The North Korean Space Program:

Bluff or Reality?
Vladimir KIRILLOV

During his visit to Russia in July-August 2001 North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, visited a number of space enterprises. At the Khrunichev space center he took a look at the production of the Proton-K launch vehicle, models of the Mir space stations and the Angara launch vehicle. He also looked over the Rokot launch vehicle, which is based on the RS-18 (SS-19) ballistic missile. Officials at Khrunichev stressed that no business negotia­tions were held at the center with the North Korean leader. Kim Jong Il also visited the town of Korolyov outside Moscow, which is home to Russia's space flight control center.

The general director of the Russian Aerospace Agency, Yuriy Koptev, said at a news confer­ence on August 9, 2001 that "there were no offi­cial negotiations with the North Koreans in which the Russian Aerospace Agency might have been involved." The North Korean delegation was interested in the cost of space launches, but no specific cooperation projects were discussed, Koptev said. During the talks Kim Jong Il reiterated that North Korea's leadership had de­cided to impose a moratorium on flight tests and launches of rocket systems, as he had said ear­lier, until 2003 inclusively.

However, the North Korean leadership's interest in Russia's space industry again spurred discus­sion of North Korea's national space program in political and military circles, as well as media outlets around the world.

North Korea tears into space

On August 31, 1998, at 03:07 UTC (12:07 p.m. local time), an unannounced multi-stage rocket was launched from the territory of North Korea. The first stage of the rocket fell into the Sea of Japan, approximately in the middle between the Korean Peninsula and Japan, and the second flew over Japan and fell into the Pacific Ocean.

The launch was initially interpreted as a test of a two-stage ballistic missile, tentatively called the Taepodong-1. It caused great concern in South Korea, the United States and especially Japan, which was clearly shown that its terri­tory is within the range of North Korean ballis­tic missiles. Japan protested fiercely over the fact that a North Korean missile flew over its territory without notification. Japan's deputy foreign minister said that they knew about the upcoming launch two to three weeks in advance and tried to convince the North Koreans not to go through with it.

After North Korea still went ahead with the launch despite Tokyo's appeals, the Japanese government took a number of tough measures against the country, cutting off food aid, freezing its participation in the project to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea and banning air traffic between the two countries.

The United States was also quite concerned over the testing of the new Korean missile, seeing it as a confirmation of North Korea's secret pro­gram to develop nuclear weapons. It also sus­pended talks on aid to North Korea.

New sensational reports emerged on September 3, 1998, citing intelligence sources as saying that North Korea was apparently getting ready to fire another missile to coincide with Septem­ber 5, when the Supreme People's Assembly was to officially elect North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as the country's supreme leader.

Similarly in 1993, after the test firing of the Nodong medium-range missile, a shorter-range Scud missile was launched. In this case, ac­cording to later reports from South Korean dip­lomatic circles, a second and even third launch was being readied in case of a failure on August 31. They could have taken place on September 5 or 9, 1998 (the latter date the 50th anniversary of North Korea's founding), but were not required.

Amid the ensuing international condemnation, on September 4, 1998 the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) unexpectedly reported that on August 31 North Korea had not launched a bal­listic missile, but an artificial satellite.

North Korea: a new space power?

This turn of events spurred a new wave of speculation in the world press and political cir­cles, but now its focus shifted slightly and, in­stead of purely Pyongyang's missile and nuclear ambitions, everyone was concerned with the questions of did North Korea actually attempt to launch a satellite and, if so, did it actually make it into orbit?

