The Conventional Weapons Requirements of Pakistan's Armed Forces

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha

Security Analyst

Islamabad, Pakistan

For Pakistan, thich currently faces the threat of war with India the greatest challenge today is to provide territorial security in an environment where its conventional capability does not match that of its adversary. In fact, one of the reasons that Islamabad insists upon its first use with nuclear weapons and seems to vociferously threaten India of using weapons of mass de­struction in the event that Indian forces move into Pakistan's territory is because of the com­paratively inferior po­sition of Pakistan's conventional forces. The moderniza­tion of its conventional forces is, therefore, one of the primary objectives of the military high com­mand.

Of course, military modernization depends upon the financial ca­pability of the state. Given Islamabad's fi­nancial constraints, its armed forces have not carried out any major modernization since the 1980s. The military needs, however, to ur­gently up-grade its hardware to keep abreast of the adversary. In a recently given interview to the Washington Post, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharaf spoke about his intent to acquire more conventional weapons.¹ In doing so, the military managers have to decide whether they will continue buying from traditional suppliers or diversify their sources of procurement.

Background of Military Modernization

Since its independence from the British in 1947, Pakistan's primary threat has been India. It also had unfriendly relations with Afghanistan, but tension with the Western neighbor was viewed as an extension of the threat posed by India. In its almost fifty four years of history, the country has fought three conven­tional wars with its Eastern neighbor and nu­merous skirmishes. The main point of contention between the two countries has been the Kashmir issue, which has not only resulted in two wars, but has also resulted in the current military standoff between them.

Pakistan inherited its comparative conventional weapons inferiority when it got a lesser share of military assets in 1947 as a result of the division of the Indian Subcontinent into India and Paki­stan.²

Rivalry with India in the ensuing years made Pakistan search for al­lies, especially in the West. Building re­la­tions with the Soviet Union was not a pri­or­ity in formative years. This bias for the West, particularly the US, can be observed in most of the coun­try's fifty-four years history. Appeals were made re­peatedly to Washing­ton for secur­ing mili­tary support even be­fore Pakistan opted to join the US sponsored formal security arrangements like SEATO and CENTO.³ One of the primary ap­prehensions was that the Soviet Union, which inherently had a leaning towards New Delhi, would never sup­port Pakistan. The security agreement between Moscow and New Delhi signed in 1972 further strengthened the bias against the USSR and building any ties with it.

Despite the brief interlude in the 1970s when relations between the Soviet Union and Paki­stan seem to have improved marginally during the democratic regime of Prime Minister Zul­fiqar Ali Bhutto, Islamabad's remained looking to­wards the US. The primary explanation for this is that Pakistan's foreign policy has  always been driven by its security agenda. In fact, it would not be an overstatement to categorize its foreign policy as an extension of its defense policy. Since the military's prime concern has been to acquire quality hardware at affordable terms, Is­lamabad has always been found allied with the US. It is important to note that the main reason for supporting the US in Cold War its battle against the USSR, which was fought via Afghanistan, was to attract military assis­tance from Washington.⁴ The 1980s were the only period when Islamabad received significant state of the art technology, like F-16 combat air­craft from the US, in lieu of the support that Pakistan provided the US in its covert opera­tion in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, the aliance was over before Pakistan had a chance to completely modernize its armed forces. The signing of the Geneva Ac­cord in 1988, resulting in the withdrawt of So­viet troops from Afghanistan followed by the breakup of the USSR, were developments that halted the arms transfer process between Paki­stan and the US. Not only that, but Washing­ton began to object to Pakistan's nuclear prolif­era­tion, and the US also imposed an arms em­bargo in October 1990. In any case, the military assis­tance provided by Washington was not suffi­cient in alleviating the concerns of the mili­tary management relative to the state of readi­ness of its conventional forces.⁵ From 1982 to 1990, Islamabad only received about $2 billion from the two military assistance agreements signed with its Western ally. A large portion of the military aid, approximately $1.1 billion, was spent on the procurement of 40 American F-16s. The re­mainder was spent on the transfer of a hundred old M-48A5 tanks, 775 M-113A2 APCs, Stinger MANPADS, Harpoon (ship-to-ship), Sidewinder (air-to-air) and TOW (anti-tank) missiles, 3 P-3C Orion early warning na­val reconnaissance aircraft, fire control radar, 20 attack helicopters and some pieces of artil­lery.

