002 20 companies are sup­posed to contribute to the production of weaponry for Russia.

At the end of 2000 Russia and Kazakhstan de­cided to set up a bilateral commission for MTC. The commission held its first session in January 2001. The commission is developing a joint pro­gram of MTC and also a program of Russian and Kazakh arms exports to third countries. To this end intensive talks were held in Moscow and Astana throughout last year on cooperation agreements, on the list of products to be devel­oped and produced and on orders to be placed at Kazakh military industrial facilities. Accord­ing to Kazakh officials, there is evident mutual benefit in Russian-Kazakh joint arms production because "Kazakhstan has a sufficient scientific and production potential for the manufacture of rocket armaments, radar equipment and means of electronic reconnaissance." It also turns out a long list of other military equipment: small arms, torpedoes, sea mines, sweeps, communica­tion and jamming systems.

The mutual deliveries of components and equipment are conducted under several inter­governmental agreements and inter-state pro­grams on MTC, primarily the Concept of the Program of MTC of CIS Member-Countries and the Statute on the Order of Organizing and Re­pairing Armaments and Military Hardware at Repair Facilities of the Defense Ministries of CIS Member-Countries.³²

Military services, joint use of Baikonur space center

The present status of Baikonur space center is defined in the 1994 agreement between the Rus­sian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the key principles and conditions of its use that put an end to numerous disputes between the sides over the ownership, status and oper­ating principles of the biggest Soviet military and civilian space infrastructure facility.³³ However, the form of rent remains a stumbling block. Under the agreement Russia leased the space center for 20 years with the possibility of prolonging the lease after the expiration of the first 20-year term.³⁴ The agreement set the rent at $115 million per annum. However, due to the energetic resistance of the Russian Finance Ministry the talks on the financial side of the agreement dragged out for four more years. Rus­sia insisted on automatically writing off the rent from Kazakhstan's foreign debt, while Kazakh­stan wanted Russia to pay it annually. A certain compromise was reached only at the end of 1998. On October 13 the sides signed a bilateral agreement in Almaty on settling mutual finan­cial questions. Under the agreement Russia's overdue rent Baikonur for 1994-1998 and the rent for the use of military test sites in 1997-1998 were taken into account in swapping the debts of Russia and Kazakhstan. Mutual debts to the tone of $1,691.7 million were settled (see Table 1). Further rent payments for Baikonur and the test sites will be unrelated to the mu­tual debts of the sides, i.e. Russia pledged to regularly pay the entire rent for Baikonur in money and has done that since 2000. As for the dropout year of 1999 the sides agreed that $65 million would be covered by Russian commodity deliveries and $50 million paid.

The use of military test sites is regulated by four agreements signed in 1995: on the condi­tions of using and leasing test ranges in Sary-Shagan and Emba, on the procedure of using the 4th State Central Test Site and the 920th State Flight Test Center of the Russian Defense Ministry. Though the agreements were signed in January 1995, the Russian State Duma ratified them only in 1998.

The size of rent and mechanism of settlements were also a subject of lengthy negotiations. Russia's overdue rent for the test ranges accrued by the end of 1998 was written off in the debt swap (see Table 1), and beginning with 1999 Russia has been making payments in keeping with lease agreements. The lease of the four above-mentioned sites costs Russia $27.5 million a year, $3 million of which is paid and $24.3 million covered with deliveries of armaments and military hardware and the training of Ka­zakh officers at Russian military educational institutions.

At the test ranges and battlegrounds Russia fine-tunes and tests conventional arms systems for its own needs and for foreign contractors³⁵ , as well as strategic arms systems for the Russian Armed Forces.³⁶         .

Table 1. Debt swap between Kazakhstan and Russia

Russia's debts	Years	Value, $ mln	Kazakhstan's debts	Years	Value, $ mln
Lease of Baikonur	1994-98	575	Technical loans	1992-93	1,250
Lease of military test grounds	1997-98	55	Overdue loan interest	1993-98	123.1
Compensation of Kazakhstan's expenses and losses on Baikonur maintenance	1992-93	1,318	Government loan	1993	68
Compensation of Kazakhstan's expenses and losses on maintenance of military test sites	1992-96	137.5	Kazcontract debts for Roscontract commodity deliveries	1993	136.6
			Kazakhstanenergo debts to Russian UES for electricity deliveries	1994-96	99.6
Debts of Kazakh railways to Russian railways and companies for cargo and passenger transportation and services	1997-98	14.4
Total		2,085.5	Total		1,691.7
Russia's spending on the revival of Baikonur capital assets	1992-93	- 393.8
Total		1,691.7	Total		1,691.7

