Belarus on Arms Market in 2001

Alexander VASILEVICH

The position of Belarus in the global arms market in 2001 is quite difficult to describe. A radical increase in the secrecy of deals made virtually all information about arms trade inac­cessible to open sources. At the same time in 2001-2002 Belarus once again was described as a major market player. The country was accused of delivering arms to countries and groups sup­porting terrorism.

The German DNA news agency described the state of arms exports' coverage in the following way: "Official information on arms exports from Minsk is shrouded in mystery, Western observ­ers are forced to rely on intelligence documents, information from intelligence analysts and dip­lomats and also East European military and po­litical magazines quoting sources close to Bela­russian arms traders."

In the second half of 2001 there appeared many indications that Belarus was selling arms to countries or groups supporting terrorism or in­stigating regional conflicts.

During the 56th session of the UN General As­sembly in September 2001 the media reported that a certain document was circulated among Security Council member-countries containing a detailed chronology of transactions of Belarus­sian companies on the world arms market and emphasizing deliveries to countries that were listed as sponsors of international terrorists. The information was reported so that it involuntar­ily prompted the conclusion that Russia had consciously conceded its first role in those mar­kets to Belarus.¹

At the end of autumn beginning of winter 2001 the Western media and the Belarussian opposition press quoting them started carrying articles which assumed that Belarus was selling arms to such countries as Iraq, Albania, Afghanistan, Palestine and even to Chechen rebels.²

The Wall Street Journal reported that in 2001 Belarus secretly delivered arms and military hardware worth over $500 million to Palestin­ian militants and to countries sheltering terror­ists, with deliveries including 120 mm mortars, anti-tank missiles, mines and projectiles.³

Information also leaked into the Belorussian and international press that a group of Iraqi ser­vicemen was learning to operate S-300 (SA-10) medium-range surface-to-air missiles.

All this provoked tension in the relations be­tween Belarus and the United States. On Feb­ruary 16, 2002, three American Congressmen - James Saxton, Bernard Sanders and Ronald Lewis - arrived in Minsk. They met Belarussian Foreign Minister Mikhail Khvostov, Defense Minister Leonid Maltsev and Security Council Secretary Gennady Nevyglas (the agency that together with President Alexander Lukashenko actually controls arms trade). The congressmen urged the Belarussian leadership to take steps making the system of Belarussian arms trade and its financing transparent. This could be a guarantee that the arms would not be sold to terrorists or reach them in some roundabout way.

On February 20-21, 2002 US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Steven Pifer, during his stay in Minsk, said that the American leadership was alarmed by reports from reliable sources that Belarus was involved in illegal arms deliveries to coun­tries or organizations supporting terrorism and was also giving military training to persons re­lated with such countries. He said that the United States had reliable information that in autumn 2001 Iraqi servicemen had been trained to operate S-300 SAM systems. The information prompted the conclusion that Iraq intended to use the system for shooting down aircraft con­trolling the no-flight zone in its air space. The subject was discussed in detail with head of the presidential administration Ural Latypov, Mik­hail Khvostov and Leonid Maltsev. The Ameri­can officials urged Belarus to do its utmost to rule out illegal arms deals and military training. They said that the complete termination of arms deliveries to rogue states would be crucial for determining the US attitude to Belarus.⁴

On February 27, US State Department spokes­man Richard Boucher announced that sanctions could be imposed against Belarus in connection with accusations of arms deliveries to countries or groups supporting terrorism or instigating re­gional conflicts.⁵

Belarussian leadership in the person of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry and President Lukashenko flatly denied any accusa­tions of delivering arms to rouge countries or terrorist groups.

In an interview with The Wall Street Journal President Lukashenko refuted the accusations of the United States and described as absolutely untrue reports that Iraqi citizens were being trained at Belarussian military colleges. He also denied arms trade with rogue countries and ter­rorist organizations. He said Belarus did not even produce weapons: such astanks, assault ri­fles, missiles or bombs. "The military-industrial com­plex of the republic is manufacturing compo­nents for certain types of armaments, producing optical instruments, computer soft­ware, unique guidance systems, integrated cir­cuits, some of them for the space programs of dif­ferent countries, and repairing military hard­ware," he said.

An official statement of the Belarussian Foreign Ministry said following the visit of the American delegation: "No facts that would confirm illegal arms trade by Belarus were produced to us… Once again we stress that Belarus has never traded, is not trading and is not planning to trade arms in circumvention of UN Security Council sanctions or with countries that have been perceived to support terrorists."

