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New Trends in Development of Space Launch Complexes
Vladimir KIRILLOV
The main task currently facing the suppliers of launch services around the world is to cut down service costs. However, the problem cannot be resolved only by reducing the cost of developing and manufacturing launch vehicles (LV). To a significant extent launch service tariffs depend on the construction and operating costs of space launch complexes (SLC). This has a special impact on the price of new commercial LVs that have been developed around the world in large numbers over the past few years.
The recent experience of a large number of space companies has shown that there are two ways to reduce the price of developing and operating an SLC: either to develop a simplified complex out of the existing equipment or make a new one to be used by several types of LV. During the past decade the world has seen the development of both trends.
Heirs of ICBM
The appearance of the first LV was a logical continuation of the development of ballistic missiles. In the second half of the 1950s the USSR and the USA made their first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that were later reworked into launch vehicles for spacecraft. Altered SLC of ICBM prototypes were used to launch these LV at test ranges that later evolved into space centers: Baikonur, Plesetsk and KapustinYar in the USSR; Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Edward Air Base in the USA. The price of developing the launch complexes for the first LV did not matter because all of them were designed and manufactured at the expense of the state.
These SLC were built primarily with an eye on personnel and equipment safety requirements in tests. The designer companies had little information about the processes taking place during the launch of big rockets and this resulted in unjustifiably inflating the size of exhaust gas chutes and underestimating the SLC service life. Thus, the first SLC for R-7 (SS-6) ICBM (the entire family of Vostok, Voskhod and Soyuz LV was later developed on its basis) had an initial service life of merely 10 launches. Baikonur and Plesetsk currently have six launchers for this type of LV that have been used in more than 1,500 launches. And none of the complexes has been rebuilt; only their equipment has been repaired.
The distinctive feature of the launch complexes for the first Soviet ICBM was that they were designed for combat duty as well as for military-space purposes. Therefore, they often had to guarantee high combat capability and firing rate. To this end the Soviet Union adopted the practice of preparing and assembling a LV in an assembly-and-test buildings (ATB) several kilometers outside the SLC. Launch complex operations amounted to final pre-launch checkups of the LV, its fuelling and launch. In many cases the SLC had to be ready for launches in close succession. Therefore, Soviet and later Russian launch vehicles remained at an SLC from a few hours to 2-3 days. Later, this became a great advantage when the number of space launches under both national and international commercial programs started growing.
The first American SLCs were designed primarily for ICBM tests. The missiles were meant to be deployed in absolutely different parts of the United States. To reduce areas under test ranges the United States rejected the idea of building ATB. First, the missiles and later launch vehicles were assembled directly at SLC launchers. Therefore the missiles remained at launch complexes for weeks and even months.
In the 1990s this became a serious restraint for the American space business when orders for commercial launches soared. It was no big problem to organize the production of a big number of LV at the US companies. However, the low throughput capacity of space centers badly limited the capabilities of launch service providers. That is why the US failed to duly respond to the skyrocketing number of commercial launches by the European Ariane LV family. In order to influence the market in at least some way and to prevent its monopolization by Europeans American companies decided to set up joint ventures with Russian rocket and space companies: Lockheed Martin, the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center (the Khrunichev Center) and S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation (RSC) Energia set up International Launch Services company for launching Proton-K and Proton-M LV, while Boeing, RSC Energia, the Ukrainian Yuzhnoye State Design Office (Yuzhnoye Design Office) and the Norwegian Kvaerner Maritime A. S. formed the Sea Launch joint venture for commercial launches of the modified Zenit-3SL.