Cooperation with other countries

CIS countries

Kazakhstan has been delivering arms to CIS countries on a very small scale. There are only a few known cases of Kazakh arms exports to CIS countries over the past decade: the transfer of an experimental sample of the S-300P (SA-10) SAM system in 1996 and an unidentified amount of armored vehicles in 1999-2000 to Belarus³⁷ , the delivery of 7.62 millimeter PKT tank machine guns to Ukraine³⁸ and 8 MiG-25 fighters to Azerbaijan in 1998.³⁹

USA

So far US arms supplies to Kazakhstan have been small scale. Under the US Foreign Mili­tary Sales program agreements on arms deliv­er­ies to Kazakhstan totalled $1.782 million in 1998 f.y. and $2.43 million in 2000.⁴⁰ Under the program of Direct Commercial Sales Ameri­can arms manufacturers were issued li­censes for the delivery of defense output to Kazakhstan for $3,000 in 1994 f.y., $55,000 in 1995 f.y., $6,559,000 in 1996 and $51,000 in 1997.⁴¹

The list of sales of American military purpose goods included six patrol boats (the first was delivered in 1994⁴², the second in 1997⁴³). Be­sides, under the Excess Defense Articles pro­gram the United States was supposed to transfer the Balsam class ocean-going tender WLB-397 Mariposa decommissioned from the US Navy worth $760,000, however, in 1999 the deal was frozen.⁴⁴ The same year Kazakhstan imported US automatic rifles for $45,000.⁴⁵

In general the Kazakh side is ready to acquire US arms at advantageous terms, however, local experts believe that in the framework of such aid the United States will hardly supply Ka­zakhstan with the up-to-date armaments it needs.⁴⁶ There have been no reports of any con­crete talks on American aid in the framework of the US operation in Afghanistan.

Germany

At the end of 1991 - beginning of 1992 Kazakh­stan sold to the Bundeswehr 500 large-caliber machine guns for $7.5 million.⁴⁷ The type of machine gun was not reported but evidently it was the 12.7 mm NSV/NSVT or peihaps NSVP-UPM-170.

In its turn in 1995-1996 Kazakhstan received one patrol boat from Germany.⁴⁸

Turkey

According to official sources, in 1999 Kazakh­stan received one TGG-AB-32 (P-132) patrol boat from Turkey.⁴⁹ In 2001 the General Staff of the Turkish Armed forces opened a military technical office in Astana. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Kazakh Armed Forces Yuri Kurmatov told the press that "the task of the new institution is to coordinate the military co­operation between the defense agencies of Ka­zakhstan and Turkey." The military-technical representative of the Turkish General Staff in Kazakhstan said: "Ankara is ready to contribute to the reformation and modernization of the Ka­zakh Armed Forces, including its Navy." The Turkish-Kazakh defense cooperation program until 2010 provides for assistance to Kazakhstan to the sum of $10 million which should be spent on the acquisition of automobiles for task forces, military hardware, dual purpose goods and also on the purchase and upgrading naval vessels.

Yugoslavia

Several sources claim that in 1995 Kazakhstan sold 57 Igla man portable SAM (SA-18) and 226 9M313 rockets to them for $19 million to Yugoslavia.⁵⁰ However, in the first place, the delivery was in fact conducted by the Russian Voyentekh company, secondly, it was reportedly illegal.⁵¹

In 1998 during the interval between the lifting and reintroduction of a UN embargo on arms de­liveries to former Yugoslavia Kazakhstan be­came the first exporter to transfer a batch of 12 decommissioned BTR-80 wheel armored carrier vehicles to Macedonia.⁵²

China

Kazakhstan's MTC with China is limited due to their traditionally complicated relations as well as other reasons. Nevertheless, closer coopera­tion with China may be expected in the near fu­ture, primarily Chinese imports of Kazakh products. The most likely contracts would be for armaments for the Chinese Navy, for in­stance, weaponry for the Russian-delivered die­sel submarines of the Kilo class. Kazakhstan has sufficient production capacities for that. Several Kazakh plants manufacture submarine torpedoes and equipment. This is confirmed by reports of several contacts between high-ranking govern­ment and military officials of the two countries, including talks between the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staffs of the Kazakh Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army of China. Back in 1997 Kazakh Defense Minis­ter Mukhtar Altynbayev said: "Kazakhstan con­tinues to implement a contract for the delivery of torpedoes for naval vessels to China signed back in Soviet times."⁵³ The press also reported Kazakh deliveries of VA-111 Shkval high-speed torpedoes to China in 1999. At a Moscow news conference in February 2000 Bekbulat Baigarin, chairman of the defense industry committee of the Kazakh Ministry of Energy, Industry and Trade, said that in 1999 the exports of the Ka­zakh military-industrial complex (including Shkval torpedoes) were conducted through the Russian arms trader Rosvoorouzhenie that had provided Kazakh companies with subcontracts for its own export contracts.⁵⁴

