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The Chinese Space Miracle at the End of the 20th Century
Vladimir KIRILLOV
Until recently, the People’s Republic of China was not very active in space. The country occupied a humble place in the second echelon of space-faring nations, with its own launch vehicles and implementing selected space programs, including military. China did not attempt to play in the same league as space powers such as the United States and Russia, which work in all possible areas of aeronautics, including manned programs. Neither could China hope to compete with the European Union, which focused on commercial, high-tech and research-oriented space programs.
But in the past two years China has launched a series of large-scale projects that point to the country’s growing ambitions in the area of space. Some of them have been completely unexpected for space experts around the world. At the same time, the leaders of China’s aerospace sector have made statements hinting at even more ambitious projects. It has become clear that China aims to turn itself into a space power within the next five to ten years. Given the gradual decline of Russia’s space sector, it has become a distinct possibility that in the second decade of the 21st century China could become the world’s second space power after the United States.
China’s military space program of recent years
China launched its space program on April 24, 1970. In the past 30 years, the country has launched 73 of its own carrier rockets, of which 62 successfully. They put 48 Chinese and 27 foreign satellites into near-earth orbits. The Chinese launches included:
2 unmanned Shenzhou (Magic Vessel) capsules;
11 DFH (Dong Fang Hong, The East is Red) communications satellites;
17 FSW (Fanhui Shi Weixing) Recoverable Test Satellites;
2 Beidou (Star Dipper) navigation satellites;
5 FY (Feng Yun, Wind and Cloud) weather satellites;
2 DQ (Da Qi, Atmosphere) atmospheric research satellites;
6 SJ (Shi Jian, Practice) research satellites;
3 JSSW (Ji Shu Shiyan Weixing) Technical Test Satellites;
2 ZY (Zi Yuan, Resource) remote sensing satellites.
Most of the Chinese launches were for the military. Between 1973 and 1976 there were six launches of JSSW experimental satellites onboard FB-1 (Feng Bao, Storm) from the Jiuquan Satellite Launching Center in northern China (40.6° north latitude, 99.9° east longitude). Three of them never made it into orbit due to malfunctions of the launch vehicles. The JSSW satellites were apparently intended to fine-tune the systems and thrusters of future satellites. It is possible that equipment for various types of surveillance (optical, radio and radio engineering) was also perfected on these satellites. But this series of satellites was discontinued. The launch vehicles were also shelved. The mysterious end to the JSSW and FB-1 programs coincided with the death of Mao Zedong.
The most obviously military was the FSW, a photo reconnaissance satellite. Officially, China said that these were remote sensing satellites to photograph the Earth for civilian purposes. Of the 17 satellites in this series launched between 1974 and 1996, three generations clearly stand out.
The first satellites to be launched, dubbed FSW-0, were obviously experimental and intended to fine-tune onboard systems, special equipment and recovery systems for the photographs taken. Four FSW-0 were launched between 1974 and 1978, the first of which did not make it into orbit due to a malfunction of the launch vehicle. These satellites were launched on CZ-2 (Chang Zheng, Long March) rockets from Jiuquan. The satellites consisted of an airtight instrumentation compartment and a recoverable capsule that contained the photo equipment. The FSW-0 remained in orbit for three days.
The experimental phase in the development of the reconnaissance satellites was completed in 1978. All subsequent FSW were operative. Six operational first-generation FSW were put into orbit between 1982 and 1987 using CZ-2C launch vehicles, all successfully. These satellites had an orbit life of five days. The 1,800-kg satellites had a diameter of 2.1 meters and length of 3.14 meters. The operating orbit as a rule had an inclination of 63° and altitude of 175?410 km, which is typical for optical observation satellites.
In the mid-1980s these satellites, dubbed FSW-1, were updated, which extended their flight time to 7-8 days. There were few external changes, but the insides were reworked considerably, including the complete replacement of the payload. The satellite gained 300 kg with an increase in fuel reserves and backup batteries for the electrical systems. The FSW-1 satellites were taken into orbit on the same CZ-2C rockets. Five FSW-1 were launched between 1987 and 1993, all successfully.
