|
Influence of Russian-Chinese Arms Trade on Evolution of the Chinese Air Force
Konstantin MAKIENKO
The Chinese Air Force at the Beginning of the 90’s
By the beginning of the 90’s, i.e. by the time of the renewal of Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation which had been interrupted at the end of the 50’s, the Air Force of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) of China was armed mainly with Soviet developed arms and equipment belonging to the first and the second post-war generation. Those were the J-5 and J-6 fighters corresponding to the Soviet analogues MiG-17 (Fresco) and MiG-19 (Farmer), and the J-7 family fighters corresponding to the Soviet second gene-ration MiG-21 (Fish-bed) planes.
Beside the fact that the Chinese Air Force was armed with out-dated military equipment, it did not have any combat experience on either the tactical or strategic levels. At the same time it was experiencing difficulties related to poor training, weakness of the infrastructure and low quality of battle control. The PLA Air Force participated actively neither in the Korean War nor in the mission against Vietnam in 1979. On the whole, the Chinese Air Force, like the PLA in general, exhibited extremely low fighting potential and preparedness.
The Epoch of the Su-27: Deliveries of Russian Aircraft Equipment in 1992-1999
While implementing a modernization program for its Air Force, the PLA immediately decided on the purchase of the Su-27 (Flanker) family of heavy fighters. Firstly, China with its large territory, considerable territorial waters and ocean economic zone, is naturally interested in long-range fighters. In addition, heavy combat aircraft can take on a bigger fighting load compared to light and medium planes. Secondly, at the beginning of the 90’s the Peoples’ Republic of China had already fulfilled the R&D program for the creation of its own light fighter F-10 developed using the technology of the Israeli Lavi fighter, which for its part is a deep modernization of the US F-16. Thus, the purchase of fourth generation light fighters was not a priority for the Chinese Air Force.
In the first half of the 90’s, China purchased two tranches of Su-27SK and Su-27UBK fighters.
The first batch of fighters was transferred in 1992. The Russian press more frequently mentions the delivery of the first batch of 26 planes including 20 single- seat Su-27SK and 6 two-seat Su-27UBK. However, according to some other sources, only 24 planes were delivered including 4 combat trainers.1
The second batch of fighters was trans-ferred in 1995 and included 16 Su-27SK and 6 Su-27UBK fighters.
At the same time there had been long and complicated negotiations concerning the transfer to China of a license for the manufacture of Su-27 family fighters at one of the plants which had experience with Soviet design military equipment production. In December 1996 the corresponding contract was signed which envisaged the manufacture of 200 Su-27SK fighters at the Shenyang plant. The Russian press estimates the price of the contract at $2.2 to 2.5 billion. The first two of the Chinese Su-27SKs, which received the national codename of J-11, were assembled in Shenyang and tested in December of 1998. The initial plan was to achieve a manufacturing capacity of 40 units a year by the year of 2004.2 According to other sources, it was initially envisaged that until 2002, production in Shenyang would proceed at a rate of 6-7 planes a year, and would be increased to 15 planes a year only after 2002.3 According to the same sources by the end of 2000 the Chinese Air Force had only 10 domestically assembled J-11 fighters. In any case, non-official Russian sources indicate that Su-27SK production is developing much slower than the both parties had expected.
The Second Wave of Purchases. The Epoch of the Su-30
It took China eight years to develop the operation of Su-27SK and to begin small serial production of the aircraft. In August 1999 a contract for the delivery of 38-40 generation 4+ Su-30MKK fighters was signed. In contrast to the serial Su-27SK, these planes were developed using Chinese specifications, and can utilize beyond visual range (BVR) rocket RVV-AE and aviation air-to-surface means of destruction with television and laser guidance. In December 2000 the first 10 Su-30MKK were transferred to China. It is remarkable that R&D work and development of the serial production of the new plane were accomplished within a very short time. It is also interesting to note that the battle capabilities of the Su-30MKK are considerably inferior to those of the Su-30MKI, developed using Indian specifications. The Su-30MKK plane has no front horizontal empennage, which the Su-30MKI has. In contrast to the Indian version, the Chinese plane is equipped with an AL-31F serial engine, while the Su-30MKI is equipped with an AL-31FP engine with a controlled thrust vector, which makes the Chinese version less maneuverable than the Indian. However it is the more up-date avionics that confirms the decisive advantage of the Indian fighter. Thus, the Su-30MKI control system is built on the basis of N-011M ‘Bars’ radar with phased grid antenna, while the Chinese fighter is equipped with modernized N-001 serial radar. All this means that China is carrying out a much less ambitious technological policy compared with that of India, which, however, entails fewer technological risks. As the result of this choice the deliveries of Su-30MKK to China began 16 months after the signing of the contract, while the deliveries of Su-30MKI to India have not begun yet even five years after the contract was signed.