North Korea

Kazakh arms deliveries to North Korea were ac­companied by rather loud scandals that spoiled Kazakhstan's image on the international arena. There are two known major arms deals with North Korea. The first was concluded in 1995 when the Kazakh Ulan company signed a $500,000 contract⁵⁵ with the North Korean Ministry for the People's Armed Forces and the same year delivered 24 100-mm KS-19 anti-air­craft guns, four SON-9 (Fire Can) fire control radar stations and a significant amount of artil­lery ammunition.⁵⁶

The second contract for approximately $8 mil­lion for 40 MiG-21 fighters was signed in 1998, and the planes delivered the following year. The decision to sell excess outdated warplanes was made in 1996. The Kazakh government is­sued a resolution on the exportation of 133 MiG-21 aircraft decommissioned from the na­tional Air Force.⁵⁷ It expected that the sales would bring about $28 million to state coffers.

In April 1998 Almaty hosted an exhibition of weaponry and other of Kazakh defense products. In addition to military and civilian goods manu­factured by Kazakh plants it featured various samples of weaponry from army stocks: Mi-8 multi mission helicopters, radars and air defense systems, MiG-21 and MiG-25 (Foxbat) fighters. On the last day of the exhibition Deputy De­fense Minister Amangeldy Kozhibayev an­nounced that India was planning to buy 40 MiG fighters in Kazakhstan.⁵⁸ However, no reports of a contract with India followed.

The first true customer appeared in autumn 1998 - Agroplast Company from the Czech Re­public offered to buy 40 MiGs for $200,000 apiece. The contract was signed on October 14, 1998. Metallist plant was the Kazakh operator of the contract. Under an October 1, 1998 agreement between the Kazakh Defense Minis­try and Metallist, the fighters were transferred to the account of the plant. In March 1999 an An-124 Ruslan freight aircraft carrying six dis­sembled MiG-21 fighters was arrested at Baku airport. Even though Bratislava was named as the official destination, there were suspicions that the planes could have been on their way to either North Korea or Bosnia. After an investi­gation the MiGs were returned to Kazakhstan and the An-124 released. In summer 1999 33 MiG-21 fighters were sent from Taldy-Kurgan by rail to North Korea via China. A new scan­dal broke out, this time initiated by South Ko­rea.⁵⁹ North Korea flatly denied the importation of the fighters or any contacts with Kazakhstan on the issue.⁶⁰ When Kazakhstan found itself under strong political pressure from the United States, it missed the chance of defending its in­terests given the absence of a tough stance of its leadership and the lack of professionalism of its diplomats.

Sri Lanka

According to SIPRI, in 1995 Sri Lanka signed a contract with Kazakhstan on the lease of 4 An-24 (Coke) transport planes that were delivered the following year. In keeping with the deal the planes are operated by Kazakh crews.

Pakistan

Unconfirmed reports say that in 1997-1998 Ka­zakhstan signed several contracts on arms deliv­eries to Pakistan: T-62 tanks, spares to them and 12.7 mm NSVT machine guns.⁶¹

The government-owned news channel Khabar reported that since 1999 Kazspetsexport has been planning to sell 40 Su-27 air superiority fighters to Pakistan. The price of the contract was estimated at $4 billion.⁶² Though the finan­cial parameters look greatly exaggerated, a con­tract with Pakistan seems highly likely. Paki­stan greatly lags behind India in the standard of its aviation and needs modern warplanes. Other major aircraft-makers have either refused to en­ter any deals with Pakistan, for instance Russia, the United States and West European countries, or have been unable to fully satisfy Pakistan's needs (the quality and combat effectiveness of Chinese war planes is greatly inferior to Ameri­can, West European or Russian). Thus, a possi­ble contract with Kazspetsexport could be an optimal solution, because Su-27 fighters are su­perior in combat capability to what the Chinese can offer.