Ever since the first ICBM tests, there has been a clear rule that every missile type should have its own SLC. In addition each complex had at least two launchers (in case one would be destroyed in a missile test). The same practice was later applied to spacecraft LV. The list of LV of various classes has grown tremendously in the four decades of the space age. Hence, Russia now uses six types of LV of the light class alone (low orbit payload below 5 tonnes): the Start family (Start and Start-1 LV), Kosmos-3M, the Tsiklon family (Tsiklon-2 and Tsiklon-3), Rockot, Dnepr (Dnipro) and Shtil. The Strela LV may appear in the same class in a few years. They are launched from six different types of SLC. Plesetsk has two launchers for Kosmos-3M, two for Tsiklon-3, one for Rockot and one for Start. Baikonur has two launchers for Tsiklon-2, two for Rockot and four for Dnepr. This amount of launch equipment requires enormous spending on construction, maintenance, running repairs and personnel.
The situation is no better with launch complexes for medium and heavy LV (low orbit payloads of 5-20 tonnes and 20-50 tonnes respectively). As was said above, Baikonur and Plesetsk have six launchers for Soyuz medium class LV alone. Baikonur also hosts four launchers for the heavy Proton-K and Proton-M. It has a total of 16 operating LV launchers, Plesetsk - 10, Cape Canaveral - 8 and Edwards Air Force Base - 7. However, current economic conditions in both Russia and the United States have called for a cheaper pattern of conducting space launches.
Angara and Yamal multi-purpose launch facilities
The idea of creating a universal SLC for different types of LV appeared a long time ago. Often it was jointly mulled by rocket-makers and launch equipment manufacturers. Nevertheless, the numerous attempts made in the 1960-1980s to develop a multi-purpose SLC failed to reach the stage of implementation.
Finally, with the advent of commercial space programs during the last decade of the 20th century, the appearance of multipurpose SLC was simply predetermined in both Russia and the United States. The two countries started practical work to implement the idea of a universal launch facility almost simultaneously.
At first, Russia attempted to adapt the existing launch complexes to new types of LV of different classes by equipping them with an adapter, allowing the installation of a new launch vehicle on an existing SLC and to link it up with existing communications. For instance, such a solution was suggested by the Barmin General Engineering Design Bureau for launching the advanced Energia-M heavy LV (RSC Energia project) from the SLC at Baikonur pad 250 by superheavy LV of the Proton class (payload of up to 100 tonnes). However, for financial reasons the development of Energia-M was suspended and consequently the plans for launches from pad 250 never materialized.
Initially, the Design Bureau of Transport Machinery (Russian acronym KBTM) suggested the same solution for launching the advanced light Neva, medium Yenisei and heavy Angara launch vehicles developed in the early 1990s on orders from the Russian Defense Ministry. Since 1992 KBTM has been engaged in R&D on a multi-purpose SLC for LV of different classes on the basis of pad 35 under construction in Plesetsk for Zenit-2 LV. The main arguments in favor of this option were as follows: the high construction readiness of the facility, the possibility of rebuilding (building) a second SLC for future rockets, the chance of using the technological and launch equipment of LV Zenit-2 complexes already delivered to the site.
In 1992-1993 KBTM came up with an RFP for a multi-purpose SLC for advanced launch vehicles and also materials and the conceptual designs of these LV.
The KBTM suggestions boiled down to the following:
· The Neva light and Yenisei medium launch vehicles were supposed to be assembled horizontally in an ATB, transported to the SLC and installed on the pad by a transport-installation unit,
· The Angara heavy LV was supposed to be assembled in an ATB vertically and taken to the SLC by a transport-launch unit from which the LV would be actually launched.
· A uniform automated control system complex (ACSC) was supposed to be applied developed on the basis of standardized computer software allowing for the choice of preparation management patterns for a launch vehicle, booster unit and spacecraft of different classes.
· There was also the suggestion to apply the principle of an unmanned launch through a high degree of automation and the rejection of manual operations at the SLC the same as at the Zenit-2 LV SLC in Baikonur in the 1980s.
Launch vehicles of different sizes and types were supposed to be installed on launchers through a spacer plate guaranteeing the connection of LV interfaces with the SLC (the same as with Energia-M LV).
