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First Steps of Peace Settlement in Afghanistan
Marianna ARUNOVA-SOLOVYEVA
The long drawn-out Afghan conflict has had a negative impact on regional and international security for many years. The Afghan crisis fit closely into the global arc of instability from Kosovo and Macedonia, through the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central, Southwest and South Asia right to the Philippines. But in the second half of the 90s of the last century it began to rapidly take on a new dramatic dimension.
A platform for the trans-border expansion of religious-political extremism began to take shape in the country, rapidly acquiring organizational-political and military structures. Afghanistan's transformation into a support base for international extremism and terrorism was fostered by the effective collapse of state system, the sharp rise in interethnic conflict, and the socioeconomic and cultural deterioration of Afghan society, which was exhausted by more than twenty years of bitter civil war.
The Islamic radicals that based themselves in the country - the al Qaeda (the Base) organization and the Taliban movement - declared that their strategic goal was to forcibly redraw the map of the region according to religious slogans, create a caliphate and subsequently extend this process to other parts of the world, including Russia and other CIS states. Having gained control over a large part of Afghanistan1 and preaching the idea of trans-border expansion, the leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban began to expand contacts with foreign Islamic extremist parties and consolidate Afghan Islamic radicals under a common ideological and organizational command, primarily by creating a network of instruction and training centers, military bases and camps to form a kind of terrorist 'interbrigades.' The key coordinating role in all of this was played by Osama bin Laden, the head of al Qaeda and the World Islamic Front for Jihad2 , and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.
In opting to step up the military confrontation with the Northern Alliance, which represented the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani that was recognized by the world community and was made up mainly of ethnic Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks, the leadership of the Taliban ignored the initiatives of the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and certain countries aimed at pushing the Taliban towards constructive negotiations with Alliance representatives in order to put an end to the bloodshed and form a broadly representative and multiethnic government. The UN Security Council resolutions 1267 of October 15, 1999 and 1333 of December 19, 2000 that voiced the views of the world community also failed to elicit the proper reaction.3
On September 11, 2001 the terrorist attacks were committed in New York and Washington, D.C. The United States blamed al Qaeda and demanded that the Taliban hand over the leaders of this organization. On October 7, 2001 the United States, together with the UK, carried out raids on terrorist targets in Afghanistan, thus declaring the launch of military operations against international terrorism under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom. Many countries took part in it in one way or another.4 A global antiterrorist coalition was formed.
The Bonn agreement and the problems of implementing it
Amid the backdrop of the successfully unfolding anti-terrorist operation, which resulted in the liberation of Kabul from Taliban rule, an inter-Afghan conference was held in Bonn from November 27 to December 5, 2001 under the aegis of the UN. It concluded with the signing of the Agreement On Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions. This document is an inter-Afghan compromise that on the whole reflects the realities that have taken shape in the country. The document lays the foundation for a determined, comprehensive settlement to the Afghan problem, sets out a plan of action for the formation of government structures and creates a temporary - for a period of six months - administration on a coalition basis. The majority of more than 30 ministerial posts went to representatives of the Northern Alliance - United National Front, who in particular took the posts of one vice-premier, ministers of defense, foreign and internal affaires. The posts of prime minister, three vice-premiers and a number of ministers (finance, education, culture and information etc.) were given to the members of the so-called Rome Process - supporters of former King Mohammad Zahir Shah. The principle of multiethnicity was also observed in the formation of the administration: it included Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and representatives of other ethnic groups.
Once six months have passed, in June 2002, a traditional Loya Jirga, or national assembly, will be called to form transitional government bodies for a period of 18 months, and a new constitution will be drafted. After the second transition period expires, another Loya Jirga will be called, the constitution will be passed and permanent government bodies will be formed.
The Bonn accords thus set out a gradual road to ending almost a quarter century of internecine strife and marked the beginning of the Afghan people's movement toward a national consensus and normal civil society. The end result of this process is supposed to be the resurrection of Afghan statehood, the reconstruction of a peaceful, independent and neutral Afghanistan with a responsible national government and predictable political regime.