KCNA's official reports, though, did not leave room for doubt, since it gave exhaustive details about the launch. It reported that the rocket was launched in the direction (that is, with an azimuth) of 86 degrees at a launching station in Musudan-ri, Hwadae county, North Hamgyong Province. These geographical bearings corre­spond to coordinates of approximately 40.52 de­grees north latitude and 129.45 degrees east longitude. The report said the rocket was launched at 12:07 August 31, Juche 87 (1998) and "correctly put the satellite into orbit" at 12 hours 11 minutes 53 seconds in four minutes 53 seconds. The launch vehicle was said to consist of three stages. The first stage was reported to have separated from the rocket 95 seconds after the launch and fell in the open waters of the East Sea of Korea (Sea of Japan) 253 km off the launching station, at the coordinates 40 de­grees 51 minutes north latitude 139 degrees 40 minutes east longitude. According to the report, the second stage "opened the capsule in 144 seconds" (apparently this refers to the jettison­ing of an aerodynamic cone protecting the pay­load and upper stage) and separated itself from the rocket in 266 seconds and fell in the open waters of the Pacific Ocean 1,646 km from the launching station, at 40 degrees 13 minutes north latitude 149 degrees 07 minutes east lon­gitude. The third stage put the satellite into or­bit 27 seconds after the separation of the second stage, the report said.

The satellite was reported to be in an elliptical orbit with a perigee of 218.82 km and an apogee of 6,978.2 km, and with an orbital period of 165 minutes 6 seconds. The inclination of the orbit was not reported, but judging by the coordi­nates of the area and azimuth of the launch it should be about 41 degrees. The report went on to say that:

"The satellite is equipped with sounding instru­ments. It will contribute to furthering scientific research for the peaceful use of outer space. It will also be instrumental in confirming the cal­culation basis for the launch of practical satel­lites in the future. At present the satellite is transmitting the melody of the immortal revolu­tionary hymns "Song of General Kim Il Sung" and "Song of General Kim Jong Il" and the Morse signals "Juche Korea" in the frequency of 27 MHz."

Considering the status of the media in the De­mocratic People's Republic of Korea, there were few in the world who took the report at face value, especially since a cursory analysis found certain contradictions. First of all, prominent space expert Jonathan McDowell¹  reported that the figures in the North Korean report were inconsistent. At the reported distances and launch azimuth, the coordinates should have been about 40.7 degrees north and 133.0 degrees east for the first stage and 41.5 degrees north and 152.1 degrees east for the second. (In sub­sequent reports, KCNA gave the longitude as 132 degrees 40 minutes east instead of 139 de­grees 40 minutes east.) According to American tracking equipment, the first stage fell at 40 de­grees 54 minutes north and 134 degrees 03 minutes east, that is, about 500 km from the east coast of Korea.

An analysis conducted by John Pike at the Federation of American Scientists of a photo­graph²  of the launch vehicle published by KCNA indicates that:

• the image of the rocket could have been su­perimposed on the landscape, as a color analysis showed off-color pixels defining fairly rectilinear areas around the image of the rocket and the exhaust.

• the image was compressed horizontally by ap­proximately one-quarter, as a result of which the rocket looked unnaturally long and thin. If the picture is stretched from the original size of 301x397 pixels to make it perfectly square (397x397), the configuration of the rocket ex­actly matches depictions of the Taepodong-1 missile made by both FAS and the US National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC).

Looking for independent confirmation of the Korean announcement, media and independ­ent analysts turned to the US Space Command (USSPACECOM), which maintains the most complete catalogue of artificial satellites and is (through NASA) the only constant supplier of orbital information on space objects for the global public. USSPACECOM, which usually logs all new space launches within the space of a few hours, this time gave no answer for more than a week.

While USSPACECOM looked for the satellite and/or thought about a diplomatic response, attention turned to Russia's Space Control Sys­tem (SKKP). Initial reports from Russian news agencies confirmed that Russia's SKKP sees the Korean satellite. But suspicions were aroused by the fact that these reports contained the exact orbit parameters as the report from KCNA. Since every country uses its own model of the Earth for calculations, such a coincidence is vir­tually impossible (if, of course, the Koreans did not order their orbital measurements from Rus­sia's SKKP).