A new modification was finally developed at the turn of the decade, the FSW-2, weighing 2,500 to 3,100 kg and with an orbit life of 15 days. Three FSW-2 were successfully put into orbit between 1992 and 1996 by a more powerful version of the CZ-2C, the CZ-2D, which were again launched from Jiuquan.
The FSW satellites apparently allowed China to conduct photoreconnaissance from space for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), surveying the territory of neighboring countries, and determining the coordinates of strategic facilities for targeting by nuclear missiles, as well as map the territory of China and other countries. The photo equipment onboard the FSW satellites probably had a resolution of several meters.
The launches of the FSW satellites were rare compared to similar programs conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union, which had at least one spy satellite in orbit almost constantly. The FSW were launched about once a year, so their military usefulness was quite limited. Only the last generation of these satellites had orbital maneuvering capabilities, allowing them to get better pictures of the required regions.
The FSW satellites were, however, quite reliable. Of the 17 satellites launched in the course of 21 years, 16 were successfully recovered. The only failure was in October 1993, when on its fifth flight the FSW-1 satellite moved into a higher orbit due to incorrect attitude control when the thruster was fired, and 18 months later made an uncontrolled descent into the atmosphere.
These satellites allowed China to perfect recovery technology, which was then used for its manned space program. The FSW also carried out a number of commercial programs in materials technology and life sciences under contracts with France, Germany and Japan. After the flight of the FSW-III in 1996, China announced that it was ending the program. Press reports of a possible fifth-generation of FSW satellites have never been confirmed.
A number of Chinese space systems, including those used by the PLA, were support systems, primarily communications satellites. The first DFH-1 satellite was classified as such, although it amounted to just a low-orbit radio transmitter, more along the lines of the first Soviet artificial satellites. Only in 1984 did China put a full-fledged communications satellite, the DFH-2, into a geostationary orbit. It had a launch mass of 900 kg, diameter of 2.1 meters and height of 3.1 meters. The payload consisted of four C band (6/4 GHz) transponders. In 1986 the country began launching operational satellites classified as DFH-2A. The DFH-2/2A were put into orbit by the CZ-3 three-stage launch vehicles with a cryogenic upper stage. The satellites were launched from the Xichang space center in southeastern China (28.25° north latitude, 102.3° east longitude), which was built especially to put satellites into geostationary orbits since the first Chinese launch center at Jiuquan was too far from the Equator. Between 1984 and 1991 China attempted to launch seven DFH-2/2A satellites, five of which reached their intended orbit.
In 1994 China began launching the DFH-3 generation of satellites, which had a launch mass of about 2,300 kg, dimensions of 2.2x2.2x1.7 meters, and solar array span of 18.1 meters in orbit. These satellites had up to 24 transponders, what is more than contemporary Russian Express communications satellites had, though half the number of the best western models. The military purpose of the DFH-3 became obvious when “civil” satellites called ChinaSat began to be launched in parallel. Nonetheless, some of the transponders of the DFH-3 were leased to non-military users. Only two such satellites have been put into orbit so far, although the platform of the DFH-3 served as the basis for new geostationary satellites such as the Zhongxing-22 retransmitter, Beidou navigation satellite, and the future FY-4 weather satellites.
China began launching the FY-1 weather satellites in 1988. The T’ai Yuan launch center in eastern China (37.5° north latitude, 112.6° east longitude) was built to put these satellites into solar-synchronous orbits. They were put into orbit by the CZ-4A and CZ-4B launch vehicles. The PLA uses the satellites to provide meteorological support for its operations. The first two - FY-1A and FY-1B - were launched in 1988 and 1990. They carried scanners with only three visible and two infrared spectral channels. But the FY-1C launched in 1999 already had four visible and six infrared channels, providing much more detailed meteorological data.
In 1997 and 2000 China put two FY-2A and FY-2B geostationary meteorological satellites into orbit. They provided global weather data. The satellites were built on the DFH-3 platform, and carried three-channel scanners with two infrared and one visible channel.
The “great leap” at the turn of the century
Hampered as it was by limited financing for space programs, a big technological lag behind the United States and the Soviet Union, and insufficient production potential, China in the 1970s and 1980s had comparatively modest successes in space, and its military applications in particular. The country’s military and political leaders initially seem to have assigned little importance to military space technology. China at the time was ruled by the doctrine of a “big army” that succeeded by numbers, not quality.
