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SALW Stockpiles Security In Russia
Oleg BORISSOV
The security of small arms and light weapons (SALW) stockpiles in the depots and arsenals of the Armed Forces and paramilitary agencies is an important factor in preventing the spread of SALW to illicit turnover.
It is absolutely evident that slackening control over even one sphere - the production, storage, transportation or exportation - may result in the spread of SALW into the illegal sector. Albania is a good example. In 1997, as a result of an attack on Albanian government arsenals, over 750,000 pieces of small arms were illegally transferred to the population, resulting in an outburst of crime in Albania and neighboring countries, the formation of unlawful armed groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army and the appearance of a large-scale black market of armaments in the Balkans which still have not been withdrawn from illicit turnover. The UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in summer 2001 paid special attention to the SALW stockpiles security. Its final document advised all countries to pass corresponding laws, acts and administrative procedures to organize effective control over the production, storage and transfer of SALW and also to develop effective systems for managing government stockpiles of SALW1. It is of note that this part of the final document caused little disagreement at the conference. Virtually all of the participating counties agreed that it was of paramount importance to guarantee the safe storage of arms.
The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons also contains a section that speaks of the importance of stockpiles security, guaranteeing their physical protection, controlling access to arms, organizing a system of inventories and accounting, and training personnel2.
Of course it is one thing to recognize a problem, and another to take effective steps to guarantee safe storage in practice, of course. Channels along which arms travel from storage places to illegal turnover vary. For instance, in Central America, private security agencies often keep large illegal stocks of automatic weapons that are later stolen and make their way to the black market3. In the United States, the greatest problem is the loss of weapons from private arsenals, which contain over 250 million pieces of weapons. In some African countries, corrupt officials and army officers sell SALW from government stocks, benefiting from the absence of a clear control and accounting system.
It is fairly difficult to speak of the state of small arms and light weapons storage in Russia, primarily due to the absence of open official statistics.
On one hand, Russia, like the USSR before it, has always had a fairly strict system of controlling the storage of arms; and the national procedures of managing arms stocks and guaranteeing their safety meet the strictest requirements.
An international seminar on control over the proliferation of SALW held in Moscow on December 6-7, 2001 indicated that, on the whole, Russia pursues a responsible policy in SALW exports to international markets; takes steps to tighten control over the production, turnover and transfer of these arms; and regularly disposes surplus stockpiles according to plan. Between 1998 and 2001 Russian Defense Ministry arsenals and bases disposed 420,000 units of small arms and close-combat weapons4.
In keeping with acting legislation, Russian unit commanders must personally inspect the presence and safety of all small arms and ammunition after each time they are issued. Special documents must be kept to register arms and ammunition. The SALW assigned to a serviceman is entered in his military ID card together with the markings of his weapon.
The safety of SALW is also guaranteed by a set of physical security measures. Big depots and stores are usually concrete or brick building where vehicles are not allowed to enter. In military units, arms and ammunition are stored in specially equipped rooms with security alarms. In the event of loss or theft of arms or ammunition, the unit commander must immediately report the case to the appropriate authorities. Rules imply regular checks of the inventory of weapons, their proper accounting and documenting, the storage conditions, the observation of the order of issuing and receiving arms, the state of security equipment and the correctness of storing keys.
To increase responsibility for the storage of small arms, the chief of the service responsible for accounting and safe storage of SALW is not allowed to simultaneously hold the post of chief of the arms depot. These rules apply not only in the Russian Armed Forces but in all militarized organizations.