Finally, on September 8, 1998 the USSPACECOM officially announced that it had not observed any object orbiting the Earth that corresponds to the orbital data the North Koreans provided in their public statements. Additionally, US Space Command said it had not observed any new object orbiting the Earth in any orbital path that could correlate to the North Korean claims. Lastly, no US radio re­ceiver had been able to detect radio transmis­sions at 27 megahertz corresponding to the North Korean claims.

On September 10, 1998, a top official in the Russian strategic missile forces who wished to remain anonymous said, "there is no North Korean satellite in space above the planet Earth."³

Considering that neither the USSPACECOM nor Russia's SKKP observed any orbiting ob­jects that might be tied to the North Korean launch claims, and that neither the official ser­vices of other countries nor amateur radio opera­tors around the world could detect transmissions in the 27 MHz band, one could say with reason­able assurance that there was no North Korean satellite in orbit.

But a second, more difficult, question remains: was there actually an attempt to launch a satel­lite or were all claims about this pure fabrica­tion intended to turn international attention away from the testing of a ballistic missile and to boost moral at home?

North Korea's missile program

The foundation of North Korea's missile pro­gram, as for most other countries friendly with the former USSR, was the mobile tactical R-17 missile, or Scud-B, with a range of about 300 km.⁴  According to some sources, the North Ko­reans received them in the 1970s from Egypt, set up serial production and subsequently mod­ernized them, bringing the range up to 500 km by increasing the length of the fuel tanks and extending the lifespan of the engine. North Ko­rea began exporting the missiles in 1987, to countries such as Iran and the United Arab Emirates. According to information published in Seoul in September 1997, North Korea can make up to 100 Scud-B missiles per year. The country reportedly exported 250 missiles for $580 mil­lion between 1987 and 1992.

In 1993 North Korea tested the Nodong inter­mediate range missile, which according to avail­able data has a range of 1,000-1,300 km (al­though in the only test firing it flew just 600 km). According to one theory, this is an indige­nous missile developed on the basis of existing technology using a combination of four liquid fuel engines from the Scud-B and expanded di­ameter tanks. According to another, the Nodong was based on an early Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, the R-21 (SS-N-5), with a range of 1,300-1,600 km, which like the R-17 was developed by the V.P. Makeyev de­sign bureau. It is assumed that the Nodong could also (or already has?) become an export commodity. In particular, the characteristics of the new Pakistani Ghauri missile with a range of 1,600 km and payload of 700 kg correspond to the parameters of the Nodong.

The next step in building the capabilities of North Korea's arsenal was to have been the me­dium range Taepodong-1 missile (1,500-2,000 km) and the Taepodong-2 intercontinental bal­listic missile. American experts reckon that the former missile is a Nodong with a modified Scud-B missile as a second stage, but do not say anything about the Taepodong-2.

Russian experts reckon that, by lengthening the tanks of the Nodong to the maximum, its range can be increased to 2,000 km, though the pay­load would have to be reduced to 300-350 kg.⁵  A "restricted" range (up to 4,000-5,000 km) could be achieved by fitting such a missile with a "lengthened" Scud as a second stage. A criti­cally important link in this work is the guidance system. If the North Koreans (like the Iraqis with their Al Hussein and Al Abbas missiles) used an old guidance system from the Scud-B on their missiles, the accuracy would be reduced to such an extent that using conventional (non-nu­clear) payloads becomes simply unfeasible due to the wide dispersion of the warhead.

The first launch of the Taepodong-1 was ex­pected in October 1996, when American intelli­gence detected the corresponding preparations. But it did not take place at that time. It is pos­sible that diplomatic pressure from the United States and Japan could have played a role in this. North Korea's Foreign Ministry at the time restricted itself to saying that the country could fire missiles when it thought necessary, and no one has the right to give it orders. Two years later, as North Korea's economic situation dete­riorated, the desire to add some pressure in ne­gotiations with the United States and Japan and to demonstrate new successes to its people for the 50th anniversary of the DPRK's founding on September 9 apparently got the better of reason.

