ABOUT US
CONTACT US
Moscow Defense Brief


Current Issue



#5 (67), 2018

CONTENTS

SEARCH : Search

Market of Aerospace Services

Russia on the Market of High Resolution Space Images

Vladimir KIRILLOV

On October 16, 2001 Land Info International, LLC based in Greenwood Village, Colorado, announced the beginning of sales of high-resolution digital space images of the Earth, acquired by Russian satellites. Among other things it offered panchromatic (black-and-white) images with a resolution of 2, 1.56 and 0.95 meters. The images supplies by the Russian Sovinformsputnik company feature hundreds of major cities in the United States, Germany, Mexico, Italy, Brazil, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey and several other countries and areas around the world.1

The sale of these high-resolution images demonstrated Russia's intentions to return to the market of high-resolution space images currently dominated by US companies.

World market of high resolution images

In 1984 the US Congress passed the Land Remote Sensing (LRS) Commercialization Act permitting the sale of images with a resolution of up to 30 meters. Then in 1992 it cancelled the act and replaced it with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act allowing the development and operation of commercial LRS systems.

Finally in April 1994 President Bill Clinton passed the PDD-23 directive letting commercial operators sell images with a resolution of up to 1 meter. In keeping with the directive in 1994-1995 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued licenses to Space Imaging/EOSAT, OrbImage, EarthWatch, AstroVision and GDE Systems Imaging for developing LRS systems with 1-meter resolution. On top of that in 1995 the US administration decided to declassify intelligence imagery with a resolution of 5-12 meters acquired by the first generation of US photoreconnaissance satellites codenamed Corona, Argon, Lanyard between 1960 and 1972. Finally in December 2000 NOAA gave permission to Space Imaging/EOSAT and EarthWatch to develop LRS systems with a 0.5-meter resolution.2

The development and deployment of high-resolution LRS systems proved a technologically complicated and financially taxing undertaking. It took some five years for Space Imaging to start operating its first commercial satellite with Ikonos 2 one-meter resolution optical-electronic equipment after receiving a license in 1994. Two of its main rivals - OrbImage and EarthWatch - are lagging behind with the deployment of their systems due to space mission failures and technical problems: EarthWatch lost two of its satellites (EarlyBird in December 1997 and QuickBird in November 2000) and OrbImage - one (OrbView-4 in September 2001).

The new 1-meter resolution products have been in demand ever since hitting the market. Due to its monopoly position, aggressive marketing and fast fulfillment of orders, Space Images rapidly outstripped its main competitor - SpotImage of France that offers images acquired by satellites of the SPOT series with a resolution of up to 10 meters but with better swath (60-120 kilometers compared to 11). To strengthen their positions the French had to align with the U. OrbImage to jointly distribute images from the promising SPOT-5 (best resolution 2.5 m) and OrbView-4 (up to 1 meter).

A new, dangerous competitor appeared on the LRS market in 2000: the American-Israeli ImageSat International registered in the Cayman islands and thus free from US legislative restrictions on spatial resolution. The first EROS-A1 satellite developed on the basis of the Israeli intelligence satellite Ofeq-3 guarantees images with a resolution of 1.8 meters and after special processing of images - up to 1 meter was launched in December 2000. Company leaders claim they have a portfolio of orders for $300 million.

American companies face significant restrictions in the trade of space imagery, which are meant to bar customers from the use of satellite data as operational intelligence data. First of all, nongovernmental customers can get space images with a resolution of 1 or 0.5 meters not earlier than 24 hours after filming. The sale of radar images with a resolution better than 5 meters to nongovernmental customers is prohibited. There is also a ban on the distribution among foreign clients of hyperspectral images with a resolution better than 20 meters until the potential use of the data is checked. And finally, under a 1997 agreement American operators are not allowed to sell images of Israeli territory with a resolution better than 2 m.3                         .