Thus, Russian legislation and regulations are quite tough. Most of them were approved in Soviet times, when cases of theft or loss of arms were rare, even though the general situation with the safety of armaments in the USSR remains unknown. Nevertheless, the fact that the number of crimes involving firearms in the USSR in 1987 constituted only a fraction of crimes in Russia in the mid-1990s indicates that it was of a relatively satisfactory situation.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the existence of rules regulating the turnover of SALW by no means guarantees their safe storage; the actual state of affairs in the sphere started gradually worsening in the last years of the Soviet Union. The first reason was the mass transfer of armaments from East European countries and related abuses. Later, the disintegration of the Soviet Union caused regional conflicts that attracted big quantities of weaponry. The deep political and economic crisis accompanied by the growth of violence and crime rates and a decline in morals and discipline in society and the in Armed Forces, promoted the large-scale distribution of SALW to illicit turnover. Chechnya became the main source of unlawful spread of several scores of thousands of units of arms in Russia. It is of note that Chechen rebels were armed almost entirely with stolen Russian weapons. The press reported numerous cases when the Chechen separatist regime purchased new batches of grenade launchers, MANPADS, machineguns and even armored vehicles which speaks not only of the unfavorable state of weapons storage in the Armed Forces, but also of non-secure storage at production sites. The hostilities in Chechnya enabled write-offs of weapons as combat losses.
The total sum of illegally distributed SALW is not known, but it seems that much of that amount "leaked" from government stocks. Official reports say that hundreds of units of "serious" SALW are confiscated from illegal turnover in Moscow and its environs alone.
For one reason or another the situation with the illegal turnover of SALW has been generally complex in Russia since the beginning of the 1990s. It remains unclear how many weapons have been stolen from government-controlled depots and arsenals.
Desertions by of armed soldiers from their army units has become a true curse for the Russian army. There are also reports that chiefs of arsenals peddle arms and manage to conceal such facts over many inspections. However, it is not clear how many weapons are recovered and how many disappear without a trace.
It makes a difference exactly what kind of SALW are distributed illegally. For example, if the disappearance of several handguns or automatic rifles may have grave but hardly disastrous consequences, the disappearance of MANPADS or anti-tank missiles can result in large-scale acts of terrorism. It is not surprising therefore that the discovery of anti-aircraft missiles by an airdrome near Moscow in the summer of 2002 caused wide repercussions and drew the attention from military, security and law enforcement command.
It is quite difficult to get an exact idea about the true scale of the illegal spread of SALW in the absence of any data. Scattered reports made by law enforcement spokesmen allow the assumption that the situation has somewhat improved in the past few years as efforts have been intensified to eradicate arms thefts. The rate of such thefts shrank, and the number of confiscations grew from 21,000 in 2000 to over 25,000 in 20015.
English researcher Owen Greene has pointed to the gravity of the problem of arms theft from government arsenals and remarked that the governments of the countries "that investigate this matter are surprised at how many illicit weapons come from their official stocks. There can be military, police or private stocks, or weapons confiscated following a crime.6" The situation in Russia can hardly be an exception. We can assume that, if a total inventory of government-owned SALW were conducted and the results announced, the picture would be horrifying. This may well be one of the reasons for the negative attitude of the authorities to transparency on matters of SALW.
If we assume that it is inexpedient to disclose information about the amount of exported SALW because it would displease the foreign buyers of such arms – though it is unclear then why they do not protest the reports about delivers of much more serious weaponry – then the announcement of SALW stocks or, to begin with, the scale of theft could help resolve the problem of the small arms and light weapons stockpiles security and tighten pubic control over the sphere. Unfortunately, in Russia, public interest in the subject is quite limited, despite scores of thousands of victims of firearms, which is an indirect indication of the immaturity of the civil society that almost fully shifts the responsibility for the solution of the problem to the shoulders of the government.
The fact that the past few years have seen the publication of figures about the amount of SALW withdrawn from illicit turnover and disposed is a step forward, but clearly insufficient. Resistance to the illegal turnover of arms, including their spread from arsenals and depots, is a global problem and cannot be resolved without statistics or official information. Greater transparency and the beginning of information exchanges between countries are a gradual process. A country can determine its scale and speed depending on its national security needs, but nevertheless this process should continue, if there is any real interest in resisting illegal turnover of SALW.
1 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN, New York, 2001. A/CONF. 192/15, § 6,9, 10.
2 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons/FSC, November 2000, pp.9-11.
3 The OAS and the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects: Tackling the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. By W.Godnick. BAC, 2001.
4 Materials of an international seminar "National and international norms, principles and measures for controlling small arms proliferation: the view from Russia," (Moscow, December 6-7, 2001), PIR-Center - Saferworld, Moscow, 2002, p. 14.
5 Ibid, p. 21.
6 Ibid, p. 24.
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