UAE

According to official reports, in 1996 Kazakh­stan delivered 2 combat armored vehicles marked as "export models" to the United Arab Emirates⁶³ and approximately in 1997-1998 im­ported 6 patrol boats for $54,000 apiece for its Customs Committee.⁶⁴

Iran

In summer 1997 the media reported that Ka­zakhstan was planning to sell and had even signed a contract with Iran for the delivery of three batteries of S-300PMU medium range SAM systems and over 100 5V55R/48N6E mis­siles to them.⁶⁵ The contract was estimated at $90 million and the money had allegedly been transferred to Almaty. According to the Wash­ington Times, Kazakhstan continued to fulfill the contract despite numerous protests from the US embassy in Almaty, but implementation was blocked by China which banned the flights of planes carrying missile systems over its terri­tory, because it regarded neighboring Kazakhstan as a competitor in arms sales to Iran. Kazakh of­ficials flatly denied all such reports. Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbayev said that firstly, Kazakhstan did not manufacture such systems, secondly, it had only one such system at its dis­posal and was using it in the air defense of Al­maty, thirdly, the systems were in short supply and too expensive, and that Kazakhstan would be willing to acquire them itself and planned to do so in the future.⁶⁶ There were no reports later to confirm such deliveries. It is quite pos­sible that even if there had been any negotia­tions, firstly, must have been suspended, and secondly, they must have involved Russian rep­resentatives, because Kazakhstan really does not have the necessary number of the missile sys­tems to sell any to Iran.

African countries

Official sources say that in 1998 Kazakhstan de­livered 4 122-mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers and 4 122-mm D-30 towed howit­zers.⁶⁷ In 1999 Kazakhstan additionally trans­ferred 24 similar howitzers and the same number of 122-mm M-46 artillery guns.⁶⁸

In 1999 Kazakhstan supplied the Congo with two 122-mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers.⁶⁹

According to some sources, in April 2000 then CEO of Kazspetsexport Talgat Ibrayev signed a $1.8 million contract for the transfer of "D-30 long-range recoilless guns" to Ethiopia.⁷⁰ The government-owned channel Khabar con­firmed the sale in a report on the investigation of the case and court ruling on Ibrayev's succes­sor E. Koshkarov. "A certain Golden Investment Ltd. Company is mentioned in the case as a me­diator in the deal on the sale of guns and shells to Ethiopia," the news report said.⁷¹

¹ Nikolai Fomin, Vitaly Khlyupin, "Oruzheinye skan­daly v Kazakhstane," Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 25, 14.06.2000.

² Vitaly Voloshin, "Ne stoit progibatsya pod iz­menchivyi mir", Continent, No. 2 (15), January 26 - February 8, 2000.

³ Mikhail Kozyrev, "Vertolyoty v obmen na kosmos," Vedomosti, 16.02.2000.

⁴ "Kazakhstan i Rossia obsuzhdayut voprosy postavok VVT", INFO-TASS electronic database, Vega base, 03.10.2001.

⁵ Report of Kazspetexport General Director M.Naruzbayev on 2000 results and plans for 2001; "Armiya sevodnya i zavtra", Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 16.01.2001; "Kazakhstan nameren realizovat voen­nuyu tekhniku na summu 3 mlrd tenge - glava Kazspetsexporta", Kazakhstan today, 12.01.2001.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Kazakh Deputy Defense Minister Zhanat Ertlesova says: "Kazakhstan will sell arms for over $13 million in 2002," Kazakhstan today, 17.10.2001.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "Kazakh state arms exporter to improve its work", BBC, 17.05.2001.

¹⁰ 40 Tu-95MS strategic bombers (27 Tu-95MS6 and 13 Tu-95MS16).

¹¹ According to Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (16.03.2001) "18 Su-27 have been delivered"; in a number of his articles on Kazakhstan in 1999-2000 Yu. Golotyuk stated that "Russia has already delivered one Su-27 regiment" to other "two air force regi­ments." In the article "Takaya raketa nuzhna samomy" (Izvestia, 15.12,1999) Golotyuk says: "30 more air­craft of this type should be added to the 47 Su-27 fighters already received from the northern neighbor…two full-fledged fighter regiments."

¹² SIPRI Arms Transfer Register 1997; VTS of 25.11.1996; VTS No. 44, 1997 (reference to Mosk­ovsky Komsomolets); Reuters report, 31.10.1997.