Since the imposition of the arms embargo Paki­stan's military has been desperately searching for other sources for acquiring conventional military hardware, especially quality equipment. The 1990s were a decade when Islamabad had no other option but to maintain a of hardware that, in most cases, was ob­tained from Beijing. The Pakistani end-users of Chinese equipment, however, have never been completely satisfied with the quality of hard­ware. This situation pertains particularly to the Air Force and the Navy which require higher quality equipment for their operations in com­parison to the land forces. Higher quality equipment is also an im­perative for situations where the armed forces want to retain some element of offensive punch. Unlike the Army, officers of the Pakistan Air Force also realize the significance of diversifica­tion of sources of supply. This is vital to remain in a position where the service's capability to launch opera­tions during a conflict is not un­dermined due to sanctions by supplying states. The search of new equipment, however,  is also determined by the peculiar environment of each service, under­standing of the need for military hardware and tactical planning.

Operational Plans and Weapons Require­ments

Despite the quantitative inferiority with India, Pakistan's armed forces have never suffered from such a disadvantageous position that would al­low New Delhi a decisive victory. This as­sess­ment is borne out by the results of previous military conflicts. While it is understood that the conventional military technological balance would never be favorable to Islamabad, it could be maintained at a level where the qualitative or quantitative difference does not dramatically favor the adversary. In this regard, the opera­tional planning of each service and its assess­ment of what it can contribute towards national security varies.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF)

The crucial role in safeguarding the country from an absolute defeat has always been played by the PAF. The Pakistan Air Force has tradi­tion­ally managed to maintain the right combina­tion of a 'low and high' mix in terms of its air­craft inventory. Such a mix has contributed tremen­dously towards the PAF's ability to pro­vide close-battle support to the Army and launch limited air superiority missions.

The existing strategic environment is, however, far more challenging. As opposed to the Indian Air Force (IAF), the PAF has a limited number of quality aircraft. The existing inventory is also ridden with problems such as the scarcity of spare parts for the F-16s. The other quality air­craft such as the French Mirages have been refurbished but it is still order aircraft that the Air Force, in any case, had planned to mothball.⁶ This plan was later postponed due to unavailability of other op­tion for filling the gap. The IAF, on the other hand, enjoys both a quantitative and qualitative advantage that could shift the balance against the PAF in a protracted conflict.⁷ Enhancing the Air Force's potential is vital for Pakistan's de­fense. A PAF capable of launching offensive opera­tions or providing credible defense could offset any nu­merical disadvantage that even the land forces have against an adversary.

The PAF's current problem, nonetheless, is that it is multi-tasked with limited hardware to un­dertake all its responsibilities. For instance, its capabilities would be stretched thin if it were tasked with fighting a battle in three sectors - the responsibility of providing close battle sup­port to the army in two land sectors and pro­viding the Pakistan Navy (PN) assistance dur­ing a possible naval blockade by the Indian Navy (IN).⁸ In addition, the Air Force is also responsible for launching nuclear devices, a task that it could only achieve through its better quality aircraft like the F-16s and the Mirage III and IVs. Such an array of activities would not leave the PAF with a sufficient number of supe­rior aircraft to engage the enemy during a conflict. The new F-7s acquired from China are good interceptors, which, however, cannot add to the much-required offensive punch of the service.

