Russian Air Defense Weapons Have No Serious Competitors

Interview with Vitaly Nosov, Director of Air Defense Department of Rosoboronexport.

What is the share of air defense weapons in overall Rosoboronexport export deliveries?

Traditionally the share of aircraft in Russian arms exports exceeds 60% while the share of air defense systems is fewer than 15%. The assess­ment is quite realistic. If you take figures for the past five years, the share of air defense weapons, radioelectronic systems and means of communications has ranged from 8 to 25%.

What countries are the biggest recipients of Russian air defense systems? What countries are the most promising for future promotion of air defense systems?

It is common knowledge that our traditional, long-standing partners - China and India - are also the biggest buyers of Russian air defense weapons. As for prospects, I would want to say that we are open to all countries with which the Russian Federation engages in military-technical coopera­tion (MTC). I would not want to divide countries into promising and not because the speed of pro­moting Russian air defense systems on foreign arms markets depends after all mainly on the aspi­rations and needs of potential clients which in their turn stem from a big number of factors. However, it should be noted that we work quite closely with countries in the Middle East and also several nations in North Africa. The future will show which countries prove the most promising from the viewpoint of promoting Russian systems.

Which Russian air defense systems are cur­rently in demand?

I would want to draw your attention to the fact that Russia was and remains one of the few coun­tries in the world that develops, manufac­tures and exports the entire range of air defense systems, i.e. radars, automatic control systems, air defense ar­tillery and missile systems for any altitudes and ranges. For this very reason Russia is a very at­tractive partner for countries that need to deploy all-round air defense groups in their territories or upgrade the existing forces because we can offer systems for various pur­poses that complement each other and can be easily integrated in the existing air defense of a foreign client. As our foreign part­ners know per­fectly well that only a comprehen­sive air de­fense system can be effective they rarely show interest in only one air defense weapon. They are in fact interested in our entire air defense product range. Knowing this Rosoboronexport in its turn offers potential buyers the latest air de­fense systems many of which have no analogs in the world: S-300PMU2 Favorit (SA-10B), S-300PMU1 (SA-10), S-300VM Antei-2500 (SA-12), Buk-M1-2 (SA-11), Tor-M1 (SA-15), Tun­guska-M1 (SA-19), Igla (SA-18) and several oth­ers. It is a different matter what systems and in what amounts a country can afford to ac­quire. For the sake of justice it must be noted that there is stable demand for S-300PMU1, Tor-M1 and Igla compared to other systems.

Does the Chinese FT-2000 air defense missile system, which the foreign media describe as an analogue and clone of S-300SMU1, pose any threat to the promotion of the Russian system on world markets?

I do not intend to evaluate the abovementioned Chinese system because the information avail­able about it is too scanty and does not permit a proper assessment. However, even the facts that the de­signers of FT-2000 have reported at inter­national arms markets permit to conclude that the system is not an analogue or clone of the Russian S-300PMU1 at all because it relies on other techni­cal principles and methods of com­bat. The Chinese FT-2000 is advertised as an anti-radiation missile employing passive discov­ery, direction finding and homing of air targets. As its main targets are (group and individual) electronic jamming aircraft and other radio fre­quency radiating targets, it is evidently an aux­iliary weapon for air defense sys­tems with a broader range of air attack tasks. Evidently the Chinese military and engineers de­veloping FT-2000 took into account the combat experience in Iraq and Yugoslavia.

The launcher and missile of the Chinese system look very much like corresponding elements of S-300PMU1 prompting the assumption that tech­nologies may have been borrowed. How­ever, the likeness in appearance should not mis­lead experts.

Is there still any chance of advancing S-300V (S-300VM) systems on the market?

Those chances never disappeared. The interest of potential buyers in the said systems has never waned. The unique combat and maintenance pa­rameters of these missile systems give reason to hope in their successful advancement on foreign arms markets in the future.

Thus, today S-300VM Antei-2500 is a system of resisting medium and short range ballistic mis­siles launched from a distance of 2,500 kilome­ters and less, and it should be in demand in countries fac­ing ballistic threats and planning to develop non­strategic missile defense systems.

Is there any objective reason for the present situation when manufacturers (Antey Con­cern, Instrument Building Design Bureau, Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau) are the main exporters of air defense systems instead of Ro­soboronexport, or is this a re­sult of subjective decisions?

