State Control Over Sensitive Exports in Ukraine

Valentin BADRAK

In recent years the trade in armaments and services as well as trade in dual-use products and sensitive technology has acquired great importance in the Ukraine, so much that it is constantly the focus of attention of leading persons in the government. This is demonstrated in particular by the creation of the Expert-Technical Committee under the Cabinet of Ministers and Government Commission on the issues of export control in 1993¹, the basis of which was later established the State Service for Export Control of Ukraine. Not only this, but the change in the climate of export aware­ness in the Ukraine is also shown by the emer­gence of the Presidential Commission on Export Control Policy and Mili­tary and Technological Coopera­tion of the Ukraine with foreign states in 1999, which was renamed in 2000 to the Presidential Com­mittee on Military and Technological Co­opera­tion Policy and Export Control.²

The Ukrainian System of Export Control: From Upheaval to Stability

In speaking of Ukrainian export control, it should be mentioned that the country is a par­ticipant in three of the four international con­trols over the arms distribution, namely the Group of Nuclear Suppliers since April 20, 1996, the Wassenaar Arrangements since July 11, 1996 and since May 27, 1998, the Controls Regime over the Rocket Technologies. Although not officially participating in the work of the fourth international control, the Australian Group, the Ukraine has actually created its own system of control over the transfer of chemical armaments and materials. In 1999 Ukraine joined the Convention on Prohibition of Development, Production, Accumulation and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruc­tion, despite considerable annual fees for the participation in this Convention.³ On December 9, 1999 a government decree was issued on as­sistance in fulfillment of this Convention.⁴ 

After the declaration of independence, the Ukraine as well as a number of other CIS and Eastern European countries were legitimately considered to be potential problem states in connection with illegal transfers of armaments on the world arms market. Among the causes of this situation, the following can be enumerated:

• the country did not have its own export controls system at the time of the breakup of the USSR

• the unprecedented reduction in the military presence of the former USSR in the territory of the Ukraine⁵ and the withdrawal of a con­siderable amount of redundant arma­ments and defense technology from mili­tary stock which could poten-tially be sold to foreign states

• insufficient gov­ernment financing of the de­fense complex and  near complete standstill in the gov­ernment defense or­der⁶, which encour­aged en­terprises to sell their production irre­gardless of political alignment

• a gradual reduction in the ability of the government to finance fundamental research⁷ creating favorable conditions for non-materi­alized transfers, which experts currently con­sider to be the most dangerous form of tech­nology export

Thus, concern among the world community re­garding uncontrolled arms distribution from post-Soviet regions was not unfounded.

The Ukraine began reforming its own export control system after a number of serious abuses were discovered in the operations of the Com­mercial Center under the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, which was created in 1991 to sell re­dundant armaments.⁸ Unfortunately, after the liquidation of the Commercial Center under the Ukrainian Defense Ministry none of the crimi­nal cases opened have been brought to a conclu­sion, causing some experts to assert that the currently numerous accusations against the Ukraine for unauthorized arms transfers is the result of excessive loyalty on the part of the government in regards to the violators in this sphere, and even the possible existence of close ties between the government and the violators. 

Even the creation of the Expert-Technical Committee with the purpose of a stricter ap­proach to the licensing of transfers did not im­prove the situation much. In particular, among the others, the Ukraine was suspected to be a supplier of anti-aircraft missile complexes, mis­sile lauchers, and anti-tank rockets to the Serbs, as well as a supplier of a considerable amount of armored vehicles in Azerbaijan.⁹ Unfortunately, two cases related with undocumented dumping were not completed. The most well known of the two was in relation with the sale of 4 Su-17 (Fitter) aircraft to Yemen for $500,000 per unit in 1994, in connection of which heated criminal proceedings were initiated, but this still remains a confidential to the public. 

Scott Jones, an American expert from the Cen­ter of World Trade and Security at the Univer­sity of Georgia, has pointed out that a number of reports from foreign organizations from a much later period had evidenced deliveries of sensitive products and technology from Ukraine to China, Iraq, Libya and Syria, and at the end of 1996 a high-ranking official from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela­tions and Trade was arrested for taking bribes and issuing licenses for the export of sensitive materials.¹⁰ The last fact may be characterized as one of the concrete steps made by the Ukrainian government on the way to a greater transparency of the military-technological coop­eration of Ukraine with foreign states.   