In 1995-1996, when work on the Neva and Yenisei program was terminated KBTM, made a conceptual design of a multipurpose ground complex for the Angara heavy LV designed at the Khrunichev Center. The project combined the launch and technical facilities and ACSC.
However, in 1997 the Angara project was fundamentally changed. The Khrunichev Center decided to develop a whole family of light, medium and heavy launch vehicles on the basis of a universal rocket module (URM) with the RD-191M engine propelled by kerosene and liquid oxygen. Launch vehicles capable of carrying a payload of 1.8 to 30 tonnes to a low orbit were supposed to be assembled as of building bricks from URM, three types of second stages and two types of boosters. Five LV modifications were adopted as basic ones. The construction of five launch complexes for each type of Angara would have led to spending on such a scale that it would have buried the entire project. Therefore KBTM decided to expand on the idea of a multipurpose SLC and develop one complex for all types of Angara launch vehicles. Corresponding changes were made in the initial project. The development of a multipurpose SLC was supposed to become the second stage of the Angara project. It was expected to be developed on the basis of Launcher 2 (right wing) of pad 35 in Plesetsk that was then only at the initial stage of construction.
At the very first stage Launcher 1 (left wing), that had been about 80% completed, was supposed to be altered and completed to launch two types of light Angara-1. In 1997 KBTM together with the Khrunichev Center supplemented the project as far as the technical and launch complexes of the light Angara-1 were concerned. After that, Launcher 1 had to be completed to avoid the application of adapter systems. A special adapter platform was being developed for different versions of Angara because there had been earlier plans of launching the Zenit-2 LV from there. However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union the production of Zenit-2 remained outside Russia (M. Makarov Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant Production Association (Yuzhmash) in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine). Consequently the plans of launching Zenit-2 from Plesetsk were dumped.
In 1998 KBTM made conceptual and detailed designs of several systems and units of the SLC equipment for modular LV of the medium and heavy classes (Angara-1, Angara-3 and Angara-5). It turned down the idea of vertical assembly for heavy LV and returned to the traditional horizontal assembly and transportation of LV to the SLC with the transport-installation unit and loading to the launcher. ATB at pad 142 earlier also assigned for Zenit-2 should now be used to assemble and test all types of Angara.
During his visit to the Khrunichev Center on January 21, 2002 President Vladimir Putin put forward the task of making a program of advancing the Plesetsk space center. In January-February Plesetsk played host to a mixed commission of the Defense Ministry, the Russian Aerospace Agency and industry representatives led by Deputy Defense Minister for construction and lodgings Col. Gen. Alexander Kosovan. The commission evaluated the degree of readiness of the multipurpose SLC and the amount of the work to be done.
According to Col. Gen. Kosovan, "there are two tasks now: to rebuild one of the sites for the Russian Soyuz-2 rocket and to build a multipurpose launcher from which light, medium and heavy Angara rockets could be launched. The total amount of investments to be made by 2005 exceeds 4 billion rubles (some $130 million - ed.). As you know Russia now pays Kazakhstan $115 million a year in rent for Baikonur cosmodrome. It is easy to calculate that the cost of developing a purely autonomous space center independent of other countries is equal to the rent for about a year and a half. Of course, this does not mean that the time has come to give up Baikonur, to urgently leave it. But it is evident that it is simply necessary for us to have a full-fledged Russian space center."
The first launch of an Angara-1 light launch vehicle from Launcher 1 is planned for the end of 2003. Launcher 2 for the multipurpose SLC project should be ready by 2006. Angara launch vehicles of all classes - from light to heavy - will take off there. The construction is funded mainly by the Khrunichev Center at the expense of its commercial programs. Until recently the financial involvement of the government in the Angara program had been insignificant. However, with the approval of the Plesetsk development program expected in April the government contribution may grow significantly.