Building new government structures in the center and locally has not been easy. The consequences of the war, which has left a heavy imprint on the sociopolitical and economic fabric of society, are being felt. The country currently resembles a conglomeration of regions that exist autonomously of the central administration. Separatist sentiments are quite strong among local military and political leaders, who often use existing interethnic friction to their own advantage.
The situation is complicated further by the fact that the process of state building is proceeding amid the continuing military campaign of the international coalition against the remnants of terrorist and Taliban forces. A crippling blow has indisputably been dealt to the military structures of extremists in Afghanistan. But it is apparently still premature to talk about the complete destruction of their ideological and organizational potential. Some concentrations of such forces still remain, including in the provinces of Farah, Helmand and Kandahar. Things have also not been completely quiet in the north, where there have been clashes between the forces of Deputy Defense Minister General Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek, and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim, who is an ethnic Tajik. With interethnic tensions undoubtedly easing, including between Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns, as well as inter-tribal and inter-clan enmities that divided the Pushtun ethnic group itself, the problem lies to a great extent in the inflated personal ambitions of local authorities at various levels. Given the right circumstances they could opt, and in some cases already are, for confrontation with representatives of the new authorities, including on certain issues of state building. All this creates a huge potential for conflict that is extremely difficult to defuse. Afghans are hardly capable of doing this on their own, without the participation, both political and military, of the international community.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), commanded by British General John McCall, began deploying in Kabul on December 22, 2001 in line with UN Security Council resolution 1386. Besides the British, who have taken on a leadership role, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Turkey have confirmed that they will participate in the Force.
The creation of ISAF could become an important element for stabilizing the situation and fostering the speedier post-conflict rebuilding of the country on the condition that its actions precisely comply with UN Security Council arrangements. ISAF is being set up for six months in order to help the interim administration to ensure the security of Kabul and adjoining areas. When this period expires, the UN Security Council will have to decide whether ISAF should continue its tour of duty in Afghanistan.
Given the well-known traits of the Afghan national character and established traditions, the drawn-out presence in the country of foreign armed forces could turn out to be counterproductive. There is no doubt that extremists, exploiting slogans calling for the protection of Afghanistan's sovereignty, will try to take maximum advantage of this factor in order to foment hostility among the population towards all foreigners.
When looking at the balance of forces and the current situation in the country, one must also take into consideration the fact that a considerable number of middle-ranking Taliban leaders and al Qaeda fighters are trying to adapt to the new circumstances in expectation of a revanche in the form of another political structure. In this sense, the situation in the south and east of the country is cause for special concern, as here the Taliban and bin Laden fighters dispersed by the counter-terrorist operation are actively insinuating themselves into the structures of local administrations.
The diversity of the current Afghan political palette seems to require that the antiterrorist coalition perfect the form and methods of its operations in Afghanistan so that the process of eliminating terrorist infrastructure would simultaneously foster the strengthening of Afghan statehood. It seems that an attempt should be made to see that, as the national institutions of government strengthen in the center and locally, full responsibility for solving such problems be assumed by the Afghans themselves.
This is an opportune moment to inject new vigor into the fight to stop the illegal production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan. The new domestic political conditions in the country offer an opportunity to concentrate efforts on eliminating the main reasons for the development of the Afghan narcotics industry using international and domestic administrative and military levers, as well as certain targeted socioeconomic stimuli and incentives.
It seems, however, that stepping up operations in this direction is unlikely to reduce the need in the near future for strengthening the external Afghan anti-narcotics cordon, which will remain the key element in the overall fight against narcotics trafficking.
In summing up the terrorist, extremist and narcotics threats in Afghanistan, there is sufficient reason to state that these dangerous challenges to the interests of the world community are not a thing of the past. In order to prevent their revival once and for all, further multilateral, comprehensive action under the aegis of the UN will undoubtedly be needed.
Need for united action by the international community
It has become a commonplace assertion that after September 11, 2001 the world changed radically. Indeed, we are all witnesses to an unheard-of unity of the world community in the fight against the terrorist threat. Striking examples of this were the cooperation between Russia and the United States in the antiterrorist fight, and measures taken by Pakistani authorities against Islamic radicals. The essence of the changes that have occurred is that the strategic interests of the world community in fighting new challenges and threats, related primarily to the advance of world terrorism and extremism, became clear and palpable, pushing the current situational considerations and tactical calculations of individual countries into the background.