An unfavorable image of the Ukraine was pro­duced when publicity was given to the results of the Temporary Inquiry Commission’s examina­tion of the facts on unauthorized arms traffic, which estimates that during the period between 1992-1996 the sale of defense equipment and materials from the Ukraine went on un­checked.¹¹ In particular, according to the Commission, in the period between 1994 -1997 the Ukrainian State Service for Export Control granted 6,500 licenses for the export of arms and military equipment and corresponding spare parts and munitions. Over 114 firms, organiza­tions and companies took part in foreign arms trade, military and special technology sales op­erations. During this period, products were ex­ported to 40 countries around the world for a total of about $760 million, with sales often closed at less than fair market value. According to the Commission, prerequisites for abuse were the lack of adequate registration of the blank li­cense application forms as well as the unchecked inventories of the arms on register with the military departments in the Ukraine. Although many experts expressed the conviction that the Temporary Commission was politically moti­vated, it is obvious that certain violations of the world trade restrictions have in reality taken place. This is also indirectly confirmed by the radical change in the whole system of foreign trade relations in the Ukraine, as well as the changes in the export control system, which took place after a number of problem situations connected with Ukrainian participation in trans­fers of sensitive technology or products.

At the same time, the changes in the foreign trade relations and export control systems that took place in 1996 made evident the Ukraine’s desire to improve the situation in the control of sensitive export. Beginning in the autumn of 1996, all domestic issues related to the arms business were subjected to the scrutiny of Ukrspetsexport, a state company established es­pecially for regulating and the centralization of military-technical cooperation. Also, instead of the earlier mentioned Export-Technical Commit­tee under the Cabinet of Ministers, there ap­peared a new agency - the Ukrainian State Service for Export Control.  Practically speak­ing, it is only since this time that the issues of military-technical cooperation have de facto be­come the monopoly of the State.  Further, a considerable interest was shown by the USA, a strategic partner of Ukraine, in helping with the establishment of an effective controlling body. Namely, within the framework of the Co­operative Threat Reduction Program or Nunn-Lugar Program, the Ukraine also began receiv­ing technical assistance for the improvement of export control systems. This program had in view the creation of an autonomized export con­trol system and large-scale enforcement meas­ures against violations in the field of export control. The switch over from an ordinary ap­plication form to an electronic system for license filing, executed with the help of the US, has reduced the licensing process for transfers on the armaments market. According to a report by Valery Gubenko, Chairman of State Service of Export Control, as of 1999 the Ukraine had re­ceived about $13 million for the creation of automotized export control system.¹²

Considerable progress has also been made in the Ukrainian Defense Ministry: in January 1998 Defense Minister Oleksander Kuzmuk gave a report in which it was stated that, «…in the military department a mechanism has been de­veloped which makes the sale of the Defense Ministry’s military equipment impossible.» Also, the Minister informed that the military department had carried out a full inventory of all types of armaments, and an annual plan was set up for the sale of some redundant arms. Ac­cording to Oleksander Kuzmuk’s statement, the military from that point on ‘no longer deals with the arms sales issues’.¹³ As early as 1998 after analyzing the national export control sys­tems American experts came to the conclusion that it was 83% in conformity with western standards.¹⁴

As was pointed out in April 1998, by the Assis­tant to the Chairman of the State Service for Export Control Alexander Kluban, during the course of 1997 about 1,000 permits were issued for the export of armaments and dual-purpose products. The total value of the products and services due to be exported in accordance with the permits came to about $1 billion. In regards to the consideration of applications, according to the report of the then Chairman of the State Service for Export Control Viktor Vaschilin, during this period there were some 3,000 to 5,000 applications reviewed annually, the ma­jority of applications not requiring licenses. Re­fusals made up a maximum of 2-3% of the appli­cations and these were mainly in conjunction with international sanctions against some coun­tries.¹⁵

All the problems relating to the improvement of export control remained until mid 1998. Almost immediately after the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the State Service for Export Con­trol in October of 1998, the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Coun­cil, Vladimir Gorbulin, commenting on the res­ignation of the then Chairman of the State Service, Vaschilin, stressed the necessity to re­vise some decisions taken by the State Service, in particular, «this concerns not only high tech­nologies but also dual-purpose technologies».¹⁶