I would not be so categorical. All of us together are the main exporters of Russian-made air de­fense systems. We have established normal business re­lations with all the abovementioned companies, signed general agreements under which our steps are coordinated on foreign mar­kets.

Can Greece be expected to place a new con­tract for 19 Tor-M1 missile systems that now consti­tute an option? Can the continuation of pur­chases be expected after the delivery of all the 50 systems?

It would be better to direct the question to the heads of Antey Concern. We on our own part will be deeply satisfied, if the Greek purchases of such an effective air defense system as Tor-M1 continue.

At the same time we deem it necessary to con­tinue working with the Greek side to better in­tegrate the delivered Russian-made air defense weapons (S-300PMU1, Tor-M1, Osa surface-to-air missile systems) in the common air defense system of Greece, to replace the IFF equipment to meet the NATO standard adopted in Greece, to supply missing components (radars, auto­matic controlsys­tems, radioelectronic security and passive detec­tion systems) and to upgrade Osa-AKM second generation air defense sys­tems.

Only Rosoboronexport can do this work at a proper standard because Antey is unable to do it in the present conditions.

There has been much talk in the press about the market of upgrading Russian aircraft. What are the prospects of upgrading Soviet-made air de­fense systems delivered to third world countries in the past? Can new con­tracts be expected for upgrading S-125 (SA-3) short range surface-to-air missiles such as the Interstate Financial and Industrial Group "Defense Systems" is currently working on with Egypt?

The state of affairs on the market of upgrading our air defense systems delivered in the past is the following.

The Soviet Union and later Russia exported over 3,000 long, medium and short rage air de­fense missile systems: S-200 (SA-5), S-75 (SA-2), S-125, Krug (SA-4), Kvadrat (SA-6), Osa, Strela 1 (SA-9), Strela 10 (SA-13), over 30,000 portable air de­fense systems, some 190,000 sur­face-to-air missiles, over 60,000 air defense guns, 7,000 radars and 1,500 control systems. As many as 25-32% of them can be upgraded, hence the size of the market is impressive. Therefore the upgrading of air defense systems delivered in the past should be and is a promis­ing direction of Rosoboronexport efforts be­cause it is impossible, primarily for financial rea­sons, to get rid of such quantities of weaponry fast (this is also true of European countries - former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization that are planning to join or have joined NATO).

Institutions and industrial enterprises have com­pleted a number of design and testing opera­tions to upgrade air defense weaponry of the first and second generations at RfP of the De­fense Ministry and Rosoboronexport that acted as the co-customer.

Projects have been completed to upgrade ZSU-23M4 Shilka-M4 self-propelled air defense gun system, ZU-23M air defense gun, Tunguska-M1 short range surface-to-air missile, Strela 10 short range surface-to-air missile, Kvadrat surface-to-air missile, Sborka-M and Ranzhir-M battery com­mand posts, P-18 and P-19 radars. The R&D to upgrade Osa-AKM surface-to-air missile system and Pechora-2 (SA-3 Goa) short-range surface-to-air missile is at its final stage.

In June 2000 we conducted a demonstration field firing of upgraded air defense weapons in Yeisk. Military delegations from six countries having such weapons in their arsenals were in­vited. After the event an express report entitled "Second life to tactical air defense weapons (re­sults of upgrad­ing)" was composed, published and circulated in a number of counties.  In 2001 some upgraded air defense weapons were dem­onstrated at MAKS-2001 international aerospace show.

On the whole the demonstrated upgraded air de­fense system models won high praise from ex­perts from several countries and also "beat" their poten­tial competitors in tenders held which gives hope for greater foreign demand for upgrading weap­onry of Russian (Soviet) make by the Russian military-industrial complex. We have reason to expect certain success in the near future, specifi­cally in the sector of upgrading the Pechora sys­tem you mentioned.

Don't you fear that the leak of technologies to Israel may dent Russia's capability to up­grade Soviet-era air defense systems?

One should accept the fact that the scientific po­tential (partly developed at the thanks to immi­grants from Russia) and production capa­bility of Israeli companies in this sphere are quite high. However, we have held and continue to hold the following viewpoint on question of upgrading So­viet/Russian air defense weapons: if this work is done with the involvement of the Russian side (designers and manufacturers of corresponding equipment), we are an interested side and wel­come this work. Otherwise we warn potential cus­tomers that the Russian side will bear no respon­sibility for the possible negative consequences of such operations and even less so assume to resolve questions arising in the proc­ess of using weaponry upgraded in such way.