¹³ Statements of Russian and Kazakh Defense Minis­ters Igor Sergeyev and Mukhtar Altynbayev at the end of October 1997; Reuters reports of October 29 and 31, 1997; INFO-TASS electronic database, Vega base, 29.10.1997; VTS, No. 22, 1997, p.47, ITAR-TASS; RIA-Novosti, 30.10,1997; CDI report, 29.10.1997.

¹⁴ Military Balance 1999-2000, IISS; CDI report, 29.10.1997; Reuters, 31.10.1997.

¹⁵ According to the press service of the Kazakh De­fense Ministry, in January 1999 4 Su-27 were trans­ferred and 12 more were supposed to be transferred before the end of the year; Izvestiya, 26.01.1999; the U.N. Register - 1999 was notified of the importation of four Su-27S - evidently the additional delivery of 12 aircraft in 1999 did not materialize.

¹⁶ Trud, 01.02.2000.

¹⁷ Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 16.0-3.2001; Vremya PO, 22.08.2000.

¹⁸ Which is indirectly confirmed by Vedomosti: "De­liveries by way of rent [for Baikonur] cannot fully satisfy the needs of Kazakhstan for Russian arms. As Vedomosti was told by Rosvoorouzhenie the agreement between the Russian arms mediator and Kazakhspet­sexport [evidently Kazspetsexport] also implies deliv­eries of military hardware to Kazakhstan for foreign currency. As Vedomosti has found out, several Su-27 and a batch of armored vehicles are in question…", Mikhail Kozyrev, "Vertolyoty v obmen na kosmos", Vedomosti, 16.02.2000.

¹⁹ Reuters, 31.10.1997.

²⁰ Evidently the notion of combat trainer aircraft was misinterpreted and Su-27UBs were replaced by L-39 aircraft.

²¹ Mikhail Kozyrev, "Vertolyoty v obmen na kos­mos", Vedomosti, 16.02.2000.

²² Trud, 01.02.2000.

²³ Mikhail Kozyrev, "Vertolyoty v obmen na kos­mos", Vedomosti, 16.02.2000.

²⁴ SIPRI Yearbook. According to SIPRI, the deliver­ies were made in 1996.

²⁵ INFO-TASS database, Vega base, 12.10.2000.

²⁶ Helicopter repairs, upgrading of onboard radars and electronic equipment, installation of gyrostabilizing optic systems; report of an expert group led by Ye. I Ruzhitsky, Itogi 5go Mezhdunarodnogo aviatsionno-kosmicheskogo salona MAKS-2001; INFO-TASS da­tabase, Vega base, 24.09.2001; VTS, #39, September 24-30, 2001.

²⁷ Reuters, 31.10.1997; VTS, #44, 1997, p. 47.

²⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies.

²⁹ Vladimir Mukhin, "Kazakhstan formiruyet voy­enno-morskiye sily", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 07.08.2001.

³⁰ Data reported by Kazakhstan to the UN Register.

³¹ But not full reorientation. According to Kazakh De­fense Ministry officials, "the military doctrine of Ka­zakhstan implies that the development of a complete air defense system of the country is one of the greatest priorities…". "The first stage of implementing the government program of advancing armaments is slated for fiscal 2002. Full-scale implementation will begin in 2005…". "Tens of millions of dollars" are to be spent to this end. Report of Deputy Defense Minister of Ka­zakhstan Gosman Amrin; INFO-TASS database, Vega base, 19.02.2001.

³² According to the statute the materiel was supposed to be sent for repairs without license under military passes without the payment of customs duties or other fees.

³³ The Russian State Duma ratified the agreement on 21.06.1994.

³⁴ To be more exact, after the expiration of "the term of December 10, 1994 lease agreement for Baikonur space center between the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan" that "shall be prolonged by 10 years, if neither side declares by written notification its intention to terminate this agreement no later than six months before its expira­tion."

³⁵ For instance, the September 1997 tests of the Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly) short range surface-to-air missile system exported from Russia to Finland.

³⁶ October 1998 - check tests of Tu-160 (Blackjack) bombers with the X-65 missile; May 2001 - tests of a new missile defense system for the Russian Strategic Rocket Force.

³⁷ About 50 vehicles that Belarus later re-exported to third countries.

³⁸ Evidently in the framework of the Pakistani tank contract.

³⁹ According to the Kazakh report to the UN Register 1998.

⁴⁰ DSCA Factbook 2000.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² G. Kovalyov, "U pogranichnikov ploskostopye, no narushitelei oni lovyat", Karavan-Blits, 19.12.1994.

⁴³ Military Balance 1999-2000, IISS.