Are these changes irreversible? It seems that the world community's policy in Afghanistan will become one of the first tests of strength for the new atmosphere in international relations.
The models of international relations that have taken root around and regarding Afghanistan are playing a negative role, and will apparently continue to for a long time to come. Since the times of the rivalry between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia in the 19th century, Afghanistan has been a kind of pawn in geopolitical games. In the 20th century this trend, having taken on an unprecedented scale during the Cold War and continuing after its end, has turned the country into a hotbed of international terrorism and extremism, a platform for aggressive actions against neighboring, and not only neighboring states.
Over long years of confrontation, regional and global players have established strong ties with various Afghan political forces, which to a great extent began to act as their agents, the instruments of the corresponding foreign interests.
The revival of this model at the new stage will mean the collapse of the project to transform Afghanistan into a peaceful, neutral state that does not pose a threat to the international community. For the difficulties on this road are so great that they can be overcome only with extremely coherent external efforts.
Of course it would be naive to assume that the countries participating in the current processes in Afghanistan will refrain from exacting political and economic dividends. But it seems one could expect that every one of the foreign players will exhibit a certain restraint when it comes to strengthening his own positions in Afghanistan, assuming common interests to be a priority. Perhaps a kind of code of conduct, even if informal, is required, the essence of which would come down to the formula of "international cooperation, not competition."
Another serious question is ensuring the effective implementation of mechanisms to coordinate the actions of the international community regarding Afghanistan. Among such mechanisms, a central role has been played recently by the UN Security Council itself, which since September last year has adopted several fundamental resolutions on this problem. It seems that in the new situation the Group of Neighbors and Friends of Afghanistan (the Group of 6 plus 2)5 will be called upon to make a more active contribution. The Russian-American working group on counteracting threats originating in Afghanistan, and a similar Russian-Indian body are playing an important role. The Shanghai Organization for Cooperation (SOC), the activities of which have clearly taken a turn towards the problems of antiterrorist security, is capable of making a positive contribution to the resolution of this important problem. In a joint statement adopted on January 7, 2002 at an extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of SOC member countries, among other things it was stressed that the international struggle against terrorism should be pursued with the UN playing a central role, though relying on the relevant regional and national structures.
Issues of economic and humanitarian aid for Afghanistan
It is clear that the resurrection of Afghanistan as a state that will live peacefully with its neighbors and the international community as a whole, and will not in future be a source of threats to regional security and global stability, is impossible without the post-war rebuilding of the country's economy and social infrastructure. Given the complete havoc reigning in the country, this would involve massive economic and humanitarian aid from the international community. Although such aid on its own does not, obviously, guarantee success, it is an absolutely necessary condition of such success.
And the world community is prepared to provide it. The Tokyo donors' conference on January 21-22, 2002 was attended by 61 countries and 21 international organizations. They pledged a combined $4.5 billion in contributions, including $1.8 billion for the current year. The largest obligations were assumed by Japan, the European Union, World Bank and Iran ($500 million each), followed by the United States ($296 million), Saudi Arabia ($220 million), India and Pakistan ($100 million). It was decided that the aid process would be implemented with a central coordinating role played by the UN. However, there is cause for concern over the fact that a number of major donors, including Japan and the United States, prefer to provide aid through bilateral channels.
A comprehensive strategy that sets out precisely the priority areas for international action is clearly needed to help Afghanistan get back on its feet in the shortest possible time.
Russia has voiced a readiness to make its contribution to the common effort to rebuild Afghanistan's economy, especially those sectors that the former Soviet Union played a major role in building.
Representatives of Afghanistan's interim government have asked Russia to study the possibility of participating in the reconstruction of a whole range of infrastructure assets, power, transport and other facilities. All these requests will be considered very carefully so that they could begin to be implemented quickly, harnessing the capabilities of both state and private Russian structures. A list of projects in which Russia would be willing to take an active part is now being compiled.
Russia's Emergency Situations Ministry, in cooperation with certain foreign nongovernmental organizations, successfully carried out the first phase of work on restoring the Salang tunnel, which has already been opened to traffic. The next phase, once the necessary financing is raised, calls for fully restoring year-round traffic through the Salang tunnel, which would give a serious shot in the arm to economic activity in the country, and broaden the possibilities for connecting Afghanistan to regional and global transport infrastructure.