The next step in the improving the export con­trol system was the regulation of special export­ers and partial modernization of the system for strategic decisions in the sphere of international trade relations with foreign states. On February 4, 1999 there appeared the Decree of the Presi­dent on establishing the earlier mentioned State Commission on the Ukrainian Export Control Policy and Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States, an epoch-making decision for the Ukrainian arms export industry and for arms export control.¹⁷ This state body, to which was subjected the State Service for Ex­port Control and Ukrspetsexport, the state arms trade corporation, was designated to deal with the most important strategic decisions in the sphere of foreign trade relations. Among it’s members are representatives of all of the minis­tries and agencies related with arms exports, military technology and special services, in par­ticular, the Ukrainian Security Service, the Ministry of Industrial Policy, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Finance. During the first half of 1999 there appeared 6 presiden­tial decrees, which purposed to create a strict but sufficiently effective scheme for decision-making in the field of foreign-trade relations. These decrees did not rule out collective leader­ship in decision-making in the area of arms ex­port, but in cases of interdepartmental disputes the issue is deferred for consideration to the head of state.¹⁸ As a result of the adoption of these measures, the export application process­ing time is reduced considerably in the sphere of foreign-trade relations: for the import and tran­sit of military equipment and armaments - up to 15 days; for the export of dual purpose goods - 30 days; military equipment and arms - 45 days. In some cases, the reaction time is even shorter: in 2000, Ukrspetsexport General Director Va­lerii Maliev mentioned cases when arms trans­fers were carried out within 10-12 days.¹⁹

Also in this period of change in the Ukraine, the Corporate Export Control Programs (CECP) were created.  These are local systems for control of the transfer of military purpose products and services. In March 1997 arms ex­porters in Ukraine set up the non-governmental Scientific and Technical Center for the Export and Import of Special Technology, Armaments and Materials. This organ, in coordination with the State Service for Export Control and state representatives of the US export control initi­ated a series of prefatory activities for the de­velopment of regulatory bodies within corpora­tions as the first line of state control. Already by mid 2000, CEC programs were introduced at three defense enterprises in the Ukraine.²⁰ To this could be added that some powerful defense enterprises established their own divisions for export control even before the introduction of the CECP’s. These enterprises include the State Aircraft Plant ‘Aviant’, the Granit PLC, the Uzhny Machine Building Plant, and a few others.²¹ Taking into account that independent negotiations of some enterprises with representa­tives of countries under international sanctions had indeed take place, the development of these local systems of export control remains an im­portant activity in the process of development of export control.  Past examples of such viola­tions include the negotiations conducted by the Kharkov firm ‘Montazhelektro’ with Libya in 1996 concerning the maintenance of aircraft and naval technology, the proposed services of mili­tary character to Afghanistan by the Odessa Tank Repairing Plant in 2000,²² and govern­ment agents in the town of Nikolaev who went on record the beginning of 2001 concerning their willingness to complete the construction of the aircraft carrier Varyag, which had already been sold for non-military purposes.²³

Simultaneously, the procedure of granting the privilege of special exporter status to Ukrainian defense contractors was toughened. If at first about 50 candidates were considered, 9 months after the corresponding Resolution of the Gov­ernment No.838²⁴ only 6 intermediary firms managed received the corresponding export permits, namely the Ukrspetsexport corporation itself, its 5 subsidiaries and 6 other state con­trolled enterprises.²⁵   To a certain extent this demonstrated the wiliness of the government to keep tight control over arms export procedures from within the arms export industry, as well as maintaining maximum consideration for foreign policy factors in the execution of foreign trade relations ad in the prevention of unauthorized deliveries.

Current Accusations of Export Viola­tions: What Might They Mean?

Despite the sufficiently high quality of the Ukrainian export control system in the opinion of western specialists, during the last 2 to 3 years the Ukraine, along with a number of other post-Soviet states, is more often remembered in the foreign media as a violator of international agreements on the world arms market.