EELV program
The United States has applied similar principles in developing multipurpose space launch complexes. In November 1994 the US Air Force (USAF) announced a contest for developing the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). Under the program a medium class LV should have been ready by 2001 and a heavy one by 2005. They should replace the outdated Atlas-D, Titan III and Delta II launch vehicles. The main condition of the EELV program was that LV of this family should make 17-20 launches for military purposes a year. In 1998 USAF declared Boeing with its Delta IV family and Lockheed Martin with its Atlas V family winners of the EELV program contest.
Both Delta IV and Atlas V families rely on the very same modular principle when launch vehicles of varying carrying capacity are assembled from a limited number of standard elements. Hence, the long list of LV with a corresponding number of SLC may be reduced. The bulk of the EELV contract was not for the new LV but for upgrading the launch complexes at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base. The purpose was to reduce the number of complexes and the time of LV pre-launch preparations which as was said above used to be a major drawback of the U.S. LV pre-launch technology.
The manufacturers of commercial LV - Lockheed Martin and Boeing - decided to give up rocket assembly directly on the launcher and use mobile service towers located near the launcher - an actual analog of the Russian ATB - instead. So far in the United States the pre-launch technologies of Saturn-5 and Space Shuttle have been close to this principle (but not the duration of their presence on a launcher).
The practice of using assembly buildings has one weak point - the buildings themselves. They stand for additional spending on the construction and for the additional ground space they occupy. However, USAF studies have shown that the investment in building the towers will pay back quikly thanks to an increase in the throughput capacity of the SLC from which launch vehicles will take off more frequently. The areas under the assembly towers are not so great after all. The space centers have had areas for the unloading and temporary storage of LV stages anyway.
Boeing together with Raytheon Engineers and Constructors is currently rebuilding the SLC-37B on Cape Canaveral. The complex was used in the 1960s for Saturn-I LV launches. In the future, five modifications of the Delta IV family should be launched from there. Boeing plans to invest a total of $250 million in the reconstruction of SLC-37B for Delta IV.
As a result, up to 18 launches a year should become possible beginning with July 2002. The launch vehicles will be assembled horizontally in the new service building that is under construction near SLC-37B and should be completed before the SLC is restored because it will also be used for launching Delta II and Delta III from SLC-17. Thanks to the building the time for the installation of Delta IV family LV on the launcher will be reduced to eight days at most. Boeing is also planning to construct a similar launch facility for Delta IV at Vandenberg Air Force Base. For this purpose it has leased SLC-6 that was initially developed for the MOL program launches and later at different times assigned for the Space Shuttle and Titan IV LV.
Several contracts have been signed for the Delta IV LV family. Civilian customers include Loral Space & Communications and SkyBridge. In addition to carrying commercial payloads Delta IV will be used by the USAF. Boeing has a $1.38 billion contract with USAF under the EELV program for 19 launches of different modifications of Delta IV in 2002 through 2006.
Lockheed Martin is engaged in similar reconstruction. Under the same EELV contract it is working at SLC-41 on Cape Canaveral from which Titan IV used to take off. The overhaul will cost Lockheed Martin $300 million. Atlas IV LV developed under orders from USAF as well as its brother Atlas V developed by Lockheed Martin for commercial launches will take off from there. Five versions of Altas V will be capable of placing satellites weighting from 4.1 to 8.2 tonnes to geotransitional orbits. The development of the entire SLC for Atlas IV/V has been completed. The first Atlas V is now being tested and is scheduled to be launched in June.
Atlas IV/V will be assembled in vertical position in a special building on a mobile launch platform the same as a space shuttle. Five to seven days before launch the payload will be docked with the LV. All prelaunch operations will take 12 to 15 days.
Lockheed Martin has signed a contract for three launches of Atlas V with the Teledesic spacecraft. Besides, under the EELV program USAF has signed a $649 million deal with Lockheed Martin for nine Atlas IV launches during 2002-2006. Seven will be made from Cape Canaveral, two from Vandenberg. Lockheed Martin is considering the possibility of updating the SLC-3W complex to carry out launches from Vandenberg.