According to a number of experts,⁶ the North Korean launch vehicle is similar in its charac­teristics to the Jupiter rocket that was used in 1958 to launch the first American satellite, Ex­plorer-1. Assuming that the North Korean rocket that was launched on August 31, 1998 consisted of a Nodong as the first stage and a modified Scud-B with lengthened tanks as the second stage, such a launch vehicle would be capable of putting a very small satellite into orbit.

On September 14, 1998, the newspaper of the Korean Worker's Party Nodong Sinmung pub­lished a photograph of the first North Korean satellite. The external image very closely re­called the first Chinese satellite, launched on April 24, 1970, but the North Korean satellite should have been much smaller than its Chinese counterpart. Furthermore, its was reported that the satellite, dubbed Kwangmyongsong-1 (Bright Star) was still in orbit and, from 8:20 to 11:07 a.m. local time, on September 13, 1998, had made its 100th circuit around the Earth. The report also said that at the begin­ning of October 1998 the satellite would be visible to the naked eye from the Korean peninsula.

This last claim is even more difficult to believe than the fact that USPACECOM could not find the satellite in two weeks. Furthermore, as spe­cialists at South Korea's Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) noted, the DPRK increased the period of the satellite's or­bit by 8 minutes compared to initial reports. But, judging by its external appearance, there could not have been any thrusters on the Kwangmyongsong-1.

Finally, it is extremely suspicious that the an­nouncement of the launch's orbital nature was made four days later, after the ensuing condem­nation and after Japan imposed tough sanctions against North Korea.

Given all of the above and the fact that KCNA's reports about the successful launch and func­tioning satellite are clearly not true, it is natu­ral to conclude that they cannot be believed elsewhere: that not only is there no satellite, but there never was one. One immediately re­calls the similar situation with the "first Iraqi satellite," which was supposedly launched on December 5, 1989 with the first launch of an Iraqi multistage rocket, subsequently declared to be a bluff.

The U.S. back peddles

However, soon after the initial statements, the United States again changed its position on the launch. Beginning on September 10-11, 1998, reports began appearing in American media out­lets that there was in fact a launch attempt. On September 14 the U.S. State Department offi­cially stated that it had concluded that North Korea did in fact attempt to launch a very small satellite, but that this satellite did not manage to reach orbit. On September 15 the U.S. De­partment of Defense confirmed this, but added that it was still analyzing certain data that would give a clearer picture of what had happened.

This turnaround was almost more surprising than the initial Korean claims of September 4. Just a few days earlier, the Defense Department asserted that it was "99% sure" that the August 31 launch was not intended to put a satellite into orbit. What happened in the interval? As far as one can judge, after analyzing uncoordi­nated intelligence data the American agencies concluded that the rocket had not two but three stages, as had been claimed by the North Kore­ans. Consequently, the aim of the launch could have been to launch an artificial satellite or test a long-range missile.

American intelligence sources⁷  said that data intercepted from the missile showed the flight path of the rocket to be "a bit odd," and that apparently "something separated from the sec­ond stage and it appears to have some thrust behind it." Subsequent analysis resulted in the conclusion that this "something" was a solid fuel third stage. According to the Americans, the first two stages did their work normally, while the third broke apart somewhere above the Pa­cific Ocean without making it into orbit.

It cannot be ruled out, however, that, having missed the preparations for the launch of an ICBM, the American intelligence agencies tried to take the side of the North Korean version of events, which looks less threatening than the testing of a missile capable of reaching the shores of Alaska. On the other hand, for the DPRK an attempt to launch a mini satellite could for a number of reasons have been prefer­able to a real test of an ICBM: in terms of the energy required, it is easier to launch a 10-kg artificial satellite than fire a 500-kg warhead at intercontinental distances. In the mind of the public, the concepts of intercontinental missile and launch vehicle are virtually indistinguish­able. Furthermore, a space launch, even one conducted to refine a ballistic missile, can al­ways be called "peaceful." And finally, without a network of tracking stations in isolated areas, it is easier to home in on a satellite going into orbit than a warhead falling somewhere into the Pacific Ocean. However, even these supposi­tions are not enough to convince that the Au­gust 31, 1998 launch was an attempt to launch a satellite rather than test a ballistic missile.