Table 1. Operating satellites with high-resolution cameras, advanced satellite launch plans for 2001-20024

Satellite name

Operator

Resolution (panchromatic / multispectral imagery)

Launch date

Nominal system altitude

Ikonos-1

SpaceImaging

1 m/4m

24.09.1999

681 km

EROS-A1

ImageSat International

1-1.8 m

05.12.2000

520 km

QuickBird-2

EarthWatch

0.6 m/2.5m

18.10.2001

450 km

OrbView-4

OrbImage

1 m/4 m

Mission failed. Destroyed during launch on 21.09.2001

470 km

EROS-B1

ImageSat International

0.8-1 m/4 m

2nd quarter of 2002 (plan)

600 km

SPOT-5

CNES, SpotImage

2.5 m/10 m

2002 (plan)

830 km


Russia appears on market of high resolution imagery

The first Russian company to trade high resolution space imagery - Sovinformsputnik - was set up on October 18, 1991 by a number of designers, manufacturers and operators of LRS systems, among them the Central Specialized Design Bureau in Samara and the Samara Progress Plant (in April 1996 the two merged in the State Scientific and Production Space Rocket Center TsSKB-Progress, Progress Space Center), Krasnogorsky Zavod joint-stock company, the Lavochkin Scientific Production Association, the Scientific Production Center Priroda, the Elas Scientific Production Joint-Stock Company and others.

Sovinformsputnik was given the task of commercial dissemination of LRS data from the Russian Defense Ministry archives as well as newly obtained images. It should be said that from the very start Russia took an absolutely different path in commercial satellite photography than other members of the space club such as the United States, France and Israel. The latter applied technologies initially developed for photo-intelligence satellites to build civilian commercial satellites. Civilian companies operate these satellites. Russia at first did not have the resources to develop or launch special satellites for commercial photography. Therefore, it decided to use the existing archives of intelligence imagery reducing the resolution to the degree permitted by the government for sale to private customers. If a frame of a specific area was absent from the archives or if a more updated image was needed, it was included in the mission plan of the satellite to be launched next. Such a commercial use of military, i.e. state-owned high precision intelligence satellites would be absolutely impossible in the Western countries.

To create a legal groundwork for Sovinform­sputnik operations the Russian government on August 18, 1992 issued an ordinance to declas­sify intelligence imagery of foreign territories with a resolution of up to 2 meters. At the time not a single company in the world was able to sell such high-resolution images.

The biggest commercial program implemented by Sovinformsputnik was the SPIN-2 project (SPaceINformation - 2 meter resolution). The contract was signed in July 1995 with three American companies: Aerial Images, Central Trading Systems and Lambda Tech Interna­tional. The project provided for photographic surveys of specific areas in the United States and selected areas in South America and Asia with cameras installed in the Kometa space mapping satellite. The sides did not disclose the size of the contract but some sources estimate that every digitized image should have cost about $1,000.5

The implementation of the project was slated for 1996. However, the mission failed because the launch vehicle perished after its fairing was destroyed on 47 seconds after takeoff on May 14, 1996. The satellite was also destroyed. The next Kometa was assigned all the tasks of SPIN-2. The project was successfully carried out on February 17-April 2, 1998 during the mission of the Cosmos-2349 (Kometa 19).

Until recently, Russia offered foreign and do­mestic commercial clients only images acquired by Kometa satellites.

Kometa space mapping system

The development of the high precision space mapping system began at the Central Specialized Design Bureau in Samara in 1972. The Yantar-1KFT system was developed on the basis of the high precision space reconnaissance satellite Yantar-2K with a reentry vehicle of the previous generation of Zenit satellites being attached to it. The Soyuz-U launch vehicle was supposed to be used for launching the satellite.6

The first Yantar-1KFT was launched from Baikonur cosmodrome on February 18, 1981 under the official name of Kosmos-1246. The mission lasted for 23 days. The following missions of the satellites of this series as a rule lasted for 44-45 days. After the seventh mission on July 22, 1987 the system was adopted for use7  and designated Kometa.

The imaging equipment of Kometa includes:

  • the topographic camera Yakhont-1 (TK-350) with spatial resolution of 10 meters,

  • the panoramic high resolution camera Topaz (KVR-1000) with the APO-Oktan-8 lens with spatial resolution of 2 m.8

So far there have been 20 Kometa launch attempts, three of which failed. The latest mission lasted from September 29 to November 14, 2000.