Defense Minister Leonid Maltsev was more am­biguous: "We are a sovereign state and we de­cide ourselves whom to trade with or not." However, he added: "Especially as we are doing it in strict compliance with international norms and no violations of such norms have been regis­tered so far."⁶

Nevertheless, according to foreign sources men­tioned above, Belarussian arms trade in 2001 exceeded $500 million.⁷

In addition, at the end of 2001 the Russian press carried reports saying that at the session of the Belarussian parliament that discussed the 2002 budget. Finance Minister Nikolai Korbut spoke of a special non-budget fund of Alexander Lukashenko at Belarusbank to which returns from arms trade were transferred. It is believed that already in 2002 the fund will have over 36 billion Belarussian rubles (some $24 million) at its disposal.⁸

Several major deals could have formed the core of arms trade in 2001:

• The sale of light weapons and ammunition, in­cluding mortars, machine guns, ordnance, anti-tank missiles and rocket projectiles to Albanian or­ganizations. In 2001 the Italian police detained a batch of Belarussian arms directed to the Kos­ovo Liberation Army.⁹

• Deliveries of light weapons, 120 mm mortars, ammunition, anti-tank missiles, rocket projectiles and mines to Palestinian organi­zations.

• The continuing deliveries of tanks to North Ko­rea.

• The sale of 48 T-72 main battle tanks from Bela­russian army stores to Morocco for ap­proximately $10-12 million.¹⁰

• The sale of radar stations, upgraded air defense and communication equipment to Iraq reported by the British Daily Telegraph. The deal im­plied the upgrading of Iraqi air defense weap­ons, the rearmament of the Iraqi Air Force and the training of Iraqi personnel to use and main­tain the military hardware. Under the deal Bel­arussian technical experts reportedly should up­grade S-125 (SA-3) short-range SAMs increasing their range from 18 to 29 kilometers and old air defense guns. The Iraqi personnel was supposed to have been sent to Belarus where it would be acquainted with the latest systems of electronic warfare. The size of the deal was estimated at $90 million. It was claimed that Belarus had also agreed to upgrade 17 Iraqi Soviet-made planes remaining in Belarus since the end of the 1980s.

• The sale of light weapons and ammunition to Libya that were later reexported to Chechnya.

None of the above mentioned deals were confirmed by official documents and some were officially denied by the Belarussian leadership.

These contracts could only have been carried out through four government mediators duly licensed to engage in arms trade: Belspetsvne­shtekhnika, Beltekhexport, Belvneshpromservis and Belorusintorg. There are also other parties licensed to make trade deals, but they are only allowed to sell products they have developed and manufactured under close control.¹¹

There are several indications that these deals could have taken place.

• The situation on the arms market. Given the in­tentions and following admission of several countries in Central and East Europe to NATO, the East European market has closed for Bela­rus. The close cooperation with Russia in arms trade that has intensified in the past few years should have led to a division of spheres of influ­ence. The circle of potential buyers is limited to countries with transitional economies in Asia, Africa and South America and which have limited re­sources for buying new armaments. The first MILEX-2001 defense industry show in Minsk on May 15-18, 2001 strikingly demonstrated the orientation of the Belarussian defense industry towards these very segments. However, Russia is no less interested in the same countries. But there is one more big market in which Russia cannot afford to operate - rogue states.

• Problematic political relations with the world com­munity. Because of its troubled relations with the West, Belarus has much less at stake in trading with rogue states than Russia does.

• A high degree of secrecy in arms trade that has been especially apparent since 2000.

• Indirect evidence of the possibility of these or other deals. For instance, the victory of the Bel­arussian-Russian oil company Slavneft in a con­test for developing oilfields in Iraq happily co­inciding with a possible arms trade deal with Baghdad.

• Active political and economic relations with rogue countries including Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea.

• Other importer-countries of Belarussian arma­ments are unknown. Plummeting returns from arms exports should have provoked a sharp reac­tion from Belarussian leadership, such as a change in the list of companies and persons in­volved in arms trade. However, the positions of these companies in 2001 sooner improved.

One of the counter-arguments the Belarussian leadership uses most frequently to contend the possibility some of implied deals or others is the absence of a sufficient amount of the necessary military hardware.

According to open sources, Belarus has a limited amount of weaponry to offer for sale on the world market, namely:

• T-80 main battle tanks

• Large quantities of spare parts inherited after the division of materiel in the framework of the CFE treaty

• Decommissioned, outdated T-62, T-55 and T-54 tanks

• Shilka air defense guns, Tunguska (SA-19) and Buk (SA-11) short range SAM systems