Subsequent world reaction

The DPRK itself had since September 4 insisted on the peaceful nature of its launch. On Sep­tember 15, 1998 the UN Security Council, at the request of Japan, reviewed the issue of North Korea launching a rocket that flew over Japanese territory. But on September 21 already North Korea's deputy ambassador to the United Nations filed an official protest on this issue, stating that the launch of the satellite is not a subject for discussion by the Security Council. He also dismissed the Security Council's ruling that the DPRK should provide prior warning of such launches, saying that the DPRK has never been informed ahead of time about launches by any countries that previously launched satel­lites, including Japan. (It should be noted that Japanese rockets in no way infringed on North Korea's air space, and this remark could only re­fer to Russia or China.) The North Korean dip­lomat said that the DPRK would "continue full-scale use of space for peaceful purposes, regard­less of what other countries say."

On its own, the claim of the space nature of the launch on August 31, 1998 only demonstrated the DPRK's desire to join the space club. But the attempt to launch a satellite in North Korea had a big impact on the space programs of other countries. Japan and South Korea, having lost confidence in American satellite reconnaissance systems that failed to detect preparations for the launch of the North Korean rocket, announced plans to build their own spy satellites. The launch of the first such Japanese satellite is scheduled for 2002 already.

The United States initially kept silent after the August 31 launch, supporting the version that this was in fact an attempt to launch a North Korean satellite. Nonetheless, a whole series of inquiries were set in motion, including congres­sional, to find out why such a sophisticated and well-funded American space intelligence service was unable to detect preparations at the Musu­dan-ri testing range until the last moment and did not warn the government about them. The results of these inquiries were never disclosed to the American public. But some time later the U.S. administration and military leadership be­gan using the North Korean launch of 1998 as an argument in favor of building a National Missile Defense (NMD) shield.

In addition, Washington demanded that Py­ongyang halt its missile program. The DPRK agreed on the condition that its expenditures on the development of missiles will be compensated by annual payments of $1 billion for three years. It became obvious that the rocket launch, even if its purpose was to put a North Korean satellite into orbit, was more a demonstration of strength intended to gain additional concessions from the world community than part of a long-term program. North Korea's beautiful "space ambitions" began to look more like primitive blackmail.

However, such a trade-off did not satisfy the U.S. administration. It continued to use North Korea's intransigence as proof of the need for an NMD from rogue states such as the DPRK. Si­multaneously, Pyongyang was accused of helping Islamabad, though Pakistan insisted that it had developed the Ghauri missile, capa­ble of carrying a nuclear warhead, on its own.

The July 2000 meeting between the leaders of North and South Korea, as well as the subse­quent visit to Pyongyang by Russian President Vladimir Putin, cleared some things up. Putin told reporters that the DPRK was prepared to give up its rocket program if other countries of­fered to launch its satellites for peaceful space research. The joint declaration by the Russian and North Korean leaders about the peaceful purposes of the DPRK's rocket program was aimed at undermining the United States argu­ment for a National Missile Defense system.

The response was not long in coming. Washing­ton officials said they were not exactly sure what the Russian president meant. According to one high-ranking official who asked not to be named, if Putin's words about a partnership with other countries meant offering North Korea the opportunity of launching its satellites with the aid of foreign launch vehicles from Kazakh­stan or some other countries, the proposals should be studied. But if he meant providing technology for the existing rocket program, it would only deepen the threat coming from North Korea, the official said.