How will Rosoboronexport choose the main con­tractor, if new orders are placed for S-300PMU1? Is it more convenient for Rosobo­ronexport to deal thorough Defense Systems group or through Almaz Central Design Bu­reau?

Under acting legislation it is the prerogative of the Russian Agency of Control Systems to de­cide about the cooperation between manufactur­ers in fulfilling a particular contract on air de­fense weaponry as well as to choose the main contrac­tor. And it is convenient for Rosoboron­export to work with any business partner having the neces­sary experience and influence.

Which foreign air defense systems are the great­est competitors of Russian weapons and in what markets? Is there any threat that Is­rael may oust Russia from the promising In­dian market of air and missile defense weapons?

At the moment Russian air defense weapons have no serious competitors thanks to their unique combat and operational parameters and thanks to a very attractive cost effectiveness ra­tio. I would want to believe that none would appear in the foreseeable future because we don't stand still de­veloping advanced air defense systems.

Israel is developing the Arrow system in the framework of nonstrategic missile defense con­cept with the technical and technological sup­port of the United States, however, the missile belongs to close intercepting air defense systems and is infe­rior to the Russian-made S-300VM Antei-2500 and S-300PMU-2 (S-300PMU1) in its combat parame­ters. Besides, Israel does not have the technologies to develop or manufacture missile attack warning systems and subsystems of air defense battle man­agement. Therefore, the threat of Russia being ousted from the market of air and missile defense weapons by Israel is minimal, however, it should be taken into ac­count in future work.

Why do you think the effectiveness of So­viet-made air defense systems in Iraq and Yugoslavia was low? Did it have a negative impact on pro­moting Russian weaponry on world markets? Do air defense systems based on active radars have any future at all? Aren't air defense systems with passive (television, infra-red) sensors or involving bistatitc or multistatic radars more promising?

Let me draw your attention to the fact that during the decades of confrontation Soviet-made air de­fense systems and foreign air attack weap­ons of the same generation were involved in equal com­bat in only two conflicts: in Vietnam in 1965-1972 and in the Middle East in October 1973. For some reason many people have forgot­ten that the per­formance of air defense weapons then was more than impressive. For instance, in 1972 alone So­viet-made air defense weapons in Vietnam shot down over 400 aircraft, 223 of them were F-4 Phantom aircraft and 51 B-52 strategic bombers - the latest in those days. In 10 days of October 1973 Kvadrat SAM systems in Syria alone shot down 64 Israeli aircraft. It was the bad losses of the US Air Force in the skies of Hanoi in 1972 that together with other reasons forced the United States to sign the peace accord.

Arms systems of different generations con­fronted each other in battlefields during the hostilities in Iraq and Yugoslavia: there were the latest air at­tack weapons backed by powerful aerospace re­connaissance weapons and radars on the side of the Western alliance, and air de­fense relying on outdated anti-aircraft missile systems and radars that virtually had no auto­matic control systems, radar battlefield surveil­lance or radioelectronic security means, support from the air or suppres­sion of aviation at air­fields etc., on the other. Be­sides, in some cases the capabilities of the systems were not fully used in combat. There has been a cardinal change recently in requirements to air de­fense systems and weapons, in approaches to ad­vancing air defense and nonstrategic missile de­fense as a whole, therefore no heroic efforts could help either Iraqi or Yugoslav specialists build ef­fective air defense groupings from a stock of old weaponry. Nobody ignores these evident facts, therefore the campaigns in Iraq and Yugo­slavia did not have a negative impact on the ad­vance­ment of Russian air defense weaponry on world markets, on the contrary, they radically spurred interest in it among potential clients.

Responding to the second part of your question I would want to remind you that air defense can be effective, only if it relies on an optimal com­bina­tion of different combat systems, radars, automatic radioelectronic security and radar battlefield sur­veillance systems of varying ranges, altitudes and frequencies, employing dif­ferent means and prin­ciples of discovering, di­recting, tracing targets and homing, including the ones enumerated in your question. A passion for one new direction or com­plete rejection of old and tested principles may have a harmful ef­fect on the stability or ef­fectiveness of air defense as a whole.