In the West the system is known as a fourth generation mapping reconnaissance satellite. The Military Topographic Department of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is the main user of the data collected by the system.9

New Russian offers

The contract between Sovinformsputnik and Land Info International was the first case when images with a resolution better than 2 meters collected by Russian intelligence satellites were sold. It should be said that Sovinformsputnik had been allowed to sell 1-meter resolution images more than a year earlier. This was announced in an official company press release on June 21, 2000, saying "the images were obtained by Russian remote sensing systems but so far had not been accessible for civilian commercial use."

The announcement by Russia of the beginning of the sale of 2-meter resolution images indirectly prompted the approval of the PDD-23 directive. Then, the situation reversed: the beginning of sales of American 1-meter resolution images triggered off the permission of the Russian government to sell similar images acquired by Russian Defense Ministry satellites.

Sovinformsputnik boasts a huge archive of 1-meter resolution digital panchromatic satellite images gathered beginning with 1992. The archives contain data of substantial areas of the United States, Europe and Central Asia as well as selected areas in South America and the Far East. The company says the cameras have a large swath, which eliminates the need to mosaic data obtained by aerial photography. Foreign civilian LRS satellites so far do not have similar capacities. In addition, the archives, large as they are, can furnish data that will not only complement data obtained by other satellites but for many areas will be the only data available for many years.

In addition to using its archives, Sovinformsputnik can supply images on order. However, this will require a longer waiting time until another Russian satellite with high-resolution cameras is launched (if of course such a satellite is not in orbit or if a new filming program cannot be fed to it).10

According to Land Info International, the price of Russian images ranges depending on resolution from $13.51 for a square kilometer (0.95 meter resolution) to $8.49 for a square kilometer (2 meters). The fulfillment time is 4-6 weeks. The press release of Land Info says that the company is offering high resolution images obtained in 1992-2001 by the Russian DK-1 (0.95 meters), DK-2 (1.56 m) and KVR-1000 (2 m) cameras.

The list of 0.95 m resolution black-and-white images made by DK-1 in 1993-1999 and offered by Land Info gives an idea about the satellites. The list states not only the filmed areas by also the mission dates. If the list of images is compared with the list of Russian satellites that were in orbit at the time, a certain correlation becomes evident. The dates when the photos offered by Land Info were taken coincide with the missions of the Russian high precision photoreconnaissance satellites Yantar-4K2 (Kobalt) and Orlets-1 (Don).11 Evidently DK-1 cameras with resolution of at least 0.95 m were installed in both types of satellites.

Kobalt satellites

Foreign space experts attribute these satellites to the fourth generation of Soviet/Russian photoreconnaissance satellites.  At the time of their development they were called Yantar-4K2 during, and after being adopted by the Soviet Armed Forces Kobalt.12

The first satellite of the family was developed in the early 1970s at the Central Specialized Design Bureau in Samara. The cameras with the extended lens and a store of film were placed in the conical main descent module of the satellite. Thanks to deorbited capsules (referred to as buckets), the films were dropped to surface in three portions: two in capsules and one with the camera in its reentry vehicle.13

The first satellite in the Yantar series was launched on December 13, 1974. Since then 117 Yantar satellites have operated in space. The Soyuz-U launch vehicle was used to place them in orbit. Initially the satellites remained in orbit for merely 30 days. By the end of the 1990s their service life quadrupled to 120 days. The latest Kobalt flew a 133-day mission between May 29 and October 10, 2001.14

Orlets satellites

Western experts attribute this satellite to the sixth generation while under the domestic classification it belongs to the second generation of optical intelligence satellites.

In May 1977 the Central Specialized Design Bureau in Samara decided to develop several new photo-intelligence satellites. The models suggested for development included the Orlets system for large swath high resolution and panoramic photography with faster data delivery.15

Under the plan the system was supposed to be developed in two stages. At the first stage the main parameters were to be achieved that did not require a significant change in the satellite weight (mainly the lifetime). At the second, after the development the Zenit-2 launch vehicle with a greater payload than Soyuz-U a modification satellite was supposed to be developed fully meeting the requirements of customers.16

To speed up data delivery an automatic machine was added to package exposed films into small return capsules - so-called capsule machine.