Ukrainian officials have more than once noted that the accusations of unauthorized arms trade against the Ukraine are an attempt by competi­tors in the arms industry and by some political forces to oust the Ukraine from the world ar­maments market. In particular, Vladimir Gorbu­lin stated that, «4 out of 5 accusations con­cerning the Ukrainian air transport of unau­thorized armaments are unfounded, and one fifth concern those aircraft which are owned by private firms and for which the Ukraine is not accountable for.»²⁶ Early in the current year, Sergey Teteruk, the head of Defense Aspects of the National Security Department of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Coun­cil on (NSDC) noted that the sale of light ar­maments continue to be a problem for the Ukraine and mentioned particularly an agree­ment signed with the OSCE in November 2000, in which it submitted to the international com­munity a register of trade in light armaments.²⁷ Besides this, according to the opinion of one NSDC representative, some foreign states are using double standards in working with Kiev. «For example, the USA claims to adhere to a hard line in relation to arms trade with Libya, yet itself works in this market.»²⁸ It is inter­esting that double standards of the western states in regards Ukraine began to speak not only of government agents but also representa­tives of some non-government organizations. It is in this light that Anatoly Gritsenko, Presi­dent of the Ukrainian Olexander Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies con­siders the surfacing of accusations about the supply of sensitive products and technologies to Iraq to be related to the stepping up of the col­laboration between the Ukraine and Iraq in non-military spheres, which is not to the liking of the Western competitors of the Ukraine.²⁹ As for the volumes of Ukrainian arms deliveries, this also cannot but worry the Western partici­pants in the armaments market: according to of­ficial information, in the year 2000 the Ukraine delivered armaments and dual-purpose products and services for the amount of about $500 mil­lion.³⁰

A related problem acknowledged in the Ukraine concerns the use of transport planes for the de­livery of armaments. Having suffered consider­able political losses from the use of hired Ukrainian planes for the transportation of ar­maments to ‘hot spots’ and from the export of armaments diverted through the Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities began to take countermea­sures.  Firstly, the number of the state carriers of military use cargoes was limited.  At present, the following three carriers have been selected: the Antonov Aviation Scientific-Technological Concern Antonov’s Airlines, and the state en­terprises of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian Cargo Airways and the aviation com­pany of Uzhmash - Uzhmashavia. Moreover, the State Service for Export Control began accom­panying practically every contract, from the ap­plication receipt up to its final delivery. Con­cerning the existing problems, Deputy General Director of Ukrspetsexport Olexander Kova­lenko noted the following: «Diversion export through third party states is really a serious problem in the contemporary arms market, and this goes for the Ukraine as well. Ukrspetsex­port quite often encounters the situation where arms sold by the Ukraine or conveyed via the Ukraine as transit goods are then offered for sale in ‘hot spots.’ Today we are introducing a set of measures to prevent such events.  Meas­ures to enhance the control over the arms trans­porters are also being taken. For example, in the contract agreement for Ukrainian air trans­port, there are included provisions prohibiting transportation of arms and military products to countries against which there are sanctions. And in the case of breach of agreement, the responsi­bility shall lie with the party who hires the car­riers.»³¹ At the same time, in the State Service for Export Control there appeared a verification division, which conducts inspections as to whether the armaments are really used by the country, which purchased them. According to the State Service itself, only in 1999 no less than 10 intermediaries were discovered who could do export transfers.³²  In 2000 the State Service announced the existence of a multilevel system of export control in Ukraine, introduced specifically to prevent illegal deliveries. In par­ticular, this includes the registration of all do­mestic producers of military-use goods which are liable to control, the giving of special powers to the exporters, the control of negotiations con­cerning export of defense and special purpose goods and technology, the classification of all goods and the licensing of foreign economic op­erations. At the same time, it was noted that it was necessity of concentrate the attention on prevention of transfer of controlled technology through joint ventures with foreign firms.³³

But since one public reads the materials con­cerning the violation of the international sanc­tions by the country exporting armaments and the rebuttal against such accusations is read by an absolutely different audience, it is under­standable that such a form of pressure on the government proves to be especially effective. This is especially true when such international media generated pressure is applied towards countries with less competitive informational in­fluence. In such a way, the skillful combination of the present day events with their real abuse in foreign trade relations by some Ukrainian arms producers and exporters during the period prior the establishing of the national export control system can and does promote the inter­national opinion that the Ukraine continues ac­tively operate on the ‘gray’ arms market.

The best example vindicating the Ukraine of the groundless accusations of illegal deliveries be­fore the eyes of the international community can been witnessed in the working visit to Ukraine of Robert Fowler, Chairman of the UN Security Council Commission on sanctions against UNITA in summer 1999.  After the examination of documents the foreign expert relieved Kiev of accusations of supporting the UNITA move­ment.³⁴

At the same time, one should note that Ukraine is not the only country accused of arms transfers to countries under sanctions. In particular, the African news agency Africa News Service re­ported on the involvement of the Belgian air transport company Sea Green in deliveries of arms to the rebellious units of the UNITA, and the Chinese Xinhua News Agency reported on the arrest and seizure by the Belgian Customs of a special cargo with defense equipment intended for delivery at the end of 1998 from the Nether­lands to Eritrea by a British air transport com­pany. The Yaderny Kontrol Journal, citing dif­ferent mass media (mainly Western), also re­ported on the arms delivery by Bulgaria to Eri­trea in July 1998 and on some military equip­ment delivered by Russia to Angola and Demo­cratic Republic of Congo.³⁵

Experts are convinced that the appearance of accusations directed towards new actors in the world arms market is not accidental but con­nected rather with the new repartition within the world arms market and directed against the activity of countries previously not represented on the world armaments market, in particular Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech, Slovakia, Poland, Belarus, Kazakhstan and some others.