Unconventional launch complexes
However, the introduction of multi-purpose launchers is not the only way to reduce LV operating expenses. The cost of building a multipurpose SLC is not less, but even higher than that of a regular SLC. What makes it profitable is that one multipurpose complex replaces several ordinary ones made for different classes of LV.
Another way of reducing expenses on SLC development is to use suitable structures and equipment as a launch site. Sometimes this equipment is borrowed from related areas (aviation, missiles), sometimes from absolutely unrelated ones (off-shore oil extraction). These relatively cheap launchers may be stationed both at space centers (ICBM silos, mobile missile launchers) and in arbitrary locations on the globe (aircraft-carrier, drilling sea platforms, submarines, mobile missile launchers). The advantage of the free deployment option is that space launches can be made from places where the problem of the fallout area does not exist. The rocket stage fallout problem can be very grave for space centers. Sometimes space centers do not use the most advantageous LV launch routes because populated areas are located in probable fallout areas or along the flight trajectory.
Mobile launchers also allow choosing the best launching position from the energy viewpoint. For a spacecraft launched to a geostationary orbit, the best place is the equator, because then an SLC lies in the equatorial plane making energy consuming maneuvers to alter the inclination of the initial orbit unnecessary. For instance, if a Zenit-3SL is launched from the equator with a takeoff weight of 446 tonnes it is capable of placing a 2.9 tonnes satellite in a GSO. If the same satellite is launched from Baikonur, it can be carried only by Proton-K with the Briz-M that has a takeoff weight of 692 tonnes.
Besides, unlike stationary complexes mobile launchers do not require the excavation and transfer of hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of soil and filling of the holes with thousands of tonnes of concrete.
The most trivial model of such a launch complex was developed for the Russian Start LV derived from the RS-12M Topol (SS-25) road mobile ICBM. The missile launcher only had to be slightly altered for launching Start. The changes amounted to the transformation of the mobile system into a stationary one and the construction of the Krona protective building with a sliding roof above it. The LV is prepared for launch, docked with the nose cone containing the satellite in Krona like in an ATB. The rocket lies in horizontal position. Before launch the Krona roof slides open, the LV container is raised to vertical position and launched.
Neither did the Shtil or Dnepr launch vehicles require much work when they were derived from the RSM-54 (SS-N-23) sea launched ballistic missile and RS-20 (SS-18. Mod 3) silo launched ICBM respectively. The former was launched from Project 667 BDRM (Delta IV class) submarines that are regular carriers of RSM-54 missiles and the latter from silo of pad 109 at Baikonur that had been used for testing RS-20.
Light launch vehicles may also be launched from air. For over 10 years US Orbital Sciences has been launching its solid fuel cruise launch vehicle from the L-1011 Stargazer carrier aircraft. The launch is made above the ocean at the altitude of 10 kilometers. The plane with the rocket attached under its wing accelerates to about 900 km/h, drops the carrier and five seconds later starts its engine. The launch equipment amounts to the aircraft and simple rigging for suspending the LV under the plane wing. Stargazer also carries the launch control equipment.
A similar idea is currently being considered by the Air Launch Aerospace Corporation. Its founders - RSC Energia, its Volga branch and Production Space Rocket Center TsSKB-Progress (Progress Space Center) - in the framework of the Yamal project have suggested developing the Polyot light LV and launching it from the An-124-100 Ruslan aircraft. Before the aircraft takes off, the rocket will be filled with kerosene and liquid oxygen and loaded into the freight compartment of Ruslan. In flight the rear doors of the freight compartment will open for the launch. Then a small parachute will pull the LV from the plane along special slides. After several seconds of free flying the engine of the first stage of the LV will kick off.