In December 1999 an additional contract for the delivery of 28 Su-27UBK combat trainers was signed. Thus, at the end of the 90’s China began transferring from forth generation interceptors to more perfect four plus generation aircraft, with limited potential for air-to-ground missions. Besides, China clearly began to experience problems due to the insufficient number of two-seat trainers for teaching pilots to fly the Su-27SKs, which will be delivered in greater numbers to the Air Force as licensed manufacture develops.
In July 2001 it became known that a contract for the delivery of another batch of 38 Su-30MKK had been signed.4 In connection with this purchase one can discern the following new trends in the Chinese purchases of the Russian aircraft equipment:
§ increased numbers of the purchased aircraft. While the Su-27SK was purchased in two batches of 26 (24) and 22 fighters, the Su-30MKK is being purchased with 38 units in each batch;
§ increased frequency of the contracts signed. The delivery of the second batch of Su-27SK planes was fulfilled 4 years after the first tranche. The second contract for Su-30MKK was signed 22 months after signing the first agreement, when not more than 25% of the planes envisaged by the August 1999 contract were delivered.
Assessment of the Modern Potential of the Chinese Air Force
As of the mid 2001, the Chinese Air Force was armed with the following air group of Su-27 family fighters:
§ Approximately 45 combat-ready Su-27SK and Su-27UBK fighters, which were delivered to China from 1992 to 1996.
§ at least 10 J-11 fighters assembled in Shenyang under the implementation of the licensed contract for manufacture of 200 such fighters.
§ 10 multifunctional Su-30MKK fighters delivered in 2000.
§ 8 Su-27UB combat trainers. Delivered in 2000 under the 1999 contract.
Total – 70-73 combat-ready Su-27 family fighters.
Thus, before 1999, China was purchasing standard Su-27 fighters, which are practically identical with planes of Russian production. These aircraft can fulfill missions to provide the country’s air defense and fight for air superiority. However, they have no potential to conduct air-to-ground tasks and are equipped with outdated avionics. Since 1999 China began purchasing multifunctional fighters with limited potential for air-to-surface missions.
Although the Chinese Air Force has made a two generation leap forward in combat aviation equipment by purchasing the Su-27SK and Su-30MKK fighters, it did not result in Chinese aviation acquiring new qualitative possibilities. Continental China’s Air Force did not gain air superiority over Taiwan, South Korea or Japan, and also is unable to carry out landing missions or provide support to navy landing missions in the region of the Parasel islands or the Spratly islands.
The air forces of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea retain both a quantitative and qualitative advantage over China’s aviation. Each of the three countries is armed with dozens of fourth generation and four plus generation fighters. Besides, they enjoy an absolute advantage in the area of information support and operation control of their air forces, which is achieved by the availability of airborne early warning (AEW) planes. The insufficient number of flying tankers and lack of AEW&C planes in China limit the possibility of effective operations of the Chinese Air Force in the South Chinese Sea water area.
China Air Force’s only qualitative breakthrough is probably that it managed to acquire a comparative advantage over the Vietnamese Air Force, and now is able to ensure air superiority in the land military operation theatre. However, it is still unable to provide efficient air support to its land forces, as it does not have the potential to air-to-ground tasks. It also cannot carry out the missions against naval targets or use high accuracy air-to-surface beyond visual range rockets.