In the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, China’s leaders began to take the national space program more seriously, but also began to view it more pragmatically. Efforts were only poured into the development of areas that land-based systems could not replace. China did not try to catch up to the United States or Soviet Union in areas such as manned space flight and planetary research, which would have brought a great deal of international prestige but at a huge cost. According to unofficial information, China’s space budget in the early 1990s was about $1 billion, which amounted to less than a tenth of the budget of NASA. This amount of funding and the country’s industrial capabilities allowed it to launch no more than three or four of its own satellites per year.
This is the average pace of rocket launches that China maintained from the late 1980s. Chinese specialists said privately that this is how many satellites and launch vehicles the country’s aerospace industry was capable of building.
In 1990 China, having acquired a wide range of launch vehicles, began commercial launches of foreign satellites. The number of launches of domestic satellites, meanwhile, decreased and the overall number stayed at four or five per year, which again points to the country’s limited ability to build launch vehicles. Since April 1990 Chinese launch vehicles have put 27 foreign satellites and dummy satellites into orbit. Another three were lost between 1992 and 1996 as a result of launch vehicle failures.
The commercial programs allowed China to raise extra cash to develop its industrial capabilities, but this revenue, averaging no more than $100 million per year, was much less than budget funding. Commercial launches alone could not raise enough financing to rapidly develop the aerospace industry.
Around the turn of 1992-1993, the country’s political leadership seriously reviewed its attitude towards the national space program. This decision was apparently influenced by the use of space technology in the wars and conflicts of the early 1990s, especially during the war in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, China at this time entered a period of rapid economic growth and began to see a massive influx of foreign investment. The country’s military doctrine also changed, moving in favor of high-tech weapons systems. China began to buy up the latest weapons from other countries, especially Russia. The country also strived to get its hands on the latest technologies. Where it was unable to develop them on its own, it found other means of obtaining them, such as joint ventures, participation in international programs and, as a last resort, outright purchases. This applied to the Chinese aerospace industry as well.
Chinese politicians’ greater attention to space issues also brought an increase in budget funding. By the end of the 1990s, the country’s space budget was already estimated at $6.5 billion. The increase in funding and development of technology lead to a qualitative leap in China’s space program. In 1999-2001 China began implementing a number of new space projects. Besides the successful tests of the Shenzhou spacecraft for manned flight, there were major achievements in both civilian and military space applications.
The success of such serious programs as the piloted ship, geostationary navigation satellite, and optical-electronic Earth observation satellite seem to have fueled the country’s ambitions in space. The director of the China National Space Administration and the deputy head of the science, technology and industry commission at the National Defense Ministry, Luan Enjie, talked about the government’s space strategy for the 21st century at an exhibition in November 2000. This strategy includes:
create technological infrastructure with emphasis on innovation research to make breakthroughs in key technologies;
encourage and support aerospace companies with the aim of fostering commercial success, establishing international standards and promoting space technologies and their application in production;
improve products and education media in order to boost confidence in the products of the aerospace sector and expanding sales markets;
speed up the formation of aerospace groups, recruit talented young people to form highly-qualified teams of technical specialists, popularize space sciences in order to mobilize public support for aerospace research;
use approaches such as “setting out priorities,” “active support,” “adequate development,” and “advanced research” to coordinate efforts in the area of space;
promote “Project 211” with the aim of creating a single satellite platform, a new generation of launch vehicles, and complete the formation of an integrated satellite system to further the country’s economic interests;
understand the importance of space sciences and research of deep space, and make manned programs a priority.
China’s new satellite reconnaissance capabilities
It is remarkable that foreign analysts seriously underestimated China’s space capabilities in the area of optical reconnaissance. The annual report on China’s military power, written for the US congress in July 2000, said that China was only capable of lifting into orbit photo-imaging satellites based on technologies that were obsolete by western measures. The report said that Beijing was not capable of conducting optical-electronic surveillance with real-time data transfer. The first step towards building such systems was the launch on October 14, 1999 of the ZY-1 satellite, which was developed jointly by China and Brazil under the CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) program. The satellite transmits Earth images by radio signal, but their resolution is only good enough for use in studying natural resources, and at best cartography. Such resolution is insufficient even for surveying. The US experts predicted that China would have a full-fledged optical-electronic imaging satellite with real-time data transfer no sooner than in ten years. They estimated a similar time span for the development in China of a high-resolution photo-imaging satellite. Therefore, it was assumed that China would have to use the services of commercial and government organizations in the United States (Landsat, Ikonas), Europe (SPOT), Israel (EROS A-1) and Russia in order to get the latest data on areas of the Earth it was interested in.