⁴⁴ Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

⁴⁵ www.nisat.org.

⁴⁶ Interview with senior Kazakh official.

⁴⁷ Mikhail Ustiugov, "An Embarrassment of Weap­ons", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1993, pp. 48-50.

⁴⁸ Andrei Grozin, Vitaly Khlyupin, "Natsionalnaya bezopasnost Kazakhstana, problemy i perspektivy", 1999, reference to the article by V. Mukhin "Kazakh­stan ukreplyayet voyennoye prisutsviye na Kaspii", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19.05.1998.

⁴⁹ UN Register of Conventional Arms 1999;Vladimir Mukhin, "Kazakhstan formiruyet voenno-morskiye sily", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 07.08.2001, p.5.

⁵⁰ SIPRI Yearbook 1996; according to some media reports the deal costs $2-3 million, see Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, #23, 1997.

⁵¹ In October 1995 former defense minister Gen. Va­lery Sapsai and Col. Zhailaubai Sadybekov were sen­tenced to prison terms for "illegal sale of materiel for $2 million," OMRI Daily Digest, 24.10.1995.

⁵² UN Register of Conventional Arms 1998; SIPRI Yearbook 1999.

⁵³ Interfax-Kazakhstan, 14.06.1997; Eksport obychnykh vooryzheniyi, #6-7 (14-15), June-July 1997, Tsentr PIR.

⁵⁴ Mikhail Kozyrev, "Vertolyoty v obmen na kos­mos", Vedomosti, 16.02.2000.

5⁵ Nikolai Fomin, Vitaly Khlyupin, "Oruzheinye skandaly v Kazakhstane', Nezavisimoe voennoe oboz­renie, #25, 14.07.2000.

⁵⁶ SIPRI Yearbook 1996.

⁵⁷ Vitaly Voloshin, "Ne stoit progibatsya pod iz­menchivyi mir", Continent, #2 (15), January 26 - Feb­ruary 8, 2000.

⁵⁸ CDI, 01.05.1998; CNN news, "Kazakhs Say India Wants to Buy 40 Old MiG fighters"; Reuters, 29.04.1998.

⁵⁹ Daniyar Kireyev, "Severanaya Koreya kupila nem­nozhko MiG-21", Izvestiya, 01.09.1999.

⁶⁰ The delivery of Kazakh MiGs to North Korea has never been proven.

⁶¹ Andrei Grozin, "Kazakhstan i mirovoi rynok oruyzhiya: problemy i perspektivy, kak, chem i protiv kogo mozhet voyevat suverennyi Kazakhstan", Insti­tute for CIS Countries, July 2000.

⁶² Key defendant in the Ibrayev case sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. Khabar, 23.02.2001.

⁶³ UN Register of Conventional Arms 1996.

⁶⁴ Andrei Grozin, Vitaly Khlyupin, "Nationalnaya be­zopasnost Kazakhstana, problemy i perspektivy", 1999 referring to articles by V. Bakursky, "Pochyom titaniki iz Dubayev?", Karavan, 22.05.1998 and by S. Kozlov, "Pervoye porazheniye Kazakhstana na more", Nezav­isimaya gazeta, -2.06.1998.

⁶⁵ Radio Mayak, 05.06.1997; Eksport obychnykh vooryzheniyi, #6-7 (14-15), June-July 1997, Tsentr PIR; "Kazakhstan zaklyuchil kontrakt po prodazhe Iranu zenitnykh raketnykh kompleksov", INFO-TASS database, Vega base, 05.06.1997; VTS #24, June 9-15, 1997; ITAR-TASS quotes the Washington Times; all sources refer to US special services.

⁶⁶ "Alma-Ata kategoricheski oprovergayet informat­siyu o prodazhe Iranu ZRK S-300", Interfax-Kazakh­stan, 09.06.1997; Eksport obychnykh vooryzheniyi, #6-7 (14-15), June-July 1997, Tsentr PIR.

⁶⁷ UN Register of Conventional Arms 1998.

⁶⁸ UN Register of Conventional Arms 1999.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Anatoly Akimov, "Strana beskontrolnogo oruz­heinogo biznesa", Vremya PO, 22.08.2000; Vitaly Khlyupin, "Torgovlya oruzhiyem po-kazakhsky", Soldat udachi, November 2000. Both articles abound in technical mistakes such as the quoted "recoilless D-³⁰ artillery guns."

⁷¹ Key defendant in the Ibrayev case sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. Khabar, 23.02.2001.