In 1981-1985 work was under way to develop Orlets of the first stage (sometimes known as Orlets-1). The satellite had a capsule machine with eight capsules. It was designed for being orbited by Soyuz-U or Soyuz-U1 launch vehicles.17 The first launch took place on July 18, 1989. On August 25, 1992, the system was approved for operation under the name of Don.18 So far six satellites of this type have been launched. Initially their service life was 58-60 days. The last two operated for 102 and 120 days respectively.19

When the second stage of developing Orlets was launched, Orelts-1 was evidently chosen as the prototype and a new capsule machine for 22 capsules was designed for it. Thanks to this its lifetime could be increased almost four-fold to 160-180 days leaving the pace of deorbiting ex­posed films to earth unchanged. For Orlets-1 that had eight capsules and that initially flew for 58-60 days the rate was one capsule in 7-8 days.20

In 1994 the design work and ground testing of Orlets of the second generation were completed. The first flight test of Orlets-2 was conducted between August 26, 1994 and April 4, 1995. The mission lasted for 224 days.21 Even though Orlets-2 made only one test flight, on November 30, 1997 it was adopted for service and desig­nated Yenisei.22 The second Orlets-2 was in or­bit between September 25, 2000 and April 20, 2001.

New Russian satellites for commercial remote sensing

It is a significant drawback of Russian military satellites currently used for commercial imaging that they rely on photography, which slows down the fulfillment of orders. Even multi-capsule Orlets satellites need time to fly over the test site to which a capsule can be dropped. Time is also needed to find the deorbited capsule, deliver it to the place of disassembly, remove and process the film, print and digitalize the photos for the convenience of the clients. All this evidently takes from several days to a month. Besides, the operational lifetime of a remote sensing satellite is limited not only by the service life of its systems and fuel store but the number of capsules it carries. As soon as the last capsule is dropped, the satellite becomes useless. The situation with the older Kobalt modifications was even worse because the satellite itself, its landing vehicle acted as the third capsule.

Foreign suppliers of commercial space images rejected such satellites from the very start. They have been operating satellites with Charge-Coupled Devices (CCD-matrixes) optical systems allowing to return images digitally via data relay satellites and transmit them to the ground via radio link. Such satellites guarantee the delivery of the data within few hours. The requirements to prevent the use of commercial LRS systems for operational intelligence are the only limitation. For instance, this is the only reason why SpaceImaging delivers orders to its clients after 24 hours.

The Russian Defense Ministry does have a system for optical-electronic reconnaissance - Yantar-4KS1M satellite that was designated Neman after being adopted for service.23 The data from it is returned via Geizer transmitter satellites to ground controllers in almost real time.24 The lifetime of such satellites is about one year. However, so far there have been no reports that images from Neman would be offered for commercial use.

In the second half of the 1990s Russia finally started developing such systems for commercial use. From the beginning they have been designed as civilian LRS satellites, i.e. the same as abroad. Evidently like in the West technologies and whole elements of military intelligence satellites have been applied in them. However, they can no longer be regarded as purely military spacecraft.

Currently three civilian projects are the closest to implementation: Resurs-DK and Resurs-DK1 (Progress Space Center, Samara), the Monitor family of satellites (the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center - the Khrunichev Center, Moscow) and the Kondor family satellites (the Machine-Building Research and Production Association - NPOmash, Reutov). The satellites are expected to be launched in 2002-2004. Their appearance may significantly change the situation on the world market of space images.

Resurs-DK satellites

It must be said that the Progress Space Center as well as the other Russian space companies has a tradition of developing civilian systems on the basis of its existing military spacecraft. In 1996 it proposed to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency the Resurs-DK project for large swath photography with a resolution of 2-3 meters. The satellite was to be launched with the Soyuz LV. In December 1996 the agency approved the project and included it in the Federal Space Program.