But less than two months after this report was published, on September 1, 2000, China launched the ZY-2. After the launch the Xinhua agency reported that the satellite was intended for scientific experiments in space, and for remote Earth sensing in order to study topography, urban planning, control the growth of farm crops and assess the damage from natural disasters.
It should be noted that the ZY-2’s predecessor, the ZY-1, was launched in October 1999 under the CBERS program with Brazil and is also called the CBERS-1. But the ZY-2 has nothing to do with the CBERS program. The CBERS-2 satellite is being developed and built in Brazil and is set to be launched at the end of this year. The use of the ZY name may indicate that both satellites are based on the same core platform. Or the ZY is a standard satellite that is being launched under different programs. If this is the case, the ZY-2 should have the same exterior and dimensions as the first satellite. Independent experts have reported that that the ZY-2 was developed by the Chinese Academy of Space Technology, or CAST, and uses a standardized core block for solar-synchronous satellites. The satellite has an expected service life of two years.
The orbit of the new satellite is about a third lower than the CBERS-1. If it is carrying the same kind of observation equipment as the CBERS-1, this means an increase in spatial resolution to 10-13 meters using a High Resolution CCD Camera.
But the satellite could very well be carrying more sophisticated equipment. And it is this possibility that worries Taiwan. Taiwan’s defense minister remarked that since officials from the China Central Military Committee were present at the launch, the ZY-2 could have a military purpose. According to unnamed Taiwanese intelligence officers, all previous remote sensing satellites that China orbited had worse resolution than 10 meters, which reduced the potential military usefulness of the data they provided to a minimum. If the equipment on board the ZY-2 provides resolution of no worse than five meters, this would be enough to meet certain military reconnaissance needs. The Taiwanese defense ministry is “closely following everything related to this launch.”
The launch of the ZY-2 puts a whole new perspective on the launch of the Zhongxing-22 satellite into geostationary orbit on January 26, 2000. China officially called this a communications satellite. But independent analysts immediately pointed out the unusual designation. The satellite was positioned at 98° E, a slot reserved as CHINASAT-22. It was initially assumed that the satellite was intended for mobile telecommunications users, but the appearance of the Beidou specialized navigation satellites in the “30” slots suggest that five of the “20” slots (CHINASAT-21 to CHINASAT-25) were also reserved for a special geostationary system.
Such a system could, for example, serve to retransmit data from low-earth orbit satellites (in a certain sense “mobile users”), and it could already be operational. It would be logical to assume that the ZY-2 optical-electronic imaging satellite launched seven months later uses the Zhongxing-22 as a retransmitter for near real-time data transfer. By the way, in the USSR the succession of launches and even the interval between them was the same: on May 18, 1982 the Soviet Union launched the first geostationary retransmission satellite, and on December 28 of the same year it orbited the first optical-electronic observation satellite.
China’s satellite navigation system
On October 30 and December 20, 2000, CZ-3A rockets, launched from the Xichang launch center, put two experimental navigation satellites – Beidou 1A and Beidou 1B – into geostationary orbits at 140° E and 80° E. This completed the first phase of China’s efforts to build a national navigation satellite system. These slots had been reserved by the International Telecommunications Union for retransmitters CHINASAT-31 (80° E) and CHINASAT-32 (140° E). In all China registered three geostationary slots for the 30-series (CHINASAT-33 at 110.5° E). After the launch of the first Beidou, China announced plans for a constellation of four satellites: three main ones and one reserve satellite.
The idea of creating a regional navigation system consisting of two satellites in geostationary orbit was proposed back in 1983. The plan underwent an experimental check in 1989 using two DFH-2A communications satellites that were in geostationary orbit. In 1993 the Beidou program was officially launched. The same base block was used as for the DFH-3 communications satellite. Li Hairu, the deputy chief designer of the BNTS system, said that development has begun of a second-generation navigation system that will include more satellites and serve other regions besides China.