Conclusions

This analysis of the development and function of the Ukrainian export control system testifies to the facts that:

The Ukraine has established an effective mecha­nism of export control of armament, military hardware, special services, sensitive materials and technology. The export control system is multilevel and excludes practically any possi­bility of participation of the state or its individ­ual subordinate bodies in illegal operations on the ‘gray’ arms market. This system also com­plicates and renders extremely improbable the participation of international or domestic syndi­cate structures in the conducting of export op­erations with Ukrainian arms and other sensi­tive products or services on the world market.

At the same time, the element of direct presi­dential supervision in the military-technical co­operation in the Ukraine also makes possible the existence of a tendency that adversely effects the foreign-trade relations of Ukraine and ex­port control. Among these negative effects are:

• the lack of parliamentary control over the foreign-trade relations and the elimination of the  practice of establishing parliamentary bodies for the execution of such control;

• the lack of corresponding laws in the field of military-technological cooperation and ex­port control in Ukraine. The appearance of corresponding laws would partially lift the distrust of the Ukraine as a player in the world arms market from the viewpoint of Western countries.

• the theme of military-technical coopera­tion and export control still remains rather closed to public. The obfuscation of informa­tion access to mass media facilitates the spe­cial information campaigns addressed against Ukraine;

• the hindrance in the process of introduc­ing corporate export control which need to be accelerated. Such internal controls would ne­gate the need for independent negotiations with foreign contacts on the world arms mar­ket and reduce negative publicity in the for­eign press related with such negotiation;

• the inefficient system of interaction with scientists and research officers from sensitive sectors (e.g., nuclear, biological, chemical, etc.), the representatives of which in conse­quence of insufficient financing in their sec­tors may assist in the drain of sensitive infor­mation from Ukraine to banned countries re­quires further improvement.³⁶

¹ Decree of the President of Ukraine No.3, 03.01.1993.

² Decree of the President of Ukraine, 04.02.1999: ‘??????? ?????????-?????????? ??????????????? ? ?????????? ?????????, ??????????? ???????? ?? ?????????-??????????? ????????’ and Decree of the President of Ukraine, 08.07.2000: ‘??? ?????? ? ?????????? ???????????? ?????????-?????????? ??????????????? ??????? ? ?????????? ?????????’

³ Approx. $800,000 annually. This figure was given by the Chairman of State Service of Export Control of Ukraine V.Vaschilin in an interview with the agency UNIAN, 06.10.1998.

⁴ See Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine No.2230, 09.12.1999.

⁵ From 780,000 military personnel in 1992 to 275,000 in 1999, a reduction of more than 2.5 times the original presence. ??????????? ??????? ? ???????, No.1, 2000, p.11

⁶ The volume of financing available for the Ukrainian Armed Forces was reduced from 2.4% of the GDP in 1992 to 1.39% of the GDP in 2000.  The number of up-to-date models of defense technology in the Ukrainian Armed Forces of Ukraine does not exceed 30%. ??????????? ??????? ? ???????, No.1, 2000, pp.9,21. 

⁷ For example, financing from the 1999 Ukrainian State Budget under the section ‘Fundamental research and assistance to scientific and technological progress’ comprised only 0.41% of the GDP, equal to 166.5 million grivnas (about $30 million), that is by 16.1 million grivnas ($3 million) less than in 1998. This tendency in the reduction of financing for basic research remains up to the present.

⁸ This was discovered as a result of the effort of the Temporary Inquiry Commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, and was circulated to Ukrainian Media on April 14, 1998.

⁹ Speech of S.Zgurts, Head of Research Projects of the Center of Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies at the International Seminar ‘Role of Non-Government Organizations and Media in Covering the Problems of Illegal Transfers of Arms, Merchandise and Technology Under Control’, Kiev, 17 May 2000. Contemporary publications bring up the subject, for example the Belgian newspaper Le Soir, on  April 20, 2001, in connection with the arrest of the former Russian citizen A.Zhukov.