Judging by photos of Resurs-DK25 published in the open press, Orlets was used as its prototype26 but instead of a capsule machine it carries a CCD-matrix permitting it to conduct optic-electronic sensing instead of photography.

When the project was announced in 1996, the Geoton-L camera with the following parameters was named as the payload of Resurs-DK: average shooting height - 400 kilometers, spatial resolution - 2-2.5 meters (panchromatic), 2.5-3 meters (narrow spectral), 6 meters (IR and UV). The resolutions conformed to the limitations set at the time by the Russian government for commercial applications (2 meters). The operating life of Resurs-DK was set at three years.27

The first Resurs-DK was supposed to be launched in 1999 or 2000. However, evidently due to financial problems the first launch was put off several times. As a result a new, simpler modification evolved with a smaller number of spectral bands. In 1997 the modification made its debut at the Paris international aerospace show in Le Bourget. A year later it was designated Resurs-DK1.

In appearance of Resurs-DK1 greatly resembles the Neman optic-electronic intelligence satellite.28 Evidently, both rely on the same optical equipment. The cameras of Resurs-DK1 have more modest parameters in the number of spectral bands than Geoton-L of Resurs-DK, which evidently can be accounted to an attempt to cut production costs. The resolution was left the same.

The new capabilities of Resurs-DK1 were demonstrated at the Moscow Aerospace Show MAKS-2001. Evidently the cameras installed were altered after the government permitted the commercial sale of 1-meter resolution images. Besides, resolution may be improved by reducing the altitude of the satellite working orbit: resolution can be doubled by lowering the altitude from 400 kilometers to 200.

According to the latest reports of Progress Space Center, the spatial resolution of Resurs-DK1 cameras is no worse than 1 meter (panchromatic) and 2-3 meters in narrow spectral bands.29 The Russian Aerospace Agency says the launch of Resurs-DK1 is slated for 2002.30 According to information leaking to the media, the launch of a proper Resurs-DK capable of acquiring imagery with 0.3-0.4 meter resolution is slated for 2004.31

Satellites of the Monitor series

The Khrunichev Center, at its own expense has developed the Monitor LRS program to meet the growing demand of Russian and foreign users for data on natural resources. It launched work on the project in 1995.

The Monitor program implies the development of a LRS system comprising a constellation of small spacecraft on the basis of the Yakhta generic space bus. The Khrunichev Center has developed several satellites of the Monitor family for the space segment of the system: E (experimental), I-1 and I-2 (medium-resolution optical IR and visible bands), S (optical stereoscopic), O (high-resolution optical IR and visible bands), R3 and R23 (radar).

All satellites will have an operational lifetime of no less than five years. The Monitor-E satellite will have a weight of 650 kilos, others with optical cameras (I-1 and I-2, O and S) - 700 kilos and the radar satellites (R3 and R23) - 800 kilos.  All are expected to be launched with the existing Rokot LV or the future Angara-1.1 LV developed at the Khrunichev Center. The satellites with optical equipment will have a resolution from 8 meters (Monitor-E) to 1 (Monitor-O). The resolution of radar equipment will be 3-5 meters.32

Currently, the launch of Monitor-E is scheduled for the second half of 2002. Talks are under way with Venezuela on the sale of its imagery. Russian ministries, CIS nations and Pacific rim countries not having their LRS satellites but requiring a steady flow of space imagery could become potential users of the system as a whole or its individual satellites.

In 1997 the Khrunichev Center, DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG of Germany and Matra Marconi Space of France (currently united in Astrium company) came out with the initiative of starting the Global Monitoring of Environment and Security (GMES) system. The European Commission okayed the project in 1998. In November 2001 the council of European Space Agency countries launched the financing of the program.

Satellites of Kondor-E series

In 1997 the Reutov-based NPOmash won the Russian Defense Ministry tender for a space system based on small spacecraft with its Kondor project. Later the Kondor project was launched and included in the program of developing a space reconnaissance system on the basis of small spacecraft.33

Evidently the NPOmash developed civilian small satellites Kondor-E for commercial remote sensing on the basis of the Kondor generic space bus. In their parameters they are closest to the Monitor family of the Khrunichev Center. The satellites are expected to be taken orbited by Strela LV developed at NPOmash on the basis of RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) intercontinental ballistic missile, which also served as a prototype Rokot LV.