Expected Contracts and Assessment of Prospective Potential of the Chinese Air
At present, the following contracts for delivery and licensed manufacture of Su-27 fighters are at the implementation stage:
§ Contract for licensed manufacture of 200 Su-27 fighters, signed in February 1996. The manufacture of the fist fighters began at the end of 1998.
§ Contract for delivery of 28 Su-30MKK fighters, signed in August 1999. The contact will be fulfilled in 2004-2005.
§ Contract for delivery of additional 38 Su-30MKK fighters, allegedly signed in July 2001.
It is expected that contracts for the delivery of additional Su-27 family fighters, which will be signed in the nearest future, will be as follow:
§ Signing of a license agreement for the manufacture of 150 to 200 Su-30MKK fighters is expected in case of successful implementation of delivery contracts for Su-30MKK in approximately 2004.
§ The signing of a contract for the delivery of additional Su-27UB combat trainers is quite possible.
§ Objectively, China needs to purchase specialized multifunctional planes, adapted for anti ship missions and carrying long-range anti-ship Kh-31 (AS-17), Yakhont or Moskit missiles. At the present moment Russia has only one forth generation air platform from which Kh-31 were launched. It is a Su-30 fighter (board 302), on the basis of which a new variant Su-30KN is being developed.
By the year 2005 the Chinese Air Force will be rmed with:
§ approximately 200 to 210 Su-27SK and Su-27UB fighters (the existing 60 to 62 fighters plus 150 fighters made under license);
§ up to 60 Su-30MKK fighters;
§ a few dozens of domestically produced F-10 fighters.
This air group will allow the Chinese Air Force not only gain air superiority in the land operation theatre in Vietnam, but also ensure limited support to its land force and armored units. The Chinese Air Force will also be able to carry out limited naval missions in the South Chinese Sea, however its potential will still be limited due to the lack of AEW planes and flying tankers. The quantitative advantage of the Chinese Air Force will also be parried if an integrated Vietnamese-Malaysian-Indonesian military air command in the South Chinese Sea is established.
As regards quantity, China will achieve parity in fourth generation air force complexes with the South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, however these three countries will retain quantitative advantage due to the advantage in the field of air force information and combat control. That is why China will not be able to carry out successful offensive air missions against Taiwan. If fighters capable of using long-range anti-ship weapons are not purchased, China will not be able to efficiently fulfill missions in the Taiwan Strait.
By the year 2010, China will mainly accomplish the rearmament of its Air Force with forth generation and four plus generation equipment. By that time China will have:
at least 270 Su-27SK and Su-27UBK fighters;
at least 70 to 76 multifunctional Su-30MKK fighters, but most probably up to 250 such fighters if the likely contract for licensed manufacture of this fighters is signed;
at least 300 light multifunctional F-10 fighters.
Thus, by 2010, China will have about 800 fourth generation and four plus generation fighters provided no additional delivery contracts are signed. These will be mostly multifunctional fighters, i.e. combat aircraft, able to use highly accurate air-to-surface means of destruction. This implies that in 2010, the Chinese Air Force will be able to simultaneously support mission of its ground troops and carry out a large-scale airborne-naval landing mission on the isles of the South Chinese Sea. At the same time in both directions they will have overwhelming quantitative advantage and comparative qualitative parity with the Vietnamese, Malaysian, Philippines and Singapore air forces.
The quantitative and qualitative growth of the Chinese Air Force will most likely provoke the additional purchase of aviation equipment by Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. For Taiwan there may appear a window of vulnerability between the years 2008 and 2012, if the JSF program is implemented with normal delays in the R&D work schedule and development of serial production. In such a case Taipei will be forced to purchase additional fourth generation fighters, or an inconsiderable number of heavy and expensive F-22 fighters.
1 A.Fomin, «Su-27. Istoriya istrebitelya», RA Intervestnik, Moscow, 1999. p.198.
2 Ibid. p.199.
3 B.Kuzyk, N.Novichkov, V.Shvarev, M.Kenzhetaev, A.Simakov, «Rossiay na mirovom rynke oruzhiya», , Military Parade, 2001, p.371.
4 Mikhail Kozyrev, Maria Rozhkova, «Gazprom», «Rusal» I oruzhie», Vedomosti, 17.07.2001, p.A3
|