The Chinese say that the accuracy of the two-satellite system is comparable to that offered by GPS (Global Positioning System). This claim is open to dispute. The comparison seems to refer to a system that includes not only the geostationary satellites but also several super long wave ground stations. Together they form a unified network of support radio navigation points and make it possible to create a variable-distance radio navigation system. The system differs from NAVSTAR or GLONASS in that speed measurements cannot be used. The precision of locating the coordinates of a user of this system is in principle comparable to that provided by the “civilian” signal of the GPS system in selective-access mode on the condition that the current location of the geostationary navigation satellites is precisely known.
But China also has plans to use the two existing global navigation systems: America’s GPS and Russia’s GLONASS. China’s aerospace industry is trying, for example, to introduce GPS and GLONASS equipment for guiding jet fighters and helicopters. A GPS receiver was demonstrated during an exhibition in Beijing in September 1996, and the accompanying brochure described a 12-channel GPS receiver and 12-channel GPS/GLONASS receiver. Another brochure showed a carrier rocket using the GPS system for guidance. At the last air show in November 2000, there were reports indicating that all new Chinese jet fighters would be equipped with GPS systems.
Last year some Russian government officials also mentioned the possibility of working with China on the GLONASS system. This system has seen better days: only eight out of the 24 Uragan navigation satellites that are supposed to make up the system, are now in operation. Russia is clearly hoping for Chinese investment to revive the system. China, meanwhile, plans to use GLONASS as a backup for GPS in case the United States, in some crisis situation (related or unrelated to China), again introduces a special access code for high-precision navigation signals. Then GLONASS could replace GPS to continue supplying navigation data to military users. Russia and China are probably now conducting negotiations to hammer out a framework for cooperation in the area of GLONASS.
It should be noted that navigation data combined with the ability to receive images of the Earth from optical-electronic observation satellites like ZY-2 or from foreign commercial satellites, allows China to develop digital maps used for targeting and guiding missiles, including nuclear-tipped ones.
Military aspects of the manned program
A little more than a year ago China conducted two trial unmanned flights of the Shenzhou space craft: Shenzhou-1 on November 19-21, 1999 made 14 curcuits around the Earth, and on January 9-16, 2001 the Shenzhou-2 made 108 curcuits. The new CZ-2F launch vehicle was used to launch both ships, from the southern launch pad at the Jiuquan space center that was built especially for the manned program.
Rumors of a Chinese manned program began to circulate as early at the late 1970s. Photographs were even published in the press allegedly depicting various stages in the training of Chinese astronauts. But as it turned out these photographs were only of researchers at the Institute of Space Medicine and Biology in Beijing, which was developing various systems for future space craft. Only in 1992-1993 did China actually select real astronauts, apparently because full-scale work on the Shenzhou spacecraft was being launched.
In the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, China maintained that it was not working on a manned space program. This was completely in line with the Chinese leadership’s pragmatic approach to space affairs. The government had to first clearly understand for itself why the country needed a manned program, and only then begin implementing the project. These goals had apparently taken shape by the early 1990s, and the aim was not just to inflate the country’s international prestige. It is more probable that China needed a militarily applicable craft to perfect elements of a spy satellite system. China also sees the Shenzhou as a vehicle that could be used to make supply runs to a future orbiting space station. Chinese efforts in the area of manned space flight could also help improve weapons systems planned for 2010-2020.
On November 21, 2000 the Chinese government for the first time published a report setting out three phases for the development of the national manned program. The first phase entails the launch of unmanned and manned craft, the development of transport operations from Earth to orbit and back to Earth. Astronauts observe the Earth and conduct experiments in space. The second phase involves the development of out-of-ship operations, docking and movement from ship to ship, the launch of a habitable space laboratory that would operate on autopilot most of the time. And finally the third phase would see the construction of a large, permanently occupied space station. It is unlikely that both these projects for orbiting stations are not intended for military purposes.