The Kondor-E project relies on a generic space bus capable of carrying various equipment, for instance, radar with synthetic aperture or optic electronic systems. Work on the first modification of Kondor-E has advanced more than on others. The modification will carry synthetic aperture radar. The radar wavelength is 9.6 sm., resolution around 1 meter depending on the imaging mode. The modification with optic electronic equipment will operate in the panchromatic and three spectral bands (visible and IR). The resolution will also be around 1 meter.

Both modifications will have a weight of 1,150 kilos and payload of up to 350 kilos. The altitude of the orbit will be 400-500 kilometers and inclination 97.6 degrees. Both satellites will transmit data in real time via relay satellite. The operating life of Kondor-E satellites will range from 3 to 10 years. Design work under the Kondor-E project launched in 1994 has been completed. The first satellite with synthetic aperture radar is to be launched in 2003 from Svobodny space center.  NPOmash has not disclosed any plans of launching the satellite with an optic electronic system so far.

It must be said that unlike the Khrunichev Center with its ample financial possibilities stemming from its commercial operations, NPOmash does not have resources for its own projects. Therefore, the development of Kondor-E is evidently conducted simultaneously with work on the Kondor military program. While the Khrunichev Center is planning to launch the first Monitor-E at its own expense to demonstrate its capabilities and attract clients, NPOmash is trying to find a customer before the first launch of Kondor-E in order to complete its work at the expense of the contract. Pacific rim countries, Malaysia in particular, showed much interested in Kondor-E during the LIMA-2001 exhibition. However, the NPOmash approach may hold back the program implementation for a long time because potential clients prefer buying existing systems tested in orbit instead of satellites existing only on paper.

Russia's prospects on the market of high resolution space images

The demand will steadily grow for images with one-meter and half-a-meter resolution and products developed on their basis (digital maps, 3D terrain models, stereo images). According to most estimates, by 2006 images with resolution of 1 meter and better will constitute 65% of the space imagery market. The high resolution images will be used for large scale maps and plans, geodata systems, urban development, the construction of pipelines and cables, roads and communication lines.

Construction and planning companies may become the main users of the information, and if the market develops steadily and costs decline, they may be joined by vehicle drivers equipped with digital map computers and satellite navigation systems. The press is mulling the possible impact of such images on industrial intelligence around the world. Commercial space reconnaissance allows companies to monitor the operations of their competitors (deliveries of raw materials and output, the expansion of production etc).

So far, Russia is capable of selling only images from military satellites built on order from the Defense Ministry. Thus, Russian suppliers of high-resolution LRS images have proved unprepared for the new challenges of the international market. No doubt that the delay in the implementation of the Resurs-DK, Monitor and Kondor-E programs combined with the disappearance of short-lived (up to 6 weeks) traditional photoreconnaissance satellites of the Kometa series are undermining Russia's position both on the foreign and domestic LRS data markets. Besides, despite the general progress in data technologies Russian customers has been unable to enjoy the accessibility and convenience of using LRS data from the archives of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the State Committee for Cartography or the Military Topographic Department of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The chances of advancing the national LRS infrastructure are badly crippled by the lack of updated computer catalogues, the impossibility of remote ordering of images through the Internet, and the absence of comprehensive space imagery processing and interpreting technologies that would be competitive in functional capacities and the standard of services.34

Russia will be able to offer data currently disseminated by leading foreign companies - SpaceImaging, ImageSat International, EarthWatch, OrbImage and SpotImage - only after Resurs-DK, Monitor and Kondor-E systems appear. Such satellites with optic electronic equipment rapidly transmitting LRS data via radio link will allow Russia to compete with these companies on an equal footing. Hopefully, this can be achieved already in 2002-2003.