This is a trump card that North Korean diplo­macy is trying to play in negotiations with the United States, said Chang Kyong-man, an ana­lyst at South Korea's Defense Analysis Institute. According to other analysts, the statements did not yet mean that the DPRK was giving up its whole missile program: missile exports are a big foreign currency earner for the country.

On July 30, 2000, at the G8 summit in Oki­nawa, Vladimir Putin forwarded North Korea's proposal to President Bill Clinton. Russian For­eign Minister Igor Ivanov told reporters that Pyongyang "is considering the possibility of launching one or two satellites per year and will not demand that the launches take place from the territory of North Korea." Clinton left the summit saying that the proposals need further study.

But on August 13, 2000 the North Korean leader said at a meeting with South Korean journalists: "the United States is pinning the label of terrorist nation on us. If they stop do­ing this we are prepared to establish ties with the United States even tomorrow." He also ac­knowledged that the DPRK sold missiles to Iran and Syria "only in order to earn foreign currency." Then the "great leader and general" unexpectedly disavowed Putin's words. "I told Putin that $200 to $300 million is needed to develop a launch vehicle; if the United States will launch our satellites into orbit we will stop developing rockets," South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo cited Kim Jong Il as saying. "I said this and many other things regarding scien­tific and technical research on rockets offhand. Putin later seized on this and what happened, happened."

Commenting on the possibility of halting the country's missile program, the North Korean leader said: "The development of missiles brings in hundreds of millions of dollars. How can one leave this (that is, who would give up this kind of money)? About whether North Korea had an ICBM, he went on to say: "Let's suppose that we have developed and built intercontinental missiles and fired two or three against the United States. Is this really enough to win? And even so the United States is making a prob­lem out of this."

Obviously the North Korean leader wanted to have his own effective argument with which the strong of the world would have to reckon. Since then the problem of Korean long-distance ballis­tic missiles and launch vehicles has returned to where it started. The United States continued to call the DPRK a rogue state that is a source of threat to the whole world. Work on the NDM followed its course. Meanwhile Times magazine, citing American sources, reported that in July 2001 North Korea again tested the engine used on the Taepodong missiles.

Russia maintained the hope that the DPRK would give up its missile program and held ne­gotiations with the North Korean leadership. The result was a statement made by Russian deputy presidential administration chief Sergei Prikhodko on August 4, 2001 after talks in the Kremlin between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Il: "The DPRK plans to hold to the moratorium it announced on ballistic missile launches until 2003." Prikhodko took part in the tightly guarded Russian-North Korean negotiations. At the meeting Kim Jong Il again stressed that the "DPRK's rocket program is of a peaceful nature and does not threaten countries that respect North Korea's sovereignty." The leaders of both countries came out in support of maintaining the 1972 ABM treaty.

It is possible that this statement was made with some sort of promises from Russia. Thus the process entered a second round. Now, appar­ently, Pyongyang will be waiting for Washing­ton's reaction to this statement so that it can then choose its future style of behavior. It is likely that the North Korean leader's August 4 statement will not be the final one and the po­litical trading will continue.

Sources: information agencies AP, Interfax and France Press; the Washington Post; and FAS.

¹ Jonathan's Space Report, http://hea-www.harvard.edu/QEDT/jcm/jsr.html.

² John Pike, TD-1 Launch Photo Quicklook, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/dprk/photo.htm.

³ Newspaper Izvestia, September 10, 1998.

⁴ Oruzhiye Rossii, Catalogue. Volume VI - Raketno-kosmicheskaya tekhnika, Military Parade, Moscow, 1997.

⁵ Novosti kosmonavtiki Journal, No. 19-20, 1998.

⁶ Jonathan's Space Report, http://hea-www.harvard.edu/QEDT/jcm/jsr.html, and Novosti kosmonavtiki Journal, No. 19-20, 1998.

⁷ Journal Novosti kosmonavtiki, No. 19-20, 1998.