Hence, the procurement of a new generation of quality fighter aircraft is at the top of the PAF shop­ping list. The Air Force has been aspiring for the modernization of its fighter aircraft, espe­cially after the US embargo blocked the transfer of the additional 72 F-16s ordered by Islamabad in 1987. The government, in fact,  has continued to pay for the aircraft even after October 1990 in the hope that it could be able to negotiate the release of the planes. The other option se­riously considered as a likely replacement was the French Mirage 2000-5. A deal was negoti­ated but finally called off due to the dearth of resources and rumors of financial mismanage­ment on Pakistan's side. It was only then (end 1990s) that the PAF started to look more seri­ously at other options such as the Swedish Gripens and the Russian Su-27s. The negotia­tions never materialized into deals.

In terms of priority of the PAF, the top man­agement still considers America as the best source for the acquisition of quality technology followed by France. The two additional fea­tures, which make France a popular source, are:

• The possible availability of a credit line from Paris for purchase of the French aircraft;

• The absence of political strings attached with the deal.

In the words of the Air Chief, the biggest at­traction of buying weapons, especially from France is that Paris rarely imposes sanctions and it is this reliability factor that even offsets the high cost of the French equipment.⁹ The service is equally open, however, to procuring weapons from Moscow, the third on the PAF's preference list of possible suppliers. The basic concern about purchasing aircraft from Moscow is the perception in Islamabad that Russia might not be willing to sell to Pakistan. This view is contrary to the understanding of Pakistan's military establishment during the early 1990s that Moscow would sell major weapon systems to Islamabad irrespective of the strength of a pro-India lobby. Such views do not speak of the service's bias for western equipment. Even now, when the PAF would accept a Russian aircraft with comparatively less hesitation, the service is less sure of the sub-systems used in these air­craft. The PAF would prefer to procure a 'green' aircraft and fit it with superior

Western avionics, an option recently exercised by New Delhi as well. India, it must be noted, has opted for French and Israeli subsystems to be fitted with the recently ordered Su-30 MKI fighters. According to the Chief of Air Staff, if the issue is to procure a major weapon system like fighter aircraft from East Europe, he would much rather buy it from the original equipment manufacturing (OEM) state like Russia than any other CIS state.¹⁰ The reli­ability of spare parts supply would be a major consid­eration. To the question if Russian aircraft would add to increasing the overall maintenance cost of the PAF fleet, the air chief's response was that he would still opt for the Russian MiGs or Sukhois as long as these were available.

The focus of the PAF is to attain the technological capacity to enhance its offensive capability by adding deep strike, multirole aircraft and other technologies that have a similar im­pact. This refers to the service's interest in air-to-air refueling system that would increase its range of operations. Moreover, the PAF is keen to acquire the airborne early warning technol­ogy and superior surveillance systems including balloon borne radar systems. Islamabad struggled hard to acquire airborne early warning technology from the US during the 1980s, but failed to do so due to the Ameri­can concern regarding the AWACS dramatically disturbing the regional military balance. The technology would have improved Pakistan's ca­pability to monitor troop movement on the In­dian side. Despite the dwindling hope that the Air Force will acquire AWACS technology, it still want to boost its overall surveillance capability to increase the warning and response time, an essential force multiplier in Pakistan's case.

Pakistan Army

From a supplier's perspective, the most impor­tant service in Pakistan's armed forces is the Army. This is not just due to the large size of the land force - about 512, 000 ser­vicemen - but also because of the political influ­ence of the service and the fact that it is the Army's strategic and tactical assessment that de­termines technology requirements. From the Paki­stan Army's point of view, especially in its assess­ment of threat, the important sectors lie in the country's north and south. While there is an ex­tremely risky line of control (LoC) in the north, Pakistan's crucial artery is on its south­ern border with India. The two sectors represent two different types of terrain: it is the ex­tremely difficult mountainous terrain in the north and desert in the south. In certain re­spects, the LoC is more manageable in terms of planning because the terrain is so difficult that even India with its numerical superiority would find it difficult to launch a massive military op­eration and gain a decisive victory.