1 Land Info International press release. 16.11.2001, www.landinfo.com.

2 Space News, 24.04. 2000, p.1, 18.12.2000, p.6,  22.01.2001, p.24.

3 Information from the web sites of Space Imaging (www.spaceimaging.com), OrbImage (www.orbimage.com), EarthWatch (www.digitalglobe.com).

4 Ibid.

5 I.Marinin, "Kometa na orbite Zemli", Novosti Kosmonavtiki, #4/5, 1998, p.22.

6 Vyoenno-kosmicheskie sily (military historical study), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1997.

7 TsSKB. Osnovnye daty iz istorii razvitiya. http://www.samara.ru/~cosmos/TsSKB/dates.asp.

8 Vyoenno-kosmicheskie sily (military historical study), Vol. 2, Moscow, 1998, p.18.

9 TsSKB. Osnovnye daty iz istorii razvitiya. http://www.samara.ru/~cosmos/TsSKB/dates.asp.

10 Information from Sovinformsputnik web site (www.sovinformsputnik.com).

11 Phillip S. Clark, CIS Space Activity 2000 / Molniya Space Consultancy, 2001, ?.90.

12 Ibid.

13 Vyoenno-kosmicheskie sily (military historical study), Vol. 2, Moscow, 1998, p.18.

14 Jonathan McDowell, Satellite Catalog, http://hea-www.harvard.edu/~jcm/space/log/satcat.txt.

15 Vyoenno-kosmicheskie sily (military historical study), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1997, p.206-207.

16 Vyoenno-kosmicheskie sily (military historical study), Vol. 2, Moscow,  1998, p.16.

17 Ibid.

18 TsSKB. Osnovnye daty iz istorii razvitiya. http://www.samara.ru/~cosmos/TsSKB/dates.asp.

19 Jonathan McDowell, Satellite Catalog, http://hea-www.harvard.edu/~jcm/space/log/satcat.txt.

20 Vyoenno-kosmicheskie sily (military historical study). Vol. 2, Moscow, 1998, p.128.

21 Phillip S. Clark, CIS Space Activity 2000, Molniya Space Consultancy, 2001, ?.90.

22 TsSKB. Osnovnye daty iz istorii razvitiya. http://www.samara.ru/~cosmos/TsSKB/dates.asp.

23 Phillip S. Clark, CIS Space Activity 2000, Molniya Space Consultancy, 2001, ?.90.

24 Ot prosteishego sputnika PS-1 do Burana. Iz istorii razrabotki i sozdaniya kosmicheskikh apparatov (manual), Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Rocket Forces, 2001, pp.100, 192.

25 Wojciech Malcovski, Victor Semenov, "The Resurs-DK: A New View from Samara", LaunchSpace, August, 1998, p.56-58.

26 Ot prosteishego sputnika PS-1 do Burana. Iz istorii razrabotki i sozdaniya kosmicheskikh apparatov (manual), Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Rocket Forces, 2001, p. 97.

27 Wojciech Malcovski, Victor Semenov, "The Resurs-DK: A New View from Samara", LaunchSpace, August, 1998, p.56-58.

28 Ot prosteishego sputnika PS-1 do Burana. Iz istorii razrabotki i sozdaniya kosmicheskikh apparatov (manual), Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Rocket Forces, 2001, p. 99.

29 D.I. Kozlov, "Preodolevaya zemnoye prityazheniye", Military Parade, # 4, 2001.

30 I. Lisova, "Georgy Polishchuk o tekushchem momente", Novosti Kosmonavtiki, #10, 2000.

31 Sergei Gerasimov, "V ozhidanii zalpa Avrory", Delo, 09.03.2001, www.cofe.ru/delo/article.asp?AID=4077.

32 Booklet of the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center "Sistema distantsionnogo zondirovaniya Zemli Monitor", 2001.

33 Vyoenno-kosmicheskiye sily (military historical study), Vol. 3, Moscow, 2001, p.234-235.

34 Informatsionnyi byulleten GIS-Assotsiatsii. #1 (23), 2000, http://giserver.icc.ru.



Print version




HOME | ABOUT US |  CONTACT US |  CURRENT ISSUE |  NEW |  ARCHIVE

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2018
www.cast.ru