¹⁰ Scott A. Jones. From the chapter "The Evolution of the Ukrainian Export Control System: State Building and International Cooperation," in Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot, eds., Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 8.

¹¹ See the Report of the Temporary Inquiry Commission of the Armed Forces, reported in the Ukrainian Mass Media on April 14, 1998. 

¹² UNIAN, June 11, 1999.

¹³ Interview with O. Kuzmuk, given to journalists on January 29, 1998.

¹⁴ Scott A. Jones. The chapter "The Evolution of the Ukrainian Export Control System: State Building and International Cooperation," in Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot, eds., Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 4.

¹⁵ UNIAN, July 20, 1998.

¹⁶ UNIAN, October 9, 1998.

¹⁷ Ukrainian Presidential Decree No.121, February 4, 1999: ‘??????? ?????????-?????????? ??????????????? ? ?????????? ?????????, ??????????? ???????? ?? ?????????-??????????? ????????’

¹⁸ From a statement made by Sergey Teteruk, Head of Administration of Defense Aspects of the National Safety Department of the Council of Ukrainian National Safety and Defense at the Round Table ‘Development of an Export Control System in Ukraine in the Regional Safety Context’ on  June 20, 2001.

¹⁹ Interview to the newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli, 30 September 2000.

²⁰ V.Sokolik, V.Tuz, ????? ?????. - ?????????? ???????, No. 2, 2000, p.42.

²¹ S.Kuznetsov, V. Petrenko. ??? ??????? - ?? ????????????. -  ?????????? ???????, No.1, 2000, p.48.

²² Database of the Army, Conversion and Disarmament Research Center.

²³ Information Weekly of the Ukrainian Information Agency Intelnews, 25 May 2001.

²⁴ Resolution of the Government of Ukraine No.838 as of 8 June 1998 ‘??? ???????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ???’????? ???????????????????? ?????????? ??????????? ?? ????? ?????????? ????????, ??????? ??????? ??????????? ??????????? ?? ???????, ??? ??????? ?????????, ?? ?????????? ???????? ????????’

²⁵ Resolution of the Government of the Ukraine No.1228 July 12, 1999.

²⁶ Press Conference April 20, 1999. Besides V. Gorbulin, sharp rebuttal statements were also made by Boris Tarasyuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Alexander Kuzmuk, Ukrainian Minister of Defense. 

²⁷ This document Ukraine signed under the pressure by the USA: As early as at the end of 1999, Head of the US Department of Commerce gave publicity to the information on that Ukraine and Russia had blocked new initiatives in the framework of Wassenaar Agrangements (Bruce Odessey, U.S. Objectives in Wassenaar Regime Not Fulfilled, Washington File, 06.12.1999).  

²⁸ From the Sergey Teteruk’ speech at the Round Table ‘Development of Export Control System in Ukraine in the Regional Safety Context’ on June 20, 2001.

²⁹ From a speech by Anatoly Gritsenko at the Round Table ‘Development of Export Control System in Ukraine in the Regional Safety Context’ on June 20, 2001.

³⁰ This was said by Sergey Teteruk, Head of Administration of Defense Aspects of the National Safety Department of the Council of National Safety and Defense of Ukraine at the Round Table ‘Development of Export Control System in Ukraine in the Regional Safety Context’ on June 20, 2001.

³¹ Valentin Badrak. ????????? ???????????. - ?????????? ???????, No.1, 1999, p.25.

³² Ibid., p.26.

³³ From a speech delivered by Sergey Svistil, Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian State Service for Export Control at the International Seminar ‘Role of Non-Government Organizations and Media in Covering the Problems of Illegal Transfers of Arms, Merchandise and Technology Under Control’, Kiev, May 17, 2000.

³⁴ Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 16 March 2000.

³⁵ Dmitry Polikanov, Illegal Arms Trade in Africa and Mechanisms of Its Limitation. Yaderny Kontrol, No.4, July-August 2000, pp.45-48. 

³⁶ Thus, Alexey Breus, Chief of Nuclear Programs of the Center of Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies mentions not only drain of scientist from Ukraine (as of the beginning of 2000 - about 1,000 scientists, of which about 300 - Doctors of Science), but departure of about 200 Ukrainian nuclear specialists for work to Iran (within Russian-Iranian contract for construction of a nuclear power station in Busher, which Ukraine officially refused under the pressure by the USA in 1998). A.Breus, ??????????? ?????????? - ?????????? ???????, No.2, 2000, pp.13-14.