Although Islamabad's forces are primarily geared to fight a defensive war in the north, stopping an Indian onslaught would be com­paratively less difficult. It is the southern bor­der, however, that one would rate as a greater challenge. This is the sector where the Indian Army in assistance with the IAF plans to con­duct a deep strike operation with the objective of severing Pakistan's main artery - the strategic link between Sindh that houses the main sea port and Punjab where the main industrial hub and the military's nerve center is situated. This is also a sector where Islamabad hopes to retali­ate by launching its own offensive operation. The southern border, it is worthy of note, comprises a desert terrain where the crucial factor relates to quality surveillance, fire power and mobility of operations. These tactical elements require a superior armored corps, early warning and sur­veillance capability, the ability to transport infantry at high speeds, artillery and attack helicopters.

The Army had hoped to improve its armored corps through acquiring higher quality tanks. It was in this regard that it had initiated the in­digenous development of a main battle tank: the MBT-2000 also known as 'Al-Khalid.' Although official sources claim that the tank has superior features and is on par with the best quality tanks available in the international arms mar­ket, the tank is still undergoing trials and has to prove its metal. In any case, the MBT-2000 is way behind its production schedule. Currently, the mainstay of Pakistan Army's armored corps is the Chinese T-series tanks. Hence, Islamabad opted for the acquisition of Ukrainian T-80UD tanks. Basically of Russian origin, the Paki­stan Army was interested in acquiring these tanks from the original Russian manufacturers. The deal did not materialize, how­ever,  due to Mos­cow's lack of interest in selling hardware to Pakistan. The Ukraine was viewed as the next best option. The idea was to buy tanks of Russian origin from a supplier that had rela­tively better control over the production line as compared to other former East European states like the Czech Republic and Poland that had of­fered to sell T-72s. Purchasing West Euro­pean tanks was not a probability due to exces­sive cost and reluctance of suppliers to sell to Pakistan. Resultantly, about 320 tanks were ac­quired from the Ukraine. For the purchase of transport and attack helicopters, however, another of the requirements of the Pakistan Army, the service would be keen to obtain them from an OEM State that can guarantee reliability in spare parts maintenance. A source in the Pakistan's Joint Services Headquarters (JSHQ) claimed that there was a keen interest in purchasing Russian equipment. In fact, Islamabad did purchase Mi-17 transport helicopters. The Army, however, was a bit upset about delays in the delivery of the Mi-17s.¹¹

The Army's intention is to improve its firepower and surveillance capabilities. Indeed, one of the emerging challenges for Islamabad is the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) tech­nology that India seems to be acquiring from Is­rael. This is a technology that Pakistan would like to acquire as well. Currently, it is looking at a two-pronged approach:

• To obtain UAV technology

• To procure better technology for the surveil­lance of enemy UAVs. Highly sensitive cameras that could be installed on borders to moni­tor these low-flying objects would prove a good antidote to a technology that has the ca­pacity of providing real-time images to the ad­versary.

Nonetheless, compared to the Air Force, the Army is more comfortable with Chinese tech­nology. The issue for the largest service of the armed forcesis to have a dependable source. Acquiring quality technology has not been one of the prominent features of the Army's procurement. This situation will con­tinue.

The Pakistan Navy (PN)

The Pakistan Navy has always been the least important service of its armed forces. This is despite the 900 km long coastline. It is impor­tant to note that the only seaport at Karachi was blockaded by the Indian Navy during the 1971 war. Ever since, the threat of a blockade was clearly identified in the national war plans. Currently the PN is no match to its counter­part. The military strategic plans do not pro­scribe a significant role for the smallest and most insignificant service. The Pakistani Navy can at best provide good coastal defense. Despite the difference of opinion among the top man­agement of the Pakistan Armed Forces regarding the Navy's role, it is essential to understand the vital requirement of the PN for evading a naval blockade and ensuring the supply of strategic goods during a conflict. It is generally believed that the Indian Navy does not have the poten­tial to impose a blockade by operating close to Pakistan's coastal waters.¹² The threat cannot, however, be underestimated. The adversary does not necessarily have to operate close Pakistan's coast for enforcing a blockade. Nor does it need to employ a major portion of its surface fleet to achieve such an objective. Unfortunately, the PN has only about six to seven submarines and an equal number of frigates to counter the IN. In addition, it has a limited number of missile and gunboats of Chinese origin. The newly acquired French Agosta 90B submarines will take an­other couple of years to be fully operational.