Space center in the ocean
However, all the abovementioned launch facilities have been designed only for light launch vehicles. The only SLC for a medium LV developed from "what came handy" is the Sea Launch complex for Zenit-3SL LV.
The project is carried out by the international Sea Launch company set up in April 1995 by:
· Boeing Commercial Space (USA, 40% of charter capital) responsible for marketing and project integration, the delivery of the LV fairing and adapters, the organization and construction of the ground facilities in Long Beach, Ca.,
· RSC Energia (Russia, 25%) - the installation of the rocket segment equipment on the Sea Launch Commander vessel and launch platform, the manufacture of the DM-SL booster, flight control from Mission Control in Korolyov near Moscow,
· Kvaerner Maritime (Norway, 20%) - the construction of the launch platform and vessel,
· Yuzhnoye Design Office and Yuzhmash, (Ukraine, 15%) - the delivery of the first two stages for Zenit-3SL LV.
The sea component of Sea Launch comprises the following:
· the Odyssey launch platform - a sea analogue of the Zenit-2 ground SLC in Baikonur. It was derived from a self-propelled semi-submersible oil platform,
· the Sea Launch Commander ship - a sea analogue of the ground facilities and central control post of the Zenit-2 SLC.
The Russian KBTM contributed the bulk of the launching equipment for the vessels. It used designs developed for the Zenit LV launch and technical facilities but adapted them for the specific conditions of a sea launch. Thus the launcher was made with a ridge reflector. The transport-installation unit is electrically powered and self-propelled (at Baikonur it is motioned by a locomotive). The strength factor of the equipment was increased, storm fastening was introduced and components for tropic conditions were introduced.
The Odyssey launch platform carries SLC equipment for storing the LV on a transport-installation unit in the hangar for the voyage to the launch area, for transferring the rocket and installing it on the launch table, filling it with propellant components and compressed gas, conducting prelaunch preparations and launching. Preparatory operations from filling to launching are performed automatically with the help of a control system complex via radio from Sea Launch Commander with no service personnel remaining on the platform.
The technical complex on the Sea Launch Commander has been designed to receive LV stages, boosters and satellites, to integrate and test them, to load the pre-examined rocket to the transporter and to transfer it to the launcher. The SLC can simultaneously carry two assembled launch vehicles.
However, no LV has been transferred from the Sea Launch Commander to the platform on the open sea yet. From the very start, Zenit-3SL with the attached payload has been loaded on the platform, which takes it to the launch area. The ship has sailed to the area and simultaneously secured the launch. According to the plan, rockets will be transported on the Sea Launch Commander and loaded to the platform in the launch area only in 2003. And only if the number of payloads grows. However, as the current priorities for Boeing are the Delta IV program and its commercial applications, one should not expect an increase in payloads for Zenit-3SL in the near future.
The idea of space launches from oil platforms successfully applied in Sea Launch has been adopted by several other rocket manufacturers as well. For instance, the Khrunichev Center is considering launching Angara family launch vehicles from offshore platforms. However, this is not a priority task for the center.
Conclusions
An analysis of the new LV and SLC projects currently developed around the world indicates that in the decades to come the trends described above will strengthen. Medium and heavy launch vehicles will be launched mainly from traditional space centers. However, the rule of having a separate SLC for each LV is going down into history. All new medium and heavy launch vehicles are developed on the basis of modules and are meant to be launched from one and the same multipurpose SLC.
As for light LV and partly for medium LV, in the foreseeable future either multi-purpose SLC or cheap separate SLC will be built for them. In the latter case either existing complexes for old LV will be modernized or mobile SLC will be developed on the basis of carrier aircraft, sea ships and platforms. The latter option will be given preference.
In the long term given the appearance of new technologies, materials and engine types the need for space launch complexes as such will evidently disappear. Reusable launch vehicles with aircraft take-off and landing will be used to take payloads to terrestrial orbits. And then a space launch complex will be reduced to a mere runway.
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