The Shenzhou was development and built by CAST and Shanghai Academy for Space Technology (SAST), with the latter being responsible for the propulsion module, the electrical system and partly for control and communications systems. The equipment for the craft was provided by Chinese aeronautics institutes and enterprises controlled by the Information Industry Ministry.
The Shenzhou consists of an orbiting module, a return capsule, propulsion module and an additional module for special equipment.The Shenzhou’s configuration is very reminiscent of the Russian Soyuz ship, although the Chinese craft is somewhat larger. This was clearly the result of close cooperation between China and the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, at the end of 1980s and the early 1990s. It was reported that China was not only buying blueprints for the ship, but actual systems, instruments and engines. Nonetheless, CAST and SAST took a creative approach to the development of the ship, and refrained from making a direct copy of the Russian prototype. They introduced many innovations to the Russian craft, so it cannot be said that the Shenzhou is an exact copy of the Soyuz.
On the day of the launch of the Shenzhou-2, Chinese officials said that there would be three or four additional unmanned test flights. During the flight, the China Space News speculated that the next test flight would take place at the end of 2001. After this a number of Chinese space program officials said that China would send its first astronauts into space at the end of 2002.
The flight of the Shenzhou-2 was a surprise for foreign observers. After the program was completed, as with the Shenzhou-1, the orbiting module separated, the engines of the propulsion module put the ship into a reentry trajectory, the reentry module separated, entered the atmosphere and landed near the launch center. But the orbiting module did not remain lifeless. The next day the module raised its orbit from 331x343 to 383x406 km. Such an alteration requires at least two corrections. This clearly demonstrated that the Shenzhou-2 orbiting module could be considered an independent craft with its own attitude control, stabilization and control systems, propulsion and telemetry equipment. The newspaper Zenmin Zhibao reported on January 18, 2001 that the orbiting module was functioning normally and would remain in orbit for several months to conduct scientific experiments.
The Shenzhou orbiting module could in future be used as a platform for extended testing of new systems in orbit and to house permanent equipment. The orbiting module of one of the next Shenzhou craft will probably be equipped with radar with synthesized aperture to perfect radar-spying methods, as well as with radio surveillance equipment. During manned missions, the orbiting module can hold photo equipment for optical observation. The pictures taken would return to Earth in the descent module with the astronauts.
A few words about China’s orbiting stations. Those who commissioned the Shenzhou are pragmatists. Of course they welcome all promising developments, including for orbiting stations, but “within reason.” China’s manned program will obviously be precisely structured according to phases and go slowly due to limited resources. Simple technical solutions that are as reliable as possible will be applied. Therefore, a habitable Chinese space station might be possible around 2010. It will probably be a multi-purpose station intended for global multi-spectral monitoring and surveillance. Such a station will also act as a “space inspector” capable of reacting quickly and powerfully in very complex situations. The Chinese military might very well prefer a “loyal” human eye to the capricious “electronic brains” of automatic satellites.
International cooperation
In the past eight to ten years China has considerably expanded space cooperation with other countries. Most joint projects are presented as scientific or civilian. But from a military point of view, they result in the transfer of important technology that can be used for defense purposes.
According to reports in the press, Moscow and Beijing are conducting eleven joint space projects, including in the area of manned flight. China has shown a strong interest in the capabilities of Canadian and German radar satellites in order to acquire a synthesized aperture radar for its own satellites systems. China also recently signed a contract with Italian companies to build and launch a telecommunications satellite this year with 28 transponders in the Ku band (14/11 GHz), usually used for direct television broadcasting and data transmission. Two earlier contracts with the Italians call for joint work on an Earth observation satellite.
In February 1999 China and the French space agency CNES signed an agreement to work together on new control and telemetry systems for future satellites.
Press reports have said that China has signed intergovernmental agreements and memoranda on aerospace cooperation with the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Russia, Pakistan, India and Brazil. China is also developing technical and economic cooperation, and exchanges of another type, including joint development of satellites in cooperation with companies and research institutes in more than 70 countries.
Since 1998 China and the United States have signed three intergovernmental launch services contracts. Various American satellite manufacturers have signed commercial launch contracts for about 30 satellites.
Sinosat, a satellite developed jointly by China, France and Germany, was successfully launched in 1999. A Chinese-German joint venture has made considerable improvements to the DFH-3 communications satellite and developed a new generation of similar satellites.