Despite the fact that the PN signed three out of four major deals during the 1990s, it continues to be deficient in frigates. The British Type-21s acquired during the 1990s are problematic due to dearth of spare parts. In addition, these old frig­ates did not contain an anti-missile protective suite. Therefore, the Navy is keenly interested in new frigates and subsystems to strengthen its existing platforms. The service had undertaken negotiations with the Chinese for the acquisition of a F-22P frigate. Nevertheless, a deal could not be signed due to the lack of resources.

What is most noticeable about the PN is its bias for western equipment. When its top manage­ment was asked about diversification of sources of supply through considering suppliers from a number of CIS states, the impression one got was that these other sources were not being se­riously considered.¹³ In any case, given the cur­rent shortage of resources, it is unlikely that the service would be allowed major acquisitions. Indeed it will be constrained to making pur­chases to the tune of about $100 million allo­cated to it annually for the procurement of sub­systems and spares.

Paying for the Technology

The biggest issue for Islamabad now is to meet its military's weapons requirements in an envi­ronment ridden with severe economic con­straints. For the past ten years or more, the country's economic conditions have not been en­viable. The economy is certainly in no position to meet the military's demand for its shopping list worth approximately $10 billion over the next seven to eight years.¹⁴ The restrictions im­posed by financial aid donors restrain Is­lamabad from increasing its non-development budget. Defense spending that consumes about 25% of the central government expenditure has traditionally only added to the country's debt burden and deficit. Economic constraints pose a ma­jor problem as far as major future acquisitions are concerned.

In the past, the problem of the availability of hard cash for purchasing equipment was solved through arranging credit facility. This is what Islamabad hopes to do in the future. This might be a problematic situation, however, for suppli­ers that cannot arrange a credit line for Islama­bad. The acquisition of subsystems, upgrades, etc., however, appears manageable even in the current circumstances.

Militarily, the challenges that Pakistan faces today are manifold. The growing power of neighboring India and Islamabad's financial con­straints are two issues that are considered ex­tremely threatening for maintaining a credible defense. The military is also at a stage when it seriously needs to diversify its sources of supply. Its traditional dependence on the US for the procurement of quality equipment has proven costly in terms of maintaining a qualitative edge. Acquisition from China, on the other hand, has not allowed Pakistan to fill the quali­tative deficiency, either. The military's top man­agement is keen to forge military transfer rela­tions with other states, especially Russia. The hindrance now, however, remains the financial constraints and Moscow's willingness to do business with Islamabad.

Considering the interaction between Russian President Putin and Pakistan's Genberal Pervez Musharaf, it is generally hoped that the two countries might be able to forge ties that would make technology transfers possible.

¹ For reference see Dawn, 24.06.2002.

² Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947-58. (London: Macmillan Press, 1990). Pp. 32, 78-79.

³ Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁴ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99 In Search of a Policy, Palgrave Press, UK, May 2001. pp. 92-95.

⁵ Interview with Lt. General (retd.) KM. Ariff, No­vember 1993.

⁶ Interview with Vice Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Aliuddin, February 1997.

⁷ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Is the PAF Ready for it? In the Friday Times, Vol. XIII, No. 45, January 4-10, 2002.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Interview with the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Mar­shal, Mushaaf Ali Mir, 10.06.2002.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Discussion with officials from the Joint Staff Head­quarters, Rawalpindi.

¹² One often hears of such an evaluation. Such views were expressed at a seminar held at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 25.04.2002, on the sub­ject of air power in South Asia.

¹³ Interview with the Vice Chief of Naval Staff (now the Chief of Naval Staff), Admiral Abdul Aziz Mirza, February 1997.

¹⁴ Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan's Arms Procure­ment and Military Buildup, 1979-99 In Search of a Policy. (London: Palgrave Press, UK, May 2001). P. 195.