• Sall arms with copic sights and nade-launchers

• Cmmunication systems

• Amunition.¹²

Table 1. Belarussian arms exports, 1995-1999

Importer	Delivery	Notes
1995
Sudan	10,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles
USA	2 Su-27 fighters
China	Air defense simulator systems
Hungary	FAB-500 air bombs
Yemen	9,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and DShK machine guns
1996
Hungary (or Czech Republic)	100 ?-72 main battle tanks
Sweden	Up to 5,000 telescopic sights	Manufactured by BelOMO.
North Korea	A batch of ?-55 tanks
Yugoslavia	Several hundred thousand units of small arms and ammunition	The ship carrying the batch was detained by NATO forces in the Adriatic Sea.
Yemen	6 Su-24MR bombers, 6 D-36 aircraft engines
1997
China	Over 200 chassis for missile systems	The chassis were manufactured at the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant.
Angola	10-25 BMP-1 AIFVs
China	1 Al-31 engine for a Su-27 fighter
Uganda	100,000 units of SALW	The delivery included SKS carbines, AKM and AK-74 Kalashnikov assault rifles, RPK machine guns and Plamya automatic grenade launchers
China (or Vietnam)	13 Al-31 engines for Su-27 fighters
1998
Moldova	8 BTR-60PB APCs
Algeria	36 MiG-29 fighters
Peru	25 Smerch MLRS
1999
Angola	7 BMP-1 AIFVs, MLRS and ammunition for artillery and small arms
China	2 army pipelines, their transportation vehicles and pumping stations.

Sources: Syarhey Aniska, "The iron flow. Why are we so poverty-stricken if we sell lots of weapons?", Den Daily (Minsk), 16.05.2002; CAST. Table is prepared by CAST.

It should be noted that it was arms and uniforms that constituted the core of several deals. In addition two explanations for where Belarus may be getting military hardware for trading on international markets.

Firstly, according to President Lukashenko,he personally ordered a halt to scrapping tanks as­signed to be dismantled under the Tashkent agreement at the Borisov Tank Repair Plant. The reduction in the agreement also applied to combat vehicles, artillery systems, fighters and helicopters. It is quite possible that the dismantling of other ma­teriel, and not only tanks, was suspended. However, according to official reports, Belarus fulfilled the terms of the agreement.¹³

Secondly, former chairman of the Belarussian Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich has as­sumed that it is not Belarus that is selling arms but that Russia is using Belarus as a channel for arms sales to Iraq, Iran, Libya and other coun­tries "because Belarus does not have and cannot have such weapons in sufficient quantities."¹⁴

These explanations are indirectly confirmed by certain examples, for instance, the fact that the Peruvian and Algerian deals for MiG-29 air su­periority fighters did not reduce the Belarussian air fleet even though it did not have any re­serves. There is a high probability that the deals were in fact the re-export of Russian materiel.

Conclusions

Belarus is likely to remain a significant player on the arms market. Its market niche is deliver­ies primarily to countries or groups reportedly supporting terrorism or instigating regional con­flicts. It would have been quite difficult for Belarus to take this position without cooperat­ing with Russian agencies. Officially, however, all cases of arms trade with such customers are being denied.

¹ Alexander Alesin, "Ne poimany, no reputatsia podmochena," Belorussky rynok, No. 9, 2002.

² Pavel Yakubovich, "Tupoye oruzhiye," Sovetskaya Belorussia, No. 14, 2002.

³ Mark Lenzi, "Selling Guns To Terrorists, From The "Heart Of Europe," Wall Street Journal Europe, 26.04.2002.

⁴ Alexander Alesin, "Budte prozrachnymy i k vam potyanutsya strany," Belorussky rynok, No. 8, 2002.

⁵ "Amerikantsy boyatsya belorusskikh tankov," Narodnaya Volya, No. 55, 2002.

⁶ Anatoly Nezvanov, "Pryamaya rech," Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, No. 1115, 2002.

⁷ Rafal Sadovsky, report "Belarus on world arms trade markets," Polish Center for Oriental Studies, 2001; Tatyana Kuchinskaya, "V chyei korzine 500 millionov dollarov," Den, No. 19, 2002; Alexander Alesin, "Dengi, kotorye ne pakhnut," Belorussky rynok, No. 21, 2001; Mikola Busel, "Bandity finansiruyut belorussky rezhim," Narodnaya Volya, No. 206, 2001

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "Televideniye Rossii i Ukrainy oprovergayut Lukashenko," Belarus Today, 20.12.2001.

¹⁰ Alexander Alesin, "Dengi, kotorye ne pakhnut," Belorussky rynok, No. 21, 2001.

¹¹ Vasili Baranov, "Mnogo shuma iz nichego," Respublika, 21.03.2002.

¹² Olga Biryukova, "Minoborony izbavitsya ot boyepripasov," Belorussky rynok, No. 36, 1999.

¹³ "I kaplya kamen tochit," Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, No. 1123, 2002.

¹⁴ "Amerikantsy boyatsya belorusskikh tankov," Narodnaya Volya, No. 55, 2002.