Russia will apparently establish cooperation with Afghanistan in the areas of landmine clearance, humanitarian aid and, possibly, military-technical cooperation. These issues were discussed in detail in February 2002 during a visit to Kabul by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and a visit to Moscow by Afghan Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim.
Afghan officials voiced their interest in Russian help in building the country's armed forces. During the consultations in Moscow, there were discussions on providing Afghanistan aid in military equipment and services for the national armed forces.6 But the amount of Russian-Afghan military-technical cooperation at the present stage is unlikely to be significant given Kabul's limited financial capabilities. It is known that Fahim already has $50 million at his disposable that were provided by the United States for the needs of the national armed forces.7 Turkey is providing another $0.5 million.8 It is most likely that Afghanistan will opt to purchase ammunition, spare parts and service equipment in Russia.
When considering the problem of various types of aid for Afghanistan, one must stress the probability that the more concentrated the international support is, the more critical will be the issue of how to avoid misuse of the funds coming into the country. It is obvious that this will not be easy to do. Standing in the way are a tradition of corruption and self-enrichment at the top, and the lack of a culture of democratic control in society. Another factor is the virtual absence of government administration in the countryside, where real power belongs to field commanders or tribal leaders.
An independent parallel problem is how to avoid instilling a sense of dependence in Afghans, and to support a drive towards the maximum mobilization of internal potential in the interests of the effective utilization of resources coming from outside. The extensive Afghan diaspora abroad undoubtedly has a considerable reserve of qualified personnel, and could make a significant practical contribution to the restoration of a healthy national economy and society.
On the whole, the task of rebuilding Afghanistan seems super-difficult. There are a multitude of various types of dangers and threats, each of which, in essence, is sufficiently serious to spoil the whole process. On the other hand, the whole range of possible scenarios comes down, in our view, to the following alternative. Either the international community preserves the current unity of action in relation to Afghanistan, in which case there is a real chance of turning it with time into a peaceful, more or less prosperous country that does not threaten international security; or short-term interests and the struggle for spheres of influence in Afghanistan again prevail, in which case one can be sure that the world will inevitably again face threats originating from this region.
1 The claim that the Taliban controlled 90% of the country's territory is, in our view, not irrefutable. The Taliban controlled large cities and the roads leading to them. The numerous residents of more remote places, where there were no Taliban garrisons, continued to live by their own laws.
2 Most other religious extremist organizations based in Afghanistan aligned themselves with the World Islamic Front for Jihad, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Its leader, Tahir Yuldosh, was Osama bin Laden's deputy in the World Islamic Front.
3 UN Security Council resolution 1267 demanded that the Taliban surrender bin Laden for prosecution and eliminate infrastructure for training international terrorists; imposed a ban on international flights by Afghan airline Ariana; and froze the bank accounts and foreign assets of the Taliban with the exception of cases related to the provision of humanitarian aid. Resolution 1333 imposed a military embargo on the Taliban. This meant that all states were bound to prevent direct or indirect sales of arms or other materiel to the Taliban, and not to provide advisory assistance on military issues. The money and other financial assets of bin Laden abroad were frozen, and an embargo was also imposed on supplying the Taliban with chemical substances needed to manufacture narcotics.
4 The parameters of Russia's participation in this campaign were set out in the September 24, 2001 statements of President Vladimir Putin. They entail the following: support for the active international cooperation of police forces and special services; readiness to provide Russian airspace for flights by planes carrying humanitarian cargos to the area of the antiterrorist operation; coordination of Russia's position with our allies among Central Asian states; readiness, if necessary, to take part in international search and rescue operations; broadening cooperation with the internationally recognized government of Afghanistan and providing its armed forces with additional aid in the form of arms and military hardware deliveries.
5 The Group includes Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, China, Iran and Pakistan, as well as Russia and the United States.
6 Yuri Golotyuk, "Voennaya taina stala kommercheskoi," Vremya novostei, 13.02.2002.
7 Vadim Solovyev, "Partia afganskogo gostya," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12.02.2002.
8 Ibid.
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