According to South Korean press reports in December 1998, China and Korea plan to exchange information from Earth observation satellites. In November 1998, Chinese media outlets reported about a joint project with the Netherlands to develop and operate a new satellite to monitor desertification and crop harvests in China.
Chinese scientists have taken a close look at British mini-satellite technology. Chinese and British firms have set up joint ventures to build and launch the first private version of the Chinese Tsinghau-1 satellite.
China has received a number of foreign technologies that could be used to develop anti-satellite systems. Beijing has access to surveillance radar and satellite imaging technology that could be used to build a satellite monitoring system in low-Earth orbit. It could also build a system to jam and create interference for the receivers of the global positioning system (GPS).
In some cases, Chinese lasers can neutralize optical sensors on the satellites of an adversary, which are quite vulnerable to such radiation.
Given China’s current interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume that the possibility that the country is aiming to develop laser weapons capable in future of destroying satellites, although no one has yet ventured to point exactly to a Chinese anti-satellite laser program.
Although China has used foreign technology to develop its own surveillance satellites, Chinese satellites are built with reliable local components. But in future, China will still continue to acquire and use large amounts of foreign technology and imported systems to speed up the development of its own satellites.
Mini-satellites (lighter than 100 kg) are being development for a network of optical-electronic and radar satellites. A joint venture set up by the Tsinghua University and the University of Surrey is building the Tsinghua system, which includes seven Earth observation satellites with low-resolution (no better than 50 m) optical-electronic equipment. Following the launch of the first satellite, the characteristics of subsequent ones will be improved.
Beijing is also taking part in the Asia-Pacific Small Multi-Mission Satellite Project with Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Mongolia, South Korea and Bangladesh.
Plans for the future
China’s space program is now at a turning point. The resources invested in the past seven or eight years are starting to yield qualitative changes, which are taking place more rapidly than most experts had expected. The wide range of international cooperation in space has also had a major impact on the rate of development of Chinese aeronautics and its technological sophistication.
Even the directors of the Chinese space program themselves are sometimes unable to follow and assess the rapidly changing situation. For example, on October 15, 2000, Zhou Zhicheng of CAST told the Xinhua agency that the Chinese space industry is facing serious problems due to lack of financing and poor technology. Chinese commercial satellites lag far behind foreign ones in construction and characteristics. China needs to review the basic principles of developing and managing programs, and expand exchanges of specialists with foreign companies, he said.
At the same time the president of the same academy, Li Zuhong, said that most Chinese satellites work well and China, which has focused on quality, will soon be ready to enter the international market with fast and economically viable serial production of satellites. Lin Huabao, the chief designer of Chinese satellites, agreed, saying that China would soon speed up development and construction of large communications satellites that will meet international standards.
At the rate of development seen in the past two to three years, China could justifiably earn the status of a space superpower in five to seven years. One more fact is indicative.
From January 21 to 26, 2001, the United States held training exercises dubbed Space Wargame at the Schriever airbase in Colorado. This was the first such exercise at such a high level where space was given such a central role. The exercise simulated a crisis situation between two space powers in 2017 and methods for defusing it using space resources. Participants in the exercise conceded that the two space powers the wargame had in mind were the United States and China. As the American military sees it, it is China that will be able to compete on an almost equal footing with the United States in space at the end of the second decade of this century.
Meanwhile in China there is already talk of reusable space ships, interplanetary stations for studying the Moon and Mars and a landing of Chinese astronauts on the Moon. These are of course just projects and plans that are a long way from becoming reality. But just the fact that China is interested in such programs says a great deal. And while China does not yet have the resources for such projects, they will surely be found for military programs. Looking at the military conflicts of the past decade, China’s leaders have become convinced of the importance of the space capabilities of a country’s armed forces. Therefore it is clear that China will continue to actively develop its space projects, especially in the military sphere.
Sources:
1. Annual Report on the Military Power of The People's Republic of China (Report to Congress). Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act.
2. Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of The People's Republic of China. Report to Congress pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 1998).
3. Phillip Clark. China: A Limited Military Capability// Launchspace, March/April 1999, p.36.
4. Mark A. Stokes. China's strategic modernization: implications for the